Lair v. Motl
Decision Date | 23 October 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 16-35424.,16-35424. |
Citation | 873 F.3d 1170 |
Parties | Doug LAIR ; Steve Dogiakos; American Tradition Partnership; American Tradition Partnership PAC; Montana Right to Life Association PAC ; Sweet Grass Council for Community Integrity; Lake County Republican Central Committee; Beaverhead County Republican Central Committee; Jake Oil, LLC; JL Oil, LLC; Champion Painting; John Milanovich, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Rick Hill, Warden, Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jonathan MOTL, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Political Practices; Tim Fox, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Montana; Leo J. Gallagher, in his official capacity as Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Matthew T. Cochenour (argued), Helena, Montana, for Defendants-Appellants.
James Bopp (argued), Terre Haute, Indiana, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Carlos T. Bea and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
Montana limits the amount of money individuals, political action committees and political parties may contribute to candidates for state elective office. The district court invalidated these limits as unduly restrictive of political speech under the First Amendment. Because Montana's limits are both justified by and adequately tailored to the state's interest in combating quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, we reverse.
Montana has shown the risk of actual or perceived quid pro quo corruption in Montana politics is more than "mere conjecture," the low bar it must surmount before imposing contribution limits of any amount. The state has offered evidence of attempts to purchase legislative action with campaign contributions. Contribution limits serve the state's important interest in preventing this risk of corruption from becoming reality.
Montana's limits are also "closely drawn" to serve the state's anti-corruption interest. The limits target those contributions most likely to result in actual or perceived quid pro quo corruption—high-end, direct contributions with a significant impact on candidate fundraising. Moreover, the limits are tailored to avoid favoring incumbents, not to curtail the influence of political parties, and to permit candidates to raise enough money to make their voices heard. Although Montana's limits are lower than most other states' in absolute terms, they are relatively high when comparing each state's limits to the cost of campaigning there. Thus, Montana's chosen limits fall within the realm of legislative judgments we may not second guess.
In 1994, Montana voters passed Initiative 118, a campaign finance reform package that included the contribution limits at issue here. I-118's limits replaced a regime that had been in place since 1975. That regime permitted individuals and political parties to contribute up to the following limits:
Table 1: Pre-Initiative 118 Limits
Governor Other Public Legislature City or Statewide Service County Election Commission Individual $1500 $750 $400 $250 $200 Political $8000 $2000 $1000 $250 $200 party
See Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216 (1975) (enacted by No. 23-4795, 1975 Mont. Laws Ch. 481 § 1).
I-118 lowered the cap on individual contributions while raising the cap on contributions from political parties.1 Although the contribution limits at issue here originate from I-118, the limits have not remained static. Since I-118's enactment, the Montana legislature has both amended the limits and indexed them to inflation. See id. § 13-37-216 (2003) (raising the limits); Act of Apr. 27, 2007, 2007 Mont. Laws Ch. 328 § 1 (H.B. 706) (indexing the limits to inflation); Admin. R. Mont. 44.11.227. Moreover, unlike the pre-1994 limits, I-118's limits apply per election (rather than per cycle ), so a contributor may give up to the maximum twice if a candidate faces a contested primary (once for the primary and once for the general election). See Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(5) ; Mont. Comm'r of Political Practices, Amended Office Mgmt. Policy 2.4 Reinstating Pre-Lair 2016 Campaign Contribution Limits at 2 (May 18, 2016) ("Pre-1994 Limits Policy"), http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/ContributionLimitPolicy (. that the pre-I-118 limits applied per cycle)
Table 2 shows the post I-118 contribution limits in 1994 (when they were enacted), 2011 (when this lawsuit began) and today. Table 3 compares the pre-I-118 limits to the post I-118 limits as of 2017.
Governor Other Statewide Public Service State Senate Other Public Election Commission Office 1994 2011 2017 1994 2011 2017 1994 2011 2017 1994 2011 2017 1994 2011 2017 Individual/PAC $800 $1000 $1320 $400 $500 $660 $200 $260 $340 $200 $260 $340 $200 $260 $340 Political $15,000 $36,000 $47,700 $5000 $13,000 $17,200 $2000 $5200 $6900 $800 $2100 $2800 $500 $1300 $1700 party
See Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216 ; Admin. R. Mont. 44.11.227.
Table 3: Pre-Initiative 118 Limits vs. 2017 Limits
PRE-INITIATIVE 118 2017 Per Cycle Per Cycle Per Election Individuals/PAC Governor $1500 $1320 $660 Other statewide $750 $660 $330 Public Service $400 $340 $170 Commissioner State legislature $250 $340 $170 City or county office $200 $340 $170 Political Parties Governor $8000 $47,700 $23,850 Other statewide $2000 $17,200 $8600 Public Service $1000 $6900 $3450 Commissioner State legislature $250 $2800 $1400 City or county office $200 $1700 $850
At step one, we held Montana's limits furthered the state's "interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption." Id . In reaching this conclusion, we noted "[t]he evidence presented by ... Montana ... [wa]s sufficient to justify the contribution limits imposed, and indeed carrie[d] more weight than that presented in Shrink Missouri ." Id. at 1093. We defined "corruption" or its appearance to include both "instances of bribery of public officials" and "the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors." Id. at 1092 (quoting Shrink , 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897 ).
At step two, we held Montana's limits were " 'closely drawn' to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms." Id. at 1093. The limits were adequately tailored to the state's "interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption" because they "affect[ed] only the top 10% of contributions, and ... the percentage affected include[d] the largest contributions"—those most likely to be associated with actual or perceived corruption. Id. at 1094. The limits also allowed candidates to amass sufficient resources to wage effective campaigns, as shown by testimony from candidates and statistics demonstrating the minor effects of the limits on fundraising compared to the low cost of campaigning in Montana. See id. at 1094–95. The limits, moreover, had caused no significant difference in the amount challengers were able to raise compared to incumbents. See id. at 1095. We therefore upheld Montana's limits.
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