Laird v. Laird

• Decision Date: 04 June 1901
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: LAIRD v. LAIRD et al.

86 N.W. 436

127 Mich. 24

LAIRD v. LAIRD et al.

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 4, 1901

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Willard M. Lillibridge Judge.

Claim by Charles Laird against the estate of James Laird for the board of the latter. From a judgment in favor of the claimant, William C. Laird and another bring error. Reversed.

Warner & Codd, for appellants.

James H. Pound, for appellee.

MONTGOMERY C.J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court in favor of the claimant, Charles Laird. The claim was first presented to the commissioners on claims, and was for board of the deceased for a long period of time. The case of Laird v Laird, 115 Mich. 352, 73 N.W. 382, involved, to some extent, the same questions which are presented in this record. It is contended by appellants that the case of Laird v. Laird is decisive of the present case, and a bar to the claimant's action. It appeared in that case, among other things, that the claimant here had filed the present claim before commissioners on claims, and that an appeal had been taken to the circuit court; that, pending this appeal, the bill of complaint in the chancery case was filed, claiming specific performance of a contract by which the deceased agreed to give claimant the premises in question, and whatever property he died seised of, in consideration of his board. This bill was dismissed in part upon the ground that the filing of the claim for allowance before commissioners and the retention of that case in court, was inconsistent with the claim set up in the bill. The appellants however contend that that case should be treated as a bar to this. We think this results from a misapprehension of the holding in that case. To dismiss that case on the ground that the filing of the present claim was inconsistent with the claim there made, and then to refuse relief in this case because of the filing of that bill, would be to deny a hearing upon the merits in either proceeding. We think that decision should not be so construed.

It is further contended that the filing of the will for probate was in that case held to be inconsistent with the claimant's present claim, and that for this reason he is estopped from asserting the claim for board. The expression contained in the opinion of Laird v. Laird, that the filing of the will was inconsistent with the claim set up in the bill, was used in discussing a question of fact, and drawing deductions from the acts of the complainant. It was not intended to hold, as matter of law, that, if claimant had a valid claim against the estate, the filing of this will for probate would discharge that obligation, nor do we think such is the legal effect.

It is further strenuously insisted that there is no testimony tending to sustain claimant's claim. It would not profit counsel to cite further at length the testimony, but there is testimony in the record showing admissions of deceased to the effect that he was boarding by the week, and was to pay four dollars a week, but did not pay it, for the reason that he expected to save the property for claimant. The force of this testimony was for the jury.

The circuit judge, in his charge to the jury, used the following expression: 'If claimant has satisfied you that James Laird agreed to pay $4 per week for his board, then James Laird's estate is liable, and this action is properly brought, even though his father afterwards changed his mind and instead of paying $4 per week thought he would convey the Bagg street property to him after his death. Under these circumstances, I say Charles Laird's claim is properly brought in this court for what his services are fairly worth. Upon that point, if the claimant is entitled to recover anything in this case...