Laird v. Laird, 5070

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
• Writing for the Court: Before RAPER; RAPER
• Citation: 597 P.2d 463
• Parties: Thomas L. LAIRD, Appellant (Defendant below), v. Evelyn D. LAIRD, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Docket Number: No. 5070,5070
• Decision Date: 06 July 1979

Page 463

597 P.2d 463 Thomas L. LAIRD, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
Evelyn D. LAIRD, Appellee (Plaintiff below). No. 5070. Supreme Court of Wyoming. July 6, 1979.

Page 464

Michael McCarty, Cody, signed brief of appellant and Van C. Wilgus, senior law

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student, University of Wyoming, College of Law, appeared in oral argument on his behalf.

L. B. Cozzens, Cody, signed brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellee.

Before RAPER, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, THOMAS, ROSE, and ROONEY, JJ.

RAPER, Chief Justice.

This case is concerned with the propriety of granting a motion for partial summary judgment where the validity of an antenuptial contract is challenged on the basis of fraud, deceit, overreaching, lack of understanding, and failure to make a complete disclosure of assets.

The defendant-appellant, Thomas L. Laird (appellant) appeals the district court's grant of a motion for partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, Evelyn D. Laird (appellee). The Lairds were married in April 1976. On February 15, 1977, the appellee filed a complaint in the district court seeking dissolution of that marriage. In his answer to the divorce complaint, appellant counterclaimed and asked for an equitable division of income received by appellee during the marriage as well as for an equitable division of any appreciation in the value of property owned by appellee during the course of the marriage. Appellee moved for a partial summary judgment only as to the counterclaims of appellant. ¹

Memorandum briefs were filed in the district court by both parties and the record contains interrogatories, depositions, and affidavits of the parties. On October 2, 1978, the district court granted appellee's motion for partial summary judgment. ² Appellant asserts as errors:

"1. Whether the District Court Correctly (sic) granted a motion for partial summary judgment finding an Antenuptial Agreement valid.

"2. Whether the District Court correctly examined the Antenuptial Agreement with close scrutiny and examining (sic) for fairness and reasonableness.

"3. Whether the District Court, in applying Wyoming law, could have found no material facts in dispute regarding fraud, deceit, lack of understanding or overreaching in the execution of the Antenuptial Agreement so as to justify the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment and whether the District Court could not have found genuine issues as to material facts regarding full disclosure of assets before execution.

"4. Whether the District Court incorrectly concluded that the Antenuptial Agreement, even if valid, applied to income and appreciation from separately held property over the course of the marriage and thus prevent its consideration in the Court's property settlement procedure."

We will affirm.

The parties met in the Fall of 1972. Their relationship developed and, after living together for about three years, they were married on April 17, 1976. The appellee had an antenuptial contract prepared by her attorney and, according to appellant, on April 3, 1976, when she asked him to sign, only explained that its effect would be that all property that each owned individually would be inherited by their respective heirs and that neither would have any claim or rights in the other's estate. Appellant does

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not deny he signed the document, ³ a part of the record before us. The marriage lasted less than a year. Appropriate further facts will be mentioned during the course of the opinion. We will dispose of the issues in an order different than as stated by appellant.

We must, of course, review this case in the context of a summary judgment. The propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends on the correctness of the court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo.1975, 542 P.2d 867. For purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing one of the essential elements of the cause of action asserted. Johnson v. Soulis, supra. Whether or not a fact is material depends upon the principle of law to be applied. Timmons v. Reed, Wyo.1977, 569 P.2d 112. We treat a motion for summary judgment as originally before us for disposition because we now have the same materials as did the district court. Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada, Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, Wyo.1979, 590 P.2d 1306; Seay v. Vialpando, Wyo.1977, 567 P.2d 285; Shrum v. Zeltwanger, Wyo.1977, 559 P.2d 1384.

Appellant generally asserts that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues as to material facts and because appellee was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In view of the rather unique set of circumstances presented to us here and in view of the limited scope of the issues as presented both in the trial court and in this appeal, we conclude that the summary judgment was proper.

Appellant first asserts that appellee defrauded him in that she told him that the contract only related to their mutual estates in the event of death. Even if this assertion is accepted at face value, appellant failed to show how it amounted to fraud. Against the backdrop of a motion for summary judgment, fraud must be demonstrated in a clear and convincing manner. Johnson v. Soulis, supra; Twing v. Schott, 1959, 80 Wyo. 100, 338 P.2d 839. Evidence relied upon to demonstrate an issue of fact must be admissible in evidence; parol evidence to vary the terms of a written instrument cannot be considered. Johnson v. Soulis, supra. The agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face that it " * * * waives, releases and relinquishes any and All claims and rights of every kind, nature or description that he * * * may acquire by reason of the marriage in the other...