Laird v. Laird, 5070

• Decision Date: 06 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 5070,5070
• Parties: Thomas L. LAIRD, Appellant (Defendant below), v. Evelyn D. LAIRD, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 463

597 P.2d 463

Thomas L. LAIRD, Appellant (Defendant below), v. Evelyn D. LAIRD, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 5070.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

July 6, 1979.

Michael McCarty, Cody, signed brief of appellant and Van C. Wilgus, senior law student, University of Wyoming, College of Law, appeared in oral argument on his behalf.

L. B. Cozzens, Cody, signed brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellee.

Before RAPER, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, THOMAS, ROSE, and ROONEY, JJ.

RAPER, Chief Justice.

This case is concerned with the propriety of granting a motion for partial summary judgment where the validity of an antenuptial contract is challenged on the basis of fraud, deceit, overreaching, lack of understanding, and failure to make a complete disclosure of assets.

The defendant-appellant, Thomas L. Laird (appellant) appeals the district court's grant of a motion for partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, Evelyn D. Laird (appellee). The Lairds were married in April 1976. On February 15, 1977, the appellee filed a complaint in the district court seeking dissolution of that marriage. In his answer to the divorce complaint, appellant counterclaimed and asked for an equitable division of income received by appellee during the marriage as well as for an equitable division of any appreciation in the value of property owned by appellee during the course of the marriage. Appellee moved for a partial summary judgment only as to the counterclaims of appellant. ¹

Memorandum briefs were filed in the district court by both parties and the record contains interrogatories, depositions, and affidavits of the parties. On October 2, 1978, the district court granted appellee's motion for partial summary judgment. ² Appellant asserts as errors:

"1. Whether the District Court Correctly (sic) granted a motion for partial summary judgment finding an Antenuptial Agreement valid.

"2. Whether the District Court correctly examined the Antenuptial Agreement with close scrutiny and examining (sic) for fairness and reasonableness.

"3. Whether the District Court, in applying Wyoming law, could have found no material facts in dispute regarding fraud, deceit, lack of understanding or overreaching in the execution of the Antenuptial Agreement so as to justify the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment and whether the District Court could not have found genuine issues as to material facts regarding full disclosure of assets before execution.

"4. Whether the District Court incorrectly concluded that the Antenuptial Agreement, even if valid, applied to income and appreciation from separately held property over the course of the marriage and thus prevent its consideration in the Court's property settlement procedure."

We will affirm.

The parties met in the Fall of 1972. Their relationship developed and, after living together for about three years, they were married on April 17, 1976. The appellee had an antenuptial contract prepared by her attorney and, according to appellant, on April 3, 1976, when she asked him to sign, only explained that its effect would be that all property that each owned individually would be inherited by their respective heirs and that neither would have any claim or rights in the other's estate. Appellant does not deny he signed the document, ³ a part of the record before us. The marriage lasted less than a year. Appropriate further facts will be mentioned during the course of the opinion. We will dispose of the issues in an order different than as stated by appellant.

We must, of course, review this case in the context of a summary judgment. The propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends on the correctness of the court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo.1975, 542 P.2d 867. For purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing one of the essential elements of the cause of action asserted. Johnson v. Soulis, supra. Whether or not a fact is material depends upon the principle of law to be applied. Timmons v. Reed, Wyo.1977, 569 P.2d 112. We treat a motion for summary judgment as originally before us for disposition because we now have the same materials as did the district court. Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada, Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, Wyo.1979, 590 P.2d 1306; Seay v. Vialpando, Wyo.1977, 567 P.2d 285; Shrum v. Zeltwanger, Wyo.1977, 559 P.2d 1384.

Appellant generally asserts that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues as to material facts and because appellee was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In view of the rather unique set of circumstances presented to us here and in view of the limited scope of the issues as presented both in the trial court and in this appeal, we conclude that the summary judgment was proper.

Appellant first asserts that appellee defrauded him in that she told him that the contract only related to their mutual estates in the event of death. Even if this assertion is accepted at face value, appellant failed to show how it amounted to fraud. Against the backdrop of a motion for summary judgment, fraud must be demonstrated in a clear and convincing manner. Johnson v. Soulis, supra; Twing v. Schott, 1959, 80 Wyo. 100, 338 P.2d 839. Evidence relied upon to demonstrate an issue of fact must be admissible in evidence; parol evidence to vary the terms of a written instrument cannot be considered. Johnson v. Soulis, supra. The agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face that it " * * * waives, releases and relinquishes any and All claims and rights of every kind, nature or description that he * * * may acquire by reason of the marriage in the other party's property or estate * * *." ⁴ In this regard, we agree there was no material issue of fact. Appellant cannot rely on only a part of the agreement and ignore the remaining portions of the agreement which he had a full opportunity to read before signing.

Appellant further assets there was deceit and overreaching by appellee and that he lacked understanding on the basis that he was given an abbreviated and incomplete description of the contract by appellee and because appellant was a simple man of little education who took appellee at her word. In the first instance there is no evidence presented that appellee was deceptive or overreached appellant. Questions of fraud and deceit cannot be reached when no evidence thereof appears in the record. Appellant seems to find comfort in appellee's deposition statement that an antenuptial agreement "would protect me and my possessions from a grasping husband" and that her attorney had advised her that the agreement would prevent her being "raked off," as evidence of deceit in that she did not so advise him at the time she asked him to sign it. Obviously the language of the agreement would afford that protection. That purpose was not concealed from the appellant and, though not expressed in those terms in the contract, it is readily apparent.

Appellant is no "babe-in-the-woods", but a grown man of maturity and experience, 57 years of age at the time, albeit, with little formal education. There is no showing that appellant is incompetent. He admitted an ability to read and understand the agreement and was not denied opportunity to do so. If he misunderstood the contract it was simply because he did not read it. He admitted that he had not read the agreement completely: "I only read part of it, she (appellant) explained what it was about." One who signs a contract generally cannot avoid it on the ground that he did not attend to its terms, or did not read it, or supposed that it was different in its terms, or that he took someone's word as to what it contained. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 137, p. 871. Appellant presented absolutely no evidence that he was high pressured, influenced, rushed, or denied the opportunity to read the antenuptial contract.

" 'The rule is that the one who signs a paper, without reading it, if he is able to read and understand, is guilty of such negligence in failing to inform himself of its nature that he cannot be relieved from the obligation contained in the paper thus signed, unless there was something more than mere reliance upon the statements of another as to its contents * * *.' " Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., Mo.1972, 486 S.W.2d 477, 481.

It is negligence as a matter of law to not read a contract before signing. Atkinson v. Englewood State Bank, 1960, 141 Colo. 436, 348 P.2d 702. Also, Shaw Equipment Co. v. Hoople Jordan Construction Co., Tex.Civ.App.1968, 428 S.W.2d 835, 842; Ryan v. Ald, Inc., 1967, 149 Mont. 367, 427 P.2d 53, 55-56.

Finally, on the issue of disputed facts, appellant asserts that there was a failure to disclose assets. This, too, is belied by the appellant's own answers to interrogatories and deposition. He knew full well that appellee was a "woman of substantial wealth." This was disclosed to him by appellee herself and by his own observations before nuptials, and by the antenuptial contract itself. ⁵ Appellant's answers to interrogatories particularly disclose that while living together before marriage he learned that her income was about one million, nine hundred thousand dollars per year and she had extensive property...