Laird v. State of Vermont Highway Dept. And the Travelers Insurance Co.

• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JEFFORDS
• Citation: Laird v. State of Vermont Highway Dept. And the Travelers Insurance Co., 20 A.2d 555, 112 Vt. 67 (Vt. 1941)
• Decision Date: 12 June 1941
• Parties: ELSIE J. LAIRD v. STATE OF VERMONT HIGHWAY DEPT. AND THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY

20 A.2d 555

112 Vt. 67

ELSIE J. LAIRD v. STATE OF VERMONT HIGHWAY DEPT. AND THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY

Supreme Court of Vermont

June 12, 1941

February Term, 1941.

Workmen's Compensation.---1. Authorities from Other Jurisdictions.---2. Question of Dependency of Widow's Rights.---3. Election under P. L. 6498 Binds Parties and Dependents.---4. Effect of English Authorities.---5. Dependents' Rights under P. L 6513 are Not Derivative.---6. Dependent Must Prove More Than Employee.---7. Employee has Own Rights.---8. Dependents' Rights Following Death from Injuries.---9. Dependents' Compensation Under P. L. 6515 Reduced by Employee's Period of Compensation, P. L. 6518.---10. Employee's Privilege to Follow Compensation or Third Party Does Affect Dependents' Rights, P. L. 6511, 6513.---11. Widow Not in Privity with Husband's Rights.---12. Commissioner's Final Adjudication Alone Bars Further Jurisdiction.---13. Evidence of Medical Experts.---14. Legally Supported Findings Binding.---15. Evidence Sufficient to Find Personal Injury by Accident.---16. Cerebral Hemorrhage as Accident, P. L 6504.---17. Exact Time and Place of Accident Not Material.---18. Hastening of Cerebral Hemorrhage by Arteriosclerosis.---19. Abuse of Discretion in Limiting Cross Examination.---20. Testimony Upon Postponed Hearing.

1. Decisions from other jurisdictions which depend upon the construction of statutes which vary in phraseology are of limited value in construing local statutes.

2. In an action by the widow of a deceased employee claiming death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act by reason of a claimed injury causing death of an employee, the question is not whether the rights of dependents are higher or lower than those of the deceased but whether under the Act they are independent of or derived from his rights.

3. P. L. 6498 provides that when an employee has elected by agreement to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he, for himself, his widow and other dependents, thereby surrenders rights to any compensation other than that provided for by the Act, P. L. 6485, II.

4. Since the original Workmen's Compensation Act enacted in 1915 was indirectly based upon an earlier British Workmen's Compensation Act, the English cases construing sections of that Act which were adopted into our Act are important in the interpretation of similar sections of our Act.

5. The rights of dependents of deceased employees to compensation under P. L. 6513 are not derived from those of the deceased employee but are independent and separate rights coming to them by virtue of that statute.

6. Although there is a common factual ground to some extent between the rights of an employee and of his dependents after his decease under the Workmen's Compensation Act they are not identical as a dependent must prove more than is required of the employee.

7. The rights of an employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act are based entirely on an injury and spring into being forthwith and the compensation therefor belongs to him and him alone.

8. The rights of dependents of a deceased employee arise only following a compensable injury to the employee if his death results from the injury.

9. P. L. 6518 allows the deduction of periods of compensation paid to an injured employee from period of compensation provided for a deceased employee's dependents so that the total periods of compensation shall not exceed the period of compensation allowable to the dependent alone by P. L. 6515.

10. P. L. 6511 which allows an injured employee to pursue his right under the Workmen's Compensation Act against his employer or to proceed against a third person who may be liable for the same injury, but not both, contains nothing in its purpose or wording that compels a conclusion that it limits or changes the separate and independent rights to compensation because of death of an employee conferred upon the surviving dependents by P. L. 6513.

11. A widow who was not a party to an action for workmen's compensation brought by her injured husband does not stand in privity with him so as to be bound by estoppel by the adjudication therein in her action for death benefits under the Act.

12. Although the award of the commissioner of industrial relations denying compensation may at various stages contain the order "claim dismissed", he does not oust himself of jurisdiction to hear the evidence and determine the facts until the adjudication of denial of compensation and dismissal of the claim by his final entry in the cause.

13. Although the evidence of medical experts may be weakened by cross examination or other testimony, their effect goes merely to its weight and does not destroy its probative value.

14. Findings of fact made by a trier which are legally supported by evidence are binding upon appeal.

15. A finding and holding that an employee received a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment is warranted by evidence that the employee, a man sixty-four years old, with arteriosclerosis, who, after having exerted himself considerably in traveling through and shoveling heavy, wet snow pursuant to his duties was found in a comatose state partially paralyzed as a result of cerebral hemorrhage, when a medical expert gave as his opinion that the exertion probably was the precipitating cause of the hemorrhage.

16. A cerebral hemorrhage received by an employee following physical exertion in the course of his duties where it can not be said that he planned or designed so to exert himself that a hemorrhage would result or that he as a sensible man who knew the nature of the work could have expected it is an injury "by accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, P. L. 6504.

17. Where there is competent evidence tending to prove that a cerebral rupture was brought about in the performance of his duties on the premises of his employer, it is not important that the exact time of or the exact place where the rupture occurred can not be ascertained.

18. That an employee who suffered a cerebral hemorrhage in the course of his duties was suffering from arteriosclerosis which was accelerated by the performance of his duties so that the disability of the cerebral hemorrhage came upon him earlier than it would otherwise have occurred receives, nevertheless, a compensable injury.

19. Abuse of discretion prejudicial to the defendants in a workmen's compensation case does not appear in the indication by the trier that they had pursued far enough cross-examination of a medical expert as to why he had changed his previous testimony of "possibility" of causal connection to "probability" in the case at bar where the only effect of further examination would go to the weight to be given to the testimony of the expert.

20. No abuse of discretion appears in the ruling of the commissioner of industrial relations in refusing the admission upon a postponed hearing of matters concerning weather when the matter was postponed for the purpose of further medical testimony and the excepting party had not in the interim requested leave to introduce testimony of any other character.

APPEAL to Supreme Court, Washington County, from award by commissioner of industrial relations, Howard E. Armstrong, commissioner, denying compensation to claimant as widow of employee allegedly dying from an injury received out of and in the course of his employment. The opinion states the case; see also, disposition of claim of husband during his lifetime, Laird v. State of Vermont Highway Dept. et al., 110 Vt. 195, 3 A.2d 552. Reversed, judgment for claimant.

Judgment that the order of the commissioner of industrial relations denying compensation and dismissing the claim should be, and the same is, annulled, set aside and held for naught and judgment that the claimant is entitled to compensation and benefits as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Let the claimant recover her costs in this Court. Let the result be certified to the commissioner of industrial relations for an award in accordance with the views herein expressed.

George R. McKee and J. Boone Wilson for plaintiff.

George L. Hunt for defendants.

Present: MOULTON, C. J., SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT and JEFFORDS, JJ.

OPINION

JEFFORDS

On January 2, 1938, Willis J. Laird who was employed by the named defendant as watchman at the state garage was found lying in the snow near the open main gate of the premises. He was in a comatose state, was paralyzed on his right side, and his condition was a result of a cerebral hemorrhage. He was totally disabled from this time until his death which occurred in August, 1938.

Laird entered a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, P. L. ch. 264. A hearing was had on this claim and an award made in favor of the claimant in May, 1938. The defendants appealed to this Court from the award. While the appeal was pending the claimant died. It was held that there was no legal evidence in the case connecting the claimant's injury in any way with his employment and the order of the commissioner awarding compensation was annulled and set aside. See Laird v. State of Vermont Highway Dept. et al., 110 Vt. 195, 3 A.2d 552, for a more complete statement of the facts and holdings in that case.

After the above decision was handed down the present claimant, as widow and sole dependent of Willis, filed her claim for compensation under P. L. 6513 as amended by sec. 1 of No. 172 of the Acts of 1937. Hearings were had by the commissioner over the objections of the defendants which were to the effect that the decision in the Willis Laird case was conclusive as to this claimant and estopped her from further prosecution of her claim. The commissioner...