Laird v. Wetzel

• Decision Date: 18 August 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-1916
• Parties: RICHARD ROLAND LAIRD, Petitioner, v. JOHN E. WETZEL, Acting Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, LOUIS FOLINO, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Greene, MARIROSA LAMAS, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview, THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF BUCKS, and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

RICHARD ROLAND LAIRD, Petitioner, v. JOHN E. WETZEL, Acting Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, LOUIS FOLINO,Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Greene, MARIROSA LAMAS,Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview,THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF BUCKS,and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-1916

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 18, 2016

MEMORANDUM

DuBois, J.

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 2

II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................. 3

A. History of Laird's Prior Conviction .............................................................................................. 3

B. Factual Background ...................................................................................................................... 4

C. Procedural History of the Current Petition .................................................................................... 7

III. LEGAL STANDARDS ..................................................................................................................... 8

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default ............................................................................................... 8

1. The Exhaustion Requirement ............................................................................................ 8

2. Procedural Default ........................................................................................................... 9

B. Independent and Adequate State Grounds .................................................................................. 11

C. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ................................................................................................. 13

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims under Strickland v. Washington ............................... 15

IV. DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................. 16

A. Guilt Phase Claims ...................................................................................................................... 16

1. Jury Selection and Change of Venue (Claim VIII) ........................................................... 16

(a.) Presumption of Prejudice ........................................................................................... 20

(b.) Actual Prejudice ........................................................................................................ 24 (c.) Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 26

2. Trial Counsel's Investigation and Presentation of Diminished Capacity Evidence (Claim V) ....................................................................................................... 27

(a.) Fact Witnesses .......................................................................................................... 27

(b.) Expert Witnesses ....................................................................................................... 35

(c.) Medical Records ........................................................................................................ 42

(d.) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Did Not Unreasonably Apply Strickland ................... 44

3. Frank Chester's Testimony and Presence in the Courtroom (Claim IX) ............................. 45

(a.) Identification of Chester Before the Jury ..................................................................... 46

(b.) Commonwealth's Use of Chester's Prior Testimony Despite its Belief that the Testimony was False ..................................................................................... 49

(c.) Excuse of Procedural Default: Cause and Prejudice or Miscarriage of Justice ................ 52

4. Trial Court's Refusal to Instruct the Jury on Lesser Offenses (Claim VII) ......................... 54

5. Double Jeopardy (Claim VI) .......................................................................................... 59

(a.) Re-trial for the "Same Offense" .................................................................................. 61

(b.) Multiple Punishments for the "Same Offense" ............................................................. 66

B. Penalty Phase Claims ..................................................................................................................... 68

1. Penalty Counsel's Investigation and Presentation of Mitigation Evidence (Claim I) ........... 68

(a.) Insufficiency of 2007 Mitigation Presentation in Comparison to 1997 PCRA Presentation (Mark Laird, Dr. Henry Dee, Dr. Robert Fox) ................................ 69

(b.) Failure to Call Additional Expert in Male Sexual Abuse ............................................... 77

2. Victim Impact Evidence (Claim III) ................................................................................ 82

3. "Prior Bad Acts" Evidence (Claim IV) ............................................................................ 90

4. Trial Court's Instructions and Prosecutor's Argument Regarding Mitigation (Claim II) ...... 97

C. Cumulative Prejudice Claim (Claim X) ....................................................................................... 104

V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 105

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a habeas corpus case brought by a state prisoner, Richard Laird, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After obtaining habeas relief in this Court, which was upheld on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Laird was re-tried for first-degree murder in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania. The jury found Laird guilty of first-degree murder and returned a verdict of death. The matter is before the Court at this time on Laird's second Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Presently before the Court is Laird's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he claims that his second trial and sentencing violated his constitutional rights. For the reasons that follow, his petition is denied and dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND

A. History of Laird's Prior Conviction¹

On May 19, 1988, petitioner and his co-defendant Frank Chester were convicted of, inter alia, first degree murder and kidnapping in relation to the death of Anthony Milano on December 15, 1987. The jury returned a verdict of death against both defendants on May 21, 1988. On July 19, 1989, the trial court sentenced petitioner to death on the first degree murder charge and to a "consecutive sentence of not less than 10 nor more than 20 years" on the kidnapping charge. Petitioner was not sentenced in connection with any of the other crimes for which he was convicted: second and third degree murder, aggravated assault, unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime.²

Petitioner's direct appeals and petitions for collateral review of his conviction and sentence were denied, first by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County and then by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

In 1999, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. By Memorandum and Order dated September 5, 2001, this Court granted thatpetition in part on the grounds that (1) there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the trial court's accomplice liability instructions in a way that relieved the prosecution of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner harbored a specific intent to kill; (2) petitioner's right to a fair trial and sentencing was violated when he was forced to wear shackles and handcuffs visible to the jury; (3) there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the trial court's mitigating circumstance instruction in a way that precluded them from considering constitutionally relevant evidence; and (4) defense counsel's failure to conduct any investigation into petitioner's background and many possible sources of mitigating evidence at sentencing was objectively unreasonable and resulted in prejudice. Laird v. Horn, 159 F. Supp. 2d 58 (2001). This Court vacated Laird's first degree murder conviction and death sentence without prejudice to the right of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to re-try Laird for first degree murder and, if he was found guilty, to seek the death penalty again at sentencing. Id. By Opinion and Order dated July 19, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of this Court. Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419 (3d Cir. 2005).

B. Factual Background

Petitioner was re-tried in January and February of 2007 in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County. The facts underlying petitioner's current first-degree murder conviction, as summarized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on direct appeal, Com. v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 625-627 (Pa. 2010), are as follows:

At 11:30 p.m. on December 14, 1987, the victim, Anthony Milano, drove to the Edgely Inn in Bristol Township, a bar where Laird and Chester were drinking and playing pool. Milano had never met Laird or Chester prior to that evening. During the next three hours, Milano, Chester, and Laird drank alcohol and conversed together. The bartender testified that, at somepoint, Laird and Chester began taunting Milano concerning his masculinity because they believed he might be homosexual. In this respect, Laird used derogatory terms such as "fag" when speaking of Milano to others at the bar, and at one point told the bartender that he (Laird) was "sick and tired of these people trying to infiltrate u...