Lak v. Cal. Dep't of Child Support Servs.
| Decision Date | 21 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. SACV 17-1527-PSG (KK) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | DANIEL KRISTOF LAK, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff Daniel Kristof Lak ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as various federal and state laws. As discussed below, the Court dismisses the FAC with leave to amend.
On September 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against defendants California Department of Child Support Services ("DCSS"), DCSS County of Orange ("DCSS Orange"), Steven Eldred in his individual and official capacities, and Does 1 through 20. ECF Docket No. ("Dkt.") 1, Compl. at 1. The Complaint set forth fourteen causes of action, including civil rights claims, violations of Title IV-Part D of the Social Security Act that enforces child support payments, mail fraud, a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") claim, and state tort claims. Id. at 1-2. After screening the Complaint, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint with leave to amend. Dkt. 9.
On November 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant FAC against defendants State of California, DCSS, State Disbursement Unit, County of Orange, DCSS Orange, Steven Eldred in his individual and official capacities (collectively, "Defendants"), and Does 1 through 20.1 Dkt. 10, FAC at 1. The FAC set forth thirteen causes of action. Id. at 1-2. Other than adding defendants and omitting the mail fraud claim, the FAC is largely identical to the Complaint. Id.
Plaintiff again alleges two "Civil Rights" claims for violation of due process pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") for not providing notice and opportunity to respond before his California driver's license and California State Bar license were suspended, and racial discrimination pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) based on denial of benefits as a "Caucasian male." Id. at 1, 33-34, 52-53.
Plaintiff again alleges three claims under Title IV-Part D of the Social Security Act that enforces child support payments for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(7)(B), and 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(10). Id. at 1, 56-63.
Plaintiff again alleges a federal criminal claim for violations of RICO pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 based on placing "fraudulent correspondence" in the mail over a period of seven years. Id. at 1, 63-65.
Plaintiff again alleges the following seven state claims: "Fraud" under section 3294 of the California Civil Code; "Defamation" under section 44(a) of the California Civil Code; intentional infliction of emotional distress; malicious prosecution; intentional interference with contractual relations; negligent interference with prospective economic relations; and negligence. Id. at 1-2, 65-76.
Plaintiff alleges that beginning in May 2010 Defendants continuously and intentionally enforced incorrect child and spousal support orders, despite court orders modifying his amount of support. Id. ¶¶ 10, 16, 54. Plaintiff claims Defendants falsely levied Plaintiff's personal checking accounts, and wrongfully took amounts from his Social Security Disability Income on multiple occasions. Id. ¶¶ 46, 115-16, 126-27. Plaintiff alleges DCSS denied him benefits on the basis of his status as a Caucasian male. Id. ¶¶ 156, 161, 254.
In addition, Plaintiff alleges Defendants "continually and arbitrarily suspended" Plaintiff's driver's license and California State Bar ("State Bar") licenses based on incorrect support orders and false information without prior notice or opportunity to be heard. Id. ¶¶ 1, 57, 66, 70, 82, 92, 119, 141. Plaintiff alleges each time the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") or State Bar notified him of his licenses' suspensions, Defendants "force[d] Plaintiff to sign an increased support amount in order to get his licenses back." Id. ¶ 144. Plaintiff claims his State Bar license was "suspended over 20 times for non-payment of child support" through Defendants' "false[] notif[ications] . . . that Plaintiff [wa]s delinquent on his child support obligations." Id. ¶¶ 151, 153.
Plaintiff alleges "as recently as October 31, 2017," DCSS "continue[d] to send letters that state father is delinquent on payments and that his license(s) may be suspended at any time 'without notice' and derogatory reporting may occur at any time 'without notice.'" Id. ¶ 19.
As a result of Defendants' wrongful actions, Plaintiff claims he lost his home, car, driver's license, and State Bar license, thereby "preventing him from earning a living" and "result[ing] in Plaintiff becoming homeless, living in the streets, suffering from severe depression, anxiety, and [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder] PTSD." Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 13-15, 95, 87, 141-42, 155, 236, 266.
Plaintiff seeks actual and compensatory damages, punitive damages, and a protective order preventing Defendant from "further harassing Plaintiff with unjustified collection activity, making any defamatory statements" including, statements of Plaintiff's "alleged support delinquency status" to the DMV, State Bar, various credit reporting agencies, and Plaintiff's future employers "without a finding of substantial justification" before an appointed Special Master. Id. at 76. Plaintiff also seeks an order "directing Defendant to immediately retract and correct any previously made defamatory statements" regarding Plaintiff including, statements made to the DMV, the State Bar, and various credit reporting agencies. Id. ¶ 77. Plaintiff further seeks an order for a "full and comprehensive audit, by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction (i.e., the Department ofJustice), of Defendant's policies, procedures, and practices" within the past ten years. Id.
As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the FAC and is required to dismiss the case at any time if it concludes the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for screening purposes, the Court applies the same pleading standard from Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 8") as it would when evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim "where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory." Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2007). In considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all of the material factual allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the court need not accept as true "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). A claim is facially plausible when it "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The complaint "must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
"A document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed,' and a 'pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2008). However, liberal construction should only be afforded to "aplaintiff's factual allegations," Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1989), and the Court need not accept as true "unreasonable inferences or assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations," Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003).
If the court finds the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if the plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1107-11; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009).
"The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state." Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984)). This jurisdictional bar includes "suits...
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