Lake Cnty. v. Westerfield

• Decision Date: 20 April 1916
• Docket Number: No. 10611.,10611.
• Parties: LAKE COUNTY v. WESTERFIELD.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

273 Ill. 124

112 N.E. 308

LAKE COUNTY

v.WESTERFIELD.

No. 10611.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 20, 1916.

Appeal from Appellate Court, Second District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Lake County; Claire C. Edwards, Judge.

Action by the County of Lake against Carl P. Westerfield. From a judgment of the Appellate Court for the Second District, affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals. Affirmed.

See, also, 268 Ill. 537, 109 N. E. 309; 268 Ill. 501, 109 N. E. 310.A. F. Beaubien, of Waukegan, and Church, Shepard & Day, of Chicago (Frank L. Shepard, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Ralph J. Dady, State's Atty., of Waukegan (E. M. Runyard, of Waukegan, of counsel), for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

The county of Lake, appellee, brought this suit in the circuit court of that county in assumpsit against Carl P. Westerfield, appellant, and on September 10, 1914, filed a declaration containing six counts. In each of the first five counts it was alleged that the appellant had been county treasurer and ex officio county collector of said county since December 5, 1910; that his salary was fixed by the county board at $2,500 per annum, which he had received; that on June 1, 1913, there was in his hands the sum of $7,343.90, which he had received during his term of office from banks as interest on moneys in his hands by virtue of his office; that he never kept any account of said money received as interest, and never reported the same to the county board, and never paid the said sum, or any part thereof, into the county treasury. The sixth was the consolidated money count. The plea was the general issue, and, a jury having been waived, the issues were submitted to the court upon a stipulation of facts which corresponded with the averments of the special counts. The appellant made no claim to the money on account of salary, clerk hire, or other necessary expenses, and the county had demanded that he turn the money into the treasury. The stipulation stated the defense to be that neither the county board nor the county had any interest in or right to any of the money received as interest; that such money was not an earning of the office, but the private money of the defendant, which he was not required to account for or pay into the county treasury. The court held as the law 24 propositions submitted by the appellee, which stated with unnecessary repetition and mere verbal variations that the county treasurer and ex officio county collector was not entitled to the interest on moneys in his hands as such officer above the amount of his compensation fixed by the county board and the amount allowed for clerk hire and other necessary expenses. The appellant submitted four propositions of law, to the effect that county treasurers are not liable for, and need not account for, interest which they may receive upon funds in their hands by virtue of their office, and need not pay the same into the county treasury. All of these propositions were refused. The court found the issues for the appellee, and rendered judgment for the amount of the interest and costs of suit. The appellant removed the record to the Appellate Court for the Second District by appeal, where the judgment was affirmed and a certificate of importance was granted and an appeal to this court.

Section 10, art. 10, of the Constitution provides that the county board shall fix the compensation of all county officers, with the amount of their necessary clerk hire, stationery, fuel, or other expenses, which compensation shall not be increased nor diminished during the term of office, and that all fees or allowances received by such officers in excess of their compensation shall be paid into the county treasury. Section 52 of the Fees and Salaries Act provides that all fees, perquisites, and emoluments received by county officers in counties of the class to which Lake belongs, above the amount of their compensation fixed by the county board and for clerk hire and other necessary expenses, shall be paid into the county treasury. These provisions of the Constitution and statute have established the law concerning the compensation to be received by county treasurers for the performance of their official duties, and the question of law which may be reviewed in this court, arising upon the propositions of law held and refused, is whether interest on public funds comes within the constitutional and statutory provisions.

The argument against the ruling of the trial court on the propositions of law is based on various provisions of the statutes. Section 4, c. 36, of the Revised Statutes of 1874, relating to county treasurers, provides that the county treasurer shall receive and safely keep the revenues and other public moneys of the county and all money and founds authorized by law to be paid to him and disburse the same pursuant to law. In various sections of the Revenue Act, prescribing the duties of a county treasurer as ex officio collector, the particular kind of coin, notes, certificates, and warrants which he shall receive in payment of taxes is specified, and he is required to collect special assessments made by any city, town, or village. The money collected for state taxes he is to pay over to the state treasurer and money collected for other taxing bodies is to be paid to the proper authorities. Upon failing to make the reports and payments required, suit may be brought on his bond, and his office may be declared vacant by the county board or by the court in which such suit is brought. These provisions of the statute create an absolute liability of county treasurers to safely keep and pay over the moneys in their hands, so that they become insurers of the safety of such moneys. Thompson v. Board of Trustees, 30 Ill. 99;Town of Cicero v. Hall, 240 Ill. 160, 88 N. E. 476;Town of Cicero v. Grisko, 240 Ill. 220, 88 N. E. 478.

The liability for the principal sum of money coming into the hands of the treasurer being absolute, it is contended that he is entitled to and becomes the owner of any interest upon the principal sum which he may obtain. To sustain that position counsel for appellant rely upon a number of decisions in which the fact of absolute liability was regarded as sufficient to invest the treasurer with the ownership of the principal fund or to entitle him to retain the interest earned by it. Shelton v. State, 53 Ind. 331, 21 Am. Rep. 197;State v. Walsen, 17 Colo. 170, 28 Pac. 1119,15 L. R. A. 456; Renfroe v. Colquitt, 74 Ga. 618; Commonwealth v. Godshaw, 92 Ky. 435, 17 S. W. 737;Maloy v. County Com'rs, 10 N. M. 638, 62 Pac. 1106,52 L. R. A. 126. In Shelton v. State and Commonwealth v. Godshaw, supra, the courts of Indiana and Kentucky decided that on account of the absolute liability the money received by the official becomes his own money. That conclusion seems to us, not only to be without foundation in reason, but it is expressly repudiated by counsel for app...