Lake County Contractors Ass'n v. Pollution Control Bd.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1973
• Docket Number: No. 45321,45321
• Citation: 294 N.E.2d 259,54 Ill.2d 16
• Parties: LAKE COUNTY CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. The POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD et al. (Environmental Protection Agency et al., Appellees.)
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 259

294 N.E.2d 259

54 Ill.2d 16

LAKE COUNTY CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. The POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD et al. (Environmental Protection

Agency et al., Appellees.)

No. 45321.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 20, 1973.

Hall, Meyer, Fisher, Holmberg, Snook & May, and Collins, Stepanich & Collins, Waukegan, for appellants.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Richard W. Cosby, Asst. Atty. Gen. of counsel), for appellee Environmental Protection Agency.

Richard M. Kates, Chicago, and Murray R. Conzelman, Waukegan, for individual appellees.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

The Lake County Contractors Association and the Lake County Home Builders Association appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court, Second District, one judge dissenting, which dismissed their complaint for review of an order of the Illinois Pollution Control Board on the ground that they lacked standing to seek review. The case is here pursuant to a certificate of importance. Lake County Contractors Ass'n v. Illinois Pollution Control Board (1972), 6 Ill.App.3d 762, 286 N.E.2d 600.

The order which the Associations sought to have reviewed was paragraph 7 of a broader order issued by the Board in a consolidated action involving complaints filed against the North Shore Sanitary District by the League of Women Voters, the Environmental Protection Agency, and others. Paragraph 7 reads:

'The District shall not permit any additions to present sewer connections, or new sewer connections, to its facilities until the District can demonstrate to the Board that it can adequately treat the wastes from those new sources so as not to violate the Environmental Protection Act, or the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder.'

In their complaint for direct review in the appellant court (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1041), the Associations alleged that they are not-for-profit corporations whose members are engaged in the construction industry in Lake County and that the appellate court (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. will result in unemployment and financial hardship for their members, their members' employees, and others. Neither Association, however, was a party to the proceedings before the Board. The sole issue considered by the appellate court was whether the Associations had standing to seek judicial review of the Board's order, and that is the only issue before this court.

The Board was created in 1970 by the Environmental Protection Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1001 et seq.) and it is given authority to conduct hearings upon complaints charging violation of the Act, or regulations adopted thereunder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1005), and to enforce the provisions of the Act by the issuance of orders and the imposition of penalties. ((Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1033.) Judicial review of actions of the Board is provided for in section 41 of the Act, which states:

'Any party to a Board hearing, any person who filed a complaint on which a hearing was denied, any person who has been denied a variance or permit under this Act, and any party adversely affected by a final order or determination of the Board may obtain judicial review, by filing a petition for review within thirty-five days after entry of the order or other final action complained of, pursuant to the provisions of the 'Administrative Review Act,' * * * and the rules adopted pursuant thereto, except that review shall be afforded directly in the Appellate Court for the District in which the cause of action arose and not in the Circuit Court. * * *

No challenge to the validity of a Board order shall be made in any enforcement proceeding under Title XII of this Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111 1/2, pars. 1042--1045) as to any issue that could have been raised in a timely petition for review under this Section.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1041.

The Associations contend that they are parties 'adversely affected by a final order' of the board and that they therefore fall within the fourth category of those entitled to obtain judicial review. They argue, in effect, that the word 'party,' which is not defined in the Act, is used in the fourth category in a broad sense and is the equivalent of the word 'person,' so that standing to obtain review is not limited to those who were parties of record to the administrative proceeding. In support of that interpretation they assert that a strict definition of the word 'party' would make the fourth category surplusage, since all those included in that category would already have standing through the first category which permits '(a)ny party to a Board hearing' to seek judicial review, and that the general rules of statutory construction require that, if possible, no word, clause, or sentence be rendered superfluous or meaningless. (See Peacock v. Judges Retirement System of Illinois (1957), 10 Ill.2d 498, 501, 140 N.E.2d 684.) They admit, however, that this interpretation conflicts with the Administrative Review Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.), which is specifically made applicable to actions for review of decisions of the Board (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1041), because under that statute judicial review of administrative decisions can be sought only by those who were parties to the administrative proceedings. (222 E. Chestnut St. Corp. v. Board of Appeals (1956), 10 Ill.2d 130, 132, 139 N.E.2d 221; Winston v. Zoning Board of...