Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n v. Dolphin Stadium

• Decision Date: 31 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 87-1546-CIV.,87-1546-CIV.
• Citation: 801 F. Supp. 684
• Parties: LAKE LUCERNE CIVIC ASS'N, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. DOLPHIN STADIUM CORP., a Florida corporation, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

801 F. Supp. 684

LAKE LUCERNE CIVIC ASS'N, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. DOLPHIN STADIUM CORP., a Florida corporation, et al., Defendants.

No. 87-1546-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

July 31, 1992.

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Eugene E. Stearns, H.T. Smith, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff.

Robert A. Ginsburg, Dade County Atty., Robert L. Krawcheck, James J. Allen, Asst. County Attys., Miami, Fla., for defendants County.

Robert L. Shevin, Miami, Fla., for defendants Robbie Stadium Corp. and Estate of Joseph Robbie.

Michael L. Dennis, Stephen H. Reisman, Donald Rosenberg, Miami, Fla., for defendants Mortons.

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS TO STRIKE

HIGHSMITH, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before this Court upon Defendant Dade County's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike; Defendants' (Robbie Stadium Corporation and Estate of Joseph Robbie) Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike; and, Defendants' (Estate of Emil Morton, Lottie Morton, and Estate of Lawrence Morton) Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike.

I. Background

This cause is the product of some seven years of litigation in both the state and federal systems wherein Plaintiffs have challenged Dade County's ("the County") land use approvals for a parcel of real property in Northwest Dade County allowing the construction of Joe Robbie Stadium ("Robbie Stadium") and accompanying commercial development in the midst of the plaintiffs' predominantly black middle-class residential neighborhood. The plaintiffs are individual homeowners and homeowner associations in the immediate area of Robbie Stadium and will be referred to, collectively, as "Plaintiffs".¹ Prior to the filing of the original complaint in federal court in 1987, two causes had proceeded through the appellate courts of the State of Florida, and had resulted in adjudications against the Plaintiffs. See Rolling Oaks Homeowners Ass'n., Inc. v. Dade County, 492 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1986), rev. denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.1987); Norwood-Norland Homeowners Ass'n., Inc. v. Dade County, 511 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987), rev. denied, 520 So.2d 585 (Fla.1988).

Subsequently, Plaintiffs brought a three count complaint in this Court alleging impairment of contract (Count I), substantive unconstitutionality of zoning resolution (Count II), and violation of civil rights (Count III). In its Order of March 22, 1988, the late Judge Eugene P. Spellman treated Defendants' motions to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and granted final summary judgment to the Defendants, dismissing Counts I and II with prejudice on grounds of preclusion (res judicata and collateral estoppel), and dismissing Count III under principles of abstention. (Order, D.E. # 59.)

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this Court's dismissal of Count I and Count II with prejudice, except for a portion of Count II relating to a taking claim. Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n., et al. v. Dolphin Stadium Corp., et al., 878 F.2d 1360, 1374 (11th Cir.1989), rev. denied, 493 U.S. 1079, 110 S.Ct. 1132, 107 L.Ed.2d 1038 (1990). The Eleventh Circuit reversed the abstention ruling as to Count III, holding that Plaintiffs were not precluded from pursuing civil rights discrimination claims, and remanded the case to the district court for "further appropriate proceeding." Id. at 1373-4.

On remand, Judge Spellman entered an order dismissing the complaint and directing the filing of an Amended Complaint consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's mandate. (Order, D.E. # 116.) Plaintiffs then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eleventh Circuit, contending that Judge Spellman had disregarded the Eleventh Circuit's instructions, and at the same time moved the district court to continue or stay proceedings pending disposition by the Eleventh Circuit. Judge James Lawrence King² denied the motion to continue or stay the proceedings and ordered Plaintiffs to "comply with this court's prior order and amend the complaint." (Order, at 3, D.E. # 121.)

Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Complaint, but upon receipt of Defendants' motions to dismiss and strike, Plaintiffs moved for leave to re-amend by filing a Second Amended Complaint. Although Judge King initially denied the motion, he subsequently allowed the amendment on a motion for reconsideration, giving fair warning to Plaintiffs that they had pushed the limits of the court's patience. (Order, D.E. # 140.)

The Second Amended Complaint is a seven count complaint asserting taking without just compensation (Count I), conspiracy to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 1985(3) (Count II), conspiracy to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment (Counts III and IV), conspiracy to violate the thirteenth amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count V), conspiracy to violate due process, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI), and conspiracy to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1985(2) (Count VII). All counts are addressed to all defendants, except Count I, which is addressed solely to the County, and Count VII, which is addressed to all defendants except the County.

The County seeks to dismiss Counts I through VI of the Second Amended Complaint, or alternatively to strike all allegations in the Second Amended Complaint that relate back to factual issues and claims already decided in the history of this litigation and expressly rejected by this Court. Additionally, the County asserts that it is entitled to immunity under the eleventh amendment; that the South Florida Planning Council and certain bondholders are indispensable parties under Fed. R.Civ.P. 19; and that the homeowner associations do not have standing to seek compensatory damages.

Robbie Stadium Corporation and the Estate of Joe Robbie (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Robbies") seek to dismiss Counts II through VII of the Second Amended Complaint, and to strike from the Second Amended Complaint paragraphs 16-26, 28, 41-42, 46-49, 63, 65, 69-78, 80, 82-85, 89, 110, 113, 114, 117, 118, 121, 124, and 125. Additionally, the Robbies assert that the homeowner associations lack standing; that certain bondholders, the Dade County Industrial Development Authority, certain financial institutions, and various categories of lessees are indispensable parties; and, that Count VII is barred by the statute of limitations.

The Estate of Emil Morton, Lottie Morton, and the Estate of Lawrence Morton (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Mortons") seek to dismiss Counts II through VII of the Second Amended Complaint, and to strike from the Second Amended Complaint paragraphs 16-89, 94-98, 110, 113, 114, 117, 118, 121, 124, and 125. Additionally, the Mortons assert that the homeowner associations lack standing; the Dade County Industrial Development Authority, certain bondholders, certain financial institutions, the South Florida Planning Council, and all persons having possessory interests in the stadium are indispensable parties; and that Counts II, III, IV, and VII are barred by the statute of limitations.

II. Standing of plaintiff homeowners associations

The Robbies and the Mortons assert that Plaintiffs, Lake Lucerne Civic Assn., Inc., Crestview Homeowners Assn., Inc., and Rolling Oaks Homeowners Assn., Inc. ("the Associations") lack standing to bring this action: thus, the Robbies and the Mortons move to dismiss the Associations, as plaintiffs, in Counts II through VII. The County asserts that the Associations lack standing to seek compensatory damages: thus the County moves to dismiss the Associations' claims for compensatory damages in Counts I through VI.

The Associations have standing to assert the rights of its members only if the challenged infraction adversely affects the members' associational ties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). In order to establish standing to bring a claim in their representative capacity, the Associations must allege three conditions: (i) their members suffered an actual injury for which they "would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right"; (ii) the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose; and (iii) "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit". Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 & n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 849, 855 & n. 3, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)).

In Counts I through VII, Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages as well as injunctive relief. The main argument of the County, the Robbies, and the Mortons is that the extent of the injury suffered by each member requires individualized proof, and thus fails the third prong of the Hunt test.³ The courts that have addressed the issue of associational standing have analyzed it differently depending on the nature of the relief sought. Courts applying the third prong of the Hunt test have generally allowed associations standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief.⁴ Other courts applying the third prong of the Hunt test have denied associations standing to seek monetary damages on behalf of their members.⁵ Thus, applying the third prong of the Hunt test, the determinative issue is whether the participation of individual members of the associations are required in assessing the associations' claims for relief.

This Court finds that the participation of individual members of the plaintiff's association is required in assessing the damage claims because the amount of money damages sought varies, depending upon the particular circumstances of each individual member.⁶ In the present case, each Plaintiff's claim for damages for a taking depends on the value of the property taken. The monetary relief requested will vary from member to member depending upon factors requiring their participation (i.e., their proximity to the stadium, the...