Lake Shore Ry Co v. Smith, 227
Decision Date | 17 April 1899 |
Docket Number | No. 227,227 |
Citation | 43 L.Ed. 858,19 S.Ct. 565,173 U.S. 684 |
Parties | LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO. v. SMITH |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
In 1891 the general railroad law of the state of Michigan was amended by the legislature by Act No. 90, a portion of the ninth section of which reads as follows:
On April 19, 1893, and again on October 17, 1893, the defendant in error demanded of the ticket agent of the plaintiff in error, in the city of Adrian, Mich., a 1,000-mile ticket, pursuant to the provisions of the above section, in the names of himself and his wife, Emma Watts Smith, which demand was refused. The defendant in error then applied for a mandamus to the circuit court to compel the railway company to issue such ticket upon the payment of the amount of $20; and, after a hearing, the motion was granted. Upon certiorari, the supreme court of Michigan affirmed that order and held that the statute applied only to the railway lines of the plaintiff in error operated within the state of Michigan.
The defense set up by the railway company was that, under the charter from the state to one of the predecessors of the company to whose rights it had succeeded, it had the right to charge three cents a mile for the transportation of all passengers, and that such charter constituted a contract between the state and the company, which the former had no right to impair by any legislative action, and that the statute compelling the company to sell 1000-mile tickets at the rate of two cents a mile was an impairment of the contract, and was therefore void, as in violation of the constitution of the United States. It also alleged that the act was in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, in that it deprived the company of its property and liberty of contract, without due process of law, and also deprived it of the equal protection of the laws. The act was also alleged to be in violation of the constitution of the state of Michigan, on several grounds.
The supreme court of the state decided that there was no contract in relation to the rates which the company might charge for the transportation of passengers, and that the statute violated no provision either of the federal or the state constitution, but was a valid enactment of the legislature; and therefore the court affirmed the order for mandamus, the ticket to be good upon and limited to the railway lines of the defendant railroad company within the state of Michigan. 72 N. W. 328. The company sued out a writ of error from this court.
George C. Greene, for plaintiff in error.
Fred. A. Maynard and H. C. Smith, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice PECKHAM, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
The only subject of inquiry for us in this case is whether the act of the legislature of the state of Michigan violates any provision of the federal constitution. If is not within our province to review the decision of the supreme court upon the question whether the act violates the constitution of the state.
The two questions of a federal nature that are raised in the record are (1) whether the act violates the constitution of the United States by impairing the obligation of any contract between the state and the railroad company; and (2) if not, does it nevertheless violate the fourteenth amendment of the constitution by depriving the company of its property or liberty without due process of law, or by depriving it of the equal protection of the laws? If we should d cide that this act violates any provision of the fourteenth amendment, it would be unnecessary to examine the question whether there was any contract between the state and the company, as claimed by it. We will therefore first come to an investigation of the legislative authority with reference to that amendment.
If unhampered by contract, there is nodoubt of the power of the state to provide by legislation for maximum rates of charges for railroad companies, subject to the condition that they must be such as will admit of the carrier earning a compensation that, under all the circumstances, shall be just to it and to the public, and whether they are or not is a judicial question. If the rates are fixed at an insufficient amount within the meaning of that term as given by the courts, the law would be invalid, as amounting to the taking of the property of the company without due process of law. Railway Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 344, 12 Sup. Ct. 400; Reagan v. Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 399, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047; Railway Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 15 Sup. Ct. 484; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 523, 18 Sup. Ct. 418.
The extent of the power of the state to legislate regarding the affairs of railroad companies has, within the past few years, been several times before this court. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 Sup. Ct. 4; Illinois Cent R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142, 16 Sup. Ct. 1096; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 19 Sup. Ct. 465, and cases cited. These cases arose under the commerce clause of the federal constitution, the inquiry being whether the legislation in question violated that provision. In the cases in which the legislation was upheld, it was on the ground that the state was but exercising its proper authority under its general power to legislate regarding persons and things within its jurisdiction, sometimes described as its police power, and that in exercising that power in the particular cases it did not violate the commerce clause of the federal constitution by improperly regulating or interfering with interstate commerce. The extent of the right of the state to legislate was examined in these various cases, so far, at least, as it was affected by the commerce clause of the constitution of the United States.
In Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, supra, the state statute imposed the duty upon the company of stopping its fast mail train at the station at Cairo, to do which the train had to leave the through route at a point three mnes from that station, and then return to the same point in order to resume its journey. This statute was held to be an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce, and therefore void.
In Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, supra, a statute of the state of Ohio required the company to stop certain of its trains at stations containing 3,000 inhabitants for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers, and the statute was held to be a valid exercise of legislative power, and not an improper interference with interstate commerce. In the course of the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan, it was said that: And again, speaking of cases involving state regulations more or less affecting interstate or foreign commerce, it was said that these cases 'were sustained upon the ground that they were not directed against, nor were direct burdens pon, interstate or foreign commerce; and having been enacted only to protect the public safety, the public health, or the public morals, and having a real, substantial relation to the public ends intended to be accomplished thereby, were not to be deemed absolutely forbidden because of the mere grant of power to congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, but to be regarded as only incidentally affecting such commerce, and valid until superseded by legislation of congress on the same subject.'
The police power is a general term used to express the particular right of a government which is inherent in every sovereignty. As stated by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in the course of his opinion in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583, in describing the powers of a state:
This power...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
McGrew v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.
... ... Mutual Benefit, 126 Mo. 630, 29 S. W. 607; State ex rel. v. Smith, 141 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 906; State ex rel. v. Smith, 177 Mo. 69, 92, 75 S. W ... ...
-
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Central Stockyards Co.
... ... Burch, for appellant ... W. M ... Smith and Dodd & Dodd, for appellee ... SETTLE, ... state. * * *" Lake S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S ... 285, 19 S.Ct. 465, 43 L.Ed. 702 ... himself. In Lake Shore, etc., Railway v. Smith, 173 ... U.S. 697, 19 S.Ct. 565, 43 L.Ed. 858, ... ...
-
City of Jackson v. McPherson
... ... Town of ... Highland Park, 34 S.W. (2d Series) 676; Salt Lake ... City v. Western Foundry Stove Repair Works, 55 Utah 447, ... 187 P ... 717; Friend v. City of ... Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N.E. 609; Smith v. City of ... Atlanta, 132 S.E. 66; City of Atlanta v. Smith, ... appears." ... In the ... case of Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S ... 684, 19 S.Ct. 565, 43 L.Ed. 858, ... ...
-
Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Mobile & O. R. Co.
...2, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 524; Public Utilities Commission of Illinois v. Railroad Co., 278. Ill. 58, 115 N.E. 904; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 690, 695. Odom & Gardner, of Greenwood, for appellee. Courts will enjoin enforcement of Railroad Commission's order fixing rate......
-
How Many Times Was Lochner-era Substantive Due Process Effective? - Michael J. Phillips
...on this subject); Southern Iowa Elec. Co. v. City of Chariton, 255 U.S. 539, 542-46 (1921) (same); Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 691-99 (1899) (statute compelling railroad to sell 1000-mile tickets for a set fee), overruled by Pennsylvania R.R. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (191......