Lake Worth Towers, Inc. v. Gerstung
| Decision Date | 12 April 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 41517,41517 |
| Parties | LAKE WORTH TOWERS, INC., a nonprofit corporation under the laws of the State of Florida, Petitioner, v. Gratton GERSTUNG, as Tax Collector, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Zell H. Altman, of Altman & Gabaldon, Lake Worth, for petitioner.
Malcolm Anderson, City Atty., for respondents.
We have for review on petition for writ of certiorari a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 251 So.2d 27. We have jurisdiction under Article V, Section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A., and Rule 4.5(c)(6) of the Florida Appellate Rules, 32 F.S.A., because this decision conflicts with our holding in Hackney v. McKenny, 1933, 113 Fla. 176, 151 So. 524, and with the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Hansen v. Port Everglades Steel Corporation, Fla.App.1963, 155 So.2d 387.
Petitioner, Lake Worth Towers, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, was organized to construct and operate an one hundred ninety-five unit high rise apartment building to be occupied solely by senior citizens on low fixed annual incomes. Construction on the project commenced prior to January 1, 1968; however, the building was not substantially completed until March 1968. On June 11, 1968 the State Board of Health issued a license to Petitioner to operate a home for the aged; it was made retroactive to January 1 of that year.
Because of its nonprofit status, Petitioner, on April 1, 1968, requested from Respondents, the City Commissioners and taxing authorities of the City of Lake Worth, tax exemption from city taxes on the apartment building as authorized by Section 192.06(14)(a), F.S.1967. 1 Four months later Petitioner appeared before the Commission as the City Board of Equalization and again requested total tax exemption. The requests were denied, and the property was assessed for the value of both the realty and the improvements. The tax roll reflected an item of value for the realty and an item of value for the improvements separately.
Petitioner then filed a suit in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County seeking an order either enjoining Respondents from collecting municipal taxes on the property for 1968, or, in the alternative, forcing them to reassess the property as unimproved for that tax year. In their Answer Respondents denied that the property was improperly assessed, and contended an attack of the assessment was barred by Section 192.21(2), F.S.1967. 2 Furthermore, Respondents argued in the alternative that Petitioner could not challenge the assessment because it had not exhausted its administrative remedies because when it appeared before the Board of Equalization, it had failed to contend the assessment was improper and illegal. The circuit court ruled for Respondents on the grounds that (1) Petitioner had not exhausted its administrative remedies and (2) Petitioner had not challenged the assessment before the statute of limitations had run. The court agreed, however, based upon an admission in the proofs of the Respondents, that the land should have been taxed as unimproved property for the 1968 tax year. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed on the same grounds.
We agree with the lower courts that technically Petitioner could not receive nontaxable status for 1968 as authorized by Section 192.06(14)(a) because the building was not in operation as a nonprofit home for the aged on January 1 of that year. According to Section 192.06(14)(b) a corporation qualifying under subsection (a) must file with the county tax assessor when applying for an exemption 'financial statements for the immediately preceding fiscal year'; a statement showing the corporation's 'advances, payments or obligations incurred . . . during the immediately preceding fiscal year to each officer, director, trustee, member or stockholder of the corporation,' and other information requested by the assessor to help him determine the corporation's taxable status. This, of course, Petitioner was unable to do when it requested nontaxable status on April 1, 1968, since the building had been substantially completed only during the preceding month. In addition, Section 192.04, F.S.1967 provided that 'All real and personal property shall be subject to taxation on the first day of January of each year. . . .' 3 Taxable status for the year also is determined as of that date. Overstreet v. TyTan, Inc., Fla.1950, 48 So.2d 158. To obtain total exemption, the property must be held and Used in a manner authorized by Section 192.06, F.S. Dr. William Howard Hay Foundation v. Wilcox, 1945, 156 Fla. 704, 24 So.2d 237. On January 1, 1968 Petitioner did not qualify under Section 192.06(14)(a) as a tax exempt home for the aged since the building was not in use as a nonprofit home for the aged.
We disagree, however, with the lower court's conclusion that Petitioner could not challenge the assessment as improperly including the value of the land with its completed buildings. Section 193.11, F.S.1967 provided:
(Emphasis added.)
Petitioner's property clearly qualified only for an unimproved land assessment for 1968. The issue which must be resolved by this Court, therefore, is whether Petitioner lost its right to that assessment by failing to exhaust its administrative remedies and by failing to challenge the assessment within the time limit set forth in the Statute of Limitations, Section 192.21(2), F.S. 1967. We conclude it did not.
In City of Tampa v. Palmer, 1925, 89 Fla. 514, 105 So. 115, this Court held that failure to appear before a board of equalization to challenge an assessment would not bar later consideration of the assessment by a court of equity if the assessment is illegal or 'so obviously and flagrantly excessive as to clearly impute to the assessor an intention to arbitrarily discriminate against the taxpayer.' City of Tampa v. Palmer, supra 105 So. at 120. In Hansen v. Port Everglades Steel Corporation, supra, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, said the running of the statute of limitations would not bar a challenge to an assessment in 'suits in which assessments are charged to be unauthorized and void, which may be enjoined or relieved against at any time.' Hansen v. Port Everglades Steel Corporation, supra 155 So.2d at 391.
We therefore must determine whether the assessment in this case...
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