Lakeside Electric, Inc. v. Ulbe, LLC
| Decision Date | 28 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | C. A. WM-2013-0635 |
| Parties | LAKESIDE ELECTRIC, INC. v. ULBE, LLC and RAYMOND ELECTRIC CORPORATION |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
Washington County Superior Court
For Plaintiff Jessica L. Papazian-Ross, Esq.
For Defendant: Sean T. O'Leary, Esq., Angelo R. Simone, Esq.
DECISION
This matter arises from an oral agreement to furnish labor and materials for a renovation project in the Town of New Shoreham (Block Island) in Rhode Island. Before this Court is Plaintiff Lakeside Electric, Inc.'s (Plaintiff or Lakeside Electric) Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 56. Plaintiff asserts it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Counts I through IV of its Complaint seeking enforcement of a mechanic's lien damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and attorneys' fees relative to electrical work Lakeside Electric performed on a time and materials basis at the Surf Hotel on Block Island. After a hearing thereon and upon consideration of the parties' memoranda, this Court will now render a Decision.
Defendant ULBE, LLC (ULBE), owner of the Surf Hotel, hired Co-Defendant Raymond Electric Corporation (Raymond Electric) to perform renovations at the Surf Hotel located at 32 Dodge Street on Block Island. Compl. at ¶ 4. Raymond Electric, in turn, hired Lakeside Electric as a subcontractor to perform electrical work on a time and material basis pursuant to a verbal agreement between Lakeside Electric's president, Donald R. Antaya (Antaya), and Raymond Electric's president, Raymond G. Pellegrino (Pellegrino). Id. at ¶ 5. The agreed-upon hourly rate for Lakeside Electric's work was $70.00 for up to fifty hours a week, and $105.00 for any hours worked over fifty. Pl.'s Ex. A at ¶ 4 (Antaya Aff.). The parties also agreed to a material markup of 30%. Id. As is customary for work on Block Island, transportation costs, lodging and meals were included as part of the subcontract. Id.
Lakeside Electric commenced its work in April 2013, see Antaya Aff., Ex. 1, at 1, and last performed services at the Surf Hotel on June 26, 2013. Id., Ex. 1, at 6. As attested to by Block Island's building official, Marc A. Tillson (Tillson), Raymond Electric secured the necessary electric permit from Block Island on May 16, 2013. Pl.'s Ex. B at ¶ 4 (Tillson Aff.) and attached unnumbered exhibit, at 1. All the electrical work performed by Lakeside Electric was inspected by Tillson and was deemed to be in compliance with both the electric permit issued and the Rhode Island State Electrical Code. Tillson Aff. at ¶ 4.
Lakeside Electric was eventually paid for invoices submitted in April and May of 2013, up through Invoice No. 822 dated May 7, 2013. See Antaya Aff., Ex. 1, at 1. However, outstanding balances on Invoice Nos. 831, 833 and 834 dated May 26, 2013, June 12, 2013 and July 1, 2013, respectively, have remained unpaid. Id. at ¶ 6 and Ex. 1, at 1. The outstanding balance owed to Lakeside Electric for time and materials furnished to the Surf Hotel is $33, 887.23. Id.
On November 12, 2013, Lakeside Electric filed and recorded its Notice of Intention to Do Work Or Furnish Materials Or Both (Notice of Intention) in the Land Evidence Records of Block Island, indicating therein that within 200 days of the filing of this Notice of Intention it had performed services at the Surf Hotel as reflected in unpaid Invoice Nos. 831, 833 and 834 dated May 26, 2013, June 12, 2013 and July 1, 2013, respectively, and that said invoices reflect the fair and reasonable value of the electrical work performed at the Surf Hotel in May and June 2013. See Pl.'s Ex. C. Lakeside Electric then filed a Notice of Lis Pendens in the Land Evidence Records on December 6, 2013, indicating therein that it has filed or would file a complaint to enforce its mechanic's lien within seven days. Id. On December 9, 2013, Lakeside Electric filed the instant Complaint against ULBE and Raymond Electric. Count I seeks enforcement of a mechanic's lien against ULBE, as the owner of the Surf Hotel, in the amount of $30, 538.83, plus costs and attorneys' fees. Compl., ¶¶ 10-17; see also Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.[1] Count II of the Complaint is directed against Raymond Electric and seeks damages for breach of the oral contract to pay Lakeside Electric for the electrical work performed on a time and material basis. In the alternative, Count III seeks recovery against Raymond Electric under the quasi-contractual theory of unjust enrichment. Finally, Count IV against Raymond Electric seeks attorneys' fees pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-45, as Lakeside Electric contends there is no justiciable issue in law or fact regarding the monies owed.
On June 16, 2014, Lakeside Electric filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts, designating August 18, 2014, as the hearing date. On August 15, 2014, ULBE filed its untimely objection.[2] Raymond Electric did not object to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, but its counsel appeared before the Court on August 18, 2014, for the purpose of objecting to the extent Plaintiff sought final judgment in accordance with Super. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
This Court heard oral argument on August 18, 2014, but reserved judgment in order to review ULBE's objection.[3] Having reviewed Plaintiff and ULBE's submissions, this Court now renders its Decision.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the preliminary question before this Court is whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact which must be resolved. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Boiteau, 119 R.I. 64, 376 A.2d 323 (1977); O'Connor v. McKanna, 116 R.I. 627, 359 A.2d 350 (1976). If an examination of the pleadings, affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and other similar matters reveals no such issue and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then the suit is ripe for summary judgment. Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Neri v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42, 47 (R.I. 2006); Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032, 1036 (R.I. 2004). In ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, this Court must review such evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Casey, 861 A.2d at 1036 (citing Duffy v. Dwyer, 847 A.2d 266, 268-69 (R.I. 2004)).
Once the moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts and the party who opposes the motion now "carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions." Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I. 1996); see also McAdam v. Grzelczyk, 911 A.2d 255, 259 (R.I. 2006). It is not sufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Indeed, the adverse party must set forth specific facts, via sworn affidavit or otherwise, showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Super. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Although inferences may be drawn from underlying facts contained in material before the trial court, neither conclusory statements nor assertions of inferences not based on underlying facts will suffice. See Minuto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 55 R.I. 201, 179 A. 713, 715 (1935) ().
Importantly, Rule 56(f) of the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 56(f)) takes into consideration that affidavits in opposition to a summary judgment motion may be unavailable. That provision states:
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." Super. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
It is well-settled that a decision to grant or deny a continuance in accordance with Rule 56(f) is within the discretion of the motion justice. See, e.g., Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1219-20 (R.I. 2013); Martel Inv. Grp., LLC v. Town of Richmond, 982 A.2d 595, 601 (R.I. 2009); Holley v. Argonaut Holdings, Inc., 968 A.2d 271, 275-76 (R.I. 2009); Chevy Chase, F.S.B. v. Faria, 733 A.2d 725, 727 (R.I. 1999); Greenwald v. Selya & Iannuccillo, Inc., 491 A.2d 988, 989 (R.I 1985). Additionally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has reiterated that Rule 56(f) "'clearly mandates that the party opposing the motion for summary judgment file affidavits stating why he or she cannot present facts in opposition to the motion.'" Holley, 968 A.2d at 276 (quoting R.I. Depositors' Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Ins. Premium Fin., Inc., 705 A.2d 990, 990 (R.I. 1997) (mem.)); see also Berard, 64 A.3d at 1220. Failure to file an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or an affidavit to substantiate the need for a continuance and/or discovery has proven fatal to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Berard, 64 A.3d at 1220; Martel Inv. Grp., 982 A.2d at 601-02; Holley, 968 A.2d at 276; Mitchell v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, 673 A.2d 446, 448 (R.I. 1996); Chevy Chase, F.S.B., 733 A.2d at 727.
Lakeside Electric first seeks judgment against ULBE on Count I under the Mechanic's Lien Statute, codified at §§ 34-28-1, et seq.
The purpose of the mechanic's lien law is to provide "'a liberal...
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