Lakeside Roofing Co. v. Nixon
| Decision Date | 05 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:10CV1761 JCH |
| Parties | LAKESIDE ROOFING COMPANY, et al., Plaintiff(s), v. JEREMIAH W. NIXON, et al., Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 70), and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 72), both filed on October 31, 2011. Plaintiffs and Defendants both filed responses in opposition, and while Plaintiffs also filed a reply to Defendants' response, Defendants failed to reply to Plaintiffs' response. Since the time for filing a reply has passed, the Court will rule on the record before it. See Local Rule 7-4.01(C).
Plaintiffs are nine individual residents of Illinois who seek work as journeymen roofers and three corporations who seek to employ the individual defendants and bid on public works projects in Missouri. (Defendants' SUMF, ¶ 1). The remaining Defendants are the Attorney General of Missouri, the Director of the Missouri Department of Labor ("the Missouri DOL"), and the Chairman and current Commissioners of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("the Commission").(Id. ¶¶ 2-4). Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Missouri's Excessive Unemployment Law ("Excessive Unemployment Law" or "Law"), MO. REV. STAT. §§ 290.550-290.580, and seek declaratory, injunctive, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relief. (Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Memo in Support"), ECF No. 73, p. 1). For purposes of summary judgment, Defendants concede Plaintiffs have standing to question the constitutionality of the Excessive Unemployment Law. (Id., p. 2).
Missouri's Excessive Unemployment Law provides that, during times when Missouri's unemployment rate has exceeded 5% for the preceding two months, only Missouri laborers or laborers from "nonrestrictive states" may be employed in the construction of public works projects. (Plaintiffs' SUMF, ¶ 76). Nonrestrictive states are states that have not enacted laws that restrict Missouri laborers from working on public works projects in those states. (Id.). The Commission is the public body authorized to determine which states are restrictive and which are nonrestrictive. (Id.). The following twenty-nine states are currently classified by the Commission as nonrestrictive states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. (Id., ¶ 18).
The Commission does not determine whether another state's restrictive laws are effective but rather whether the intent of another state's laws was to restrict Missouri workers from working on a public works job in that state. (Id., ¶ 50). Similarly, the Commission does not evaluate whether another state's restrictive laws are enforced by that state. (Id., ¶¶ 59, 60). Both Plaintiffs andDefendants acknowledge there is no legislative history for the Excessive Unemployment Law. (Id., ¶ 75).
The Missouri DOL has determined that, for purposes of the Excessive Unemployment Law, Missouri has been in a period of excessive unemployment since October 2007. (Id., ¶ 26). The Missouri DOL defines "laborer" as any person who performs actual construction work on a public works project. (Id., ¶ 40). Persons on the site of a public works project who are engaged only in instructional or supervisory activities are not considered laborers. (Id.).
Laborers from restrictive states may be employed in the construction of public works projects when Missouri laborers or laborers from nonrestrictive states are unavailable or are incapable of performing the particular type of work involved, if so certified by the contractor and approved by the contracting officer. MO. REV. STAT. § 290.560. To satisfy this certification process, a contractor must contact contractor and labor groups and organizations to verify that there are no workers available or capable of performing the work required. (Plaintiffs' SUMF, ¶ 42). The contractor must do a thorough search of the entire state of Missouri and then check with all nonrestrictive states. (Id., ¶ 45). The Missouri DOL recommends contacting local unemployment or work force development offices to see if there are any individuals who are currently out of work who are available to perform the work required. (Id., ¶ 42). The Missouri DOL requires a contractor to provide documentation describing the nature and results of their search for Missouri laborers and laborers from nonrestrictive states. (Id.).
Failure to comply with the Excessive Unemployment Law may result in the Missouri DOL seeking injunctive relief against the awarding or continuation of work under any public works contract. (Id., ¶¶ 33, 34). The knowing violation of the Law is considered a crime, and criminal monetary penalties may be assessed for failure to comply with the Law. (Id., ¶¶ 33-35). These civilremedies and criminal penalties may be used or assessed against the public entity, the contractor, or both parties. (Id., ¶ 35). The Missouri DOL provides a Complaint form on its website by which electronic complaints for failure to comply with the Law may be filed. (Id., 32).
On January 10, 2008, the Commission issued a Determination Regarding Public Works Projects During Excessive Unemployment, which held that Illinois had enacted one or more state laws restricting Missouri laborers from working on public works projects in Illinois. (Plaintiffs' SUMF, ¶ 19). Thus, Illinois is currently classified as a "restrictive state." (Id., ¶ 25).
On April 24, 2009, Christopher N. Grant, an attorney for the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 702, AFL-CIO, wrote a letter to the Commission. (Id., ¶ 20). In this letter, Mr. Grant pointed out that Illinois's restrictive laws had been ruled unconstitutional in Bernardi v. Leary Construction Co., Inc., 464 N.E.2d 1019 (Ill. 1984) and W.C.M. Window Co., Inc. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984) and requested that the Commission reconsider its decision to classify Illinois as a restrictive state. (Id.). On May 4, 2009, the Commission issued an Order acknowledging that the Excessive Unemployment Law had been ruled unconstitutional but refusing to read the Law as only applying to successful statutory efforts to exclude Missouri workers. (Id., ¶ 21).
On November 12, 2009, the Commission issued an Order stating that, by recently adopting Illinois Public Act 96-0037 ("the Illinois Act"), Illinois had adopted six new statutes restricting the ability of Missouri workers to work on a public works project in Illinois. (Id., 22). Therefore, the Commission stated it was reiterating its Determination of January 10, 2008, with regards to the classification of Illinois as a restrictive state. (Id.). In response to another letter from Mr. Grant, theCommission issued an Order on March 17, 2010, declining to revisit the issue of whether Illinois is a restrictive state. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 25).
Plaintiffs filed this action on September 20, 2010. Plaintiffs' Complaint contains three counts. (See Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), ECF No. 33, ¶ 56). In Count I, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the Excessive Unemployment Law is unconstitutional, void, and unenforceable on the grounds that it violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2, clause 1, of the United States Constitution; the Commerce Clause of Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution; and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id., ¶¶ 54-61). In Count II, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Illinois is a nonrestrictive state under the Law on the grounds that the Illinois Act is unconstitutional. (Id., ¶¶ 62-67). In Count III, Plaintiffs seek an injunction to enjoin the Defendants from enforcing or applying the Law. (Id., ¶¶ 68-71). Under Counts I and III, and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, Plaintiffs seek their attorneys' fees on the grounds that Defendants' violations of the United States Constitution were intentional, reckless, or wanton. (Id., ¶¶ 61, 71).
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The Court's...
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