Lakey v. State
| Decision Date | 11 April 1922 |
| Docket Number | 7 Div. 789. |
| Citation | 18 Ala.App. 442,93 So. 51 |
| Parties | LAKEY v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Clay County; W. L. Longshore, Judge.
Northern Lakey, indicted on a charge of first degree murder, was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Riddle & Riddle, of Talladega, for appellant.
Harwell G. Davis, Atty. Gen., for the State.
On a former appeal in this case (Lakey v. State, 206 Ala. 180, 89 So. 605), the Supreme Court, speaking through Sayre, J., took occasion to criticize the action of the deputy sheriff because he went into the jury room and remained for a period of from 10 to 30 minutes without any apparent necessity therefor, although the evidence taken on application for a new trial tended to show that there was no communication between the deputy and the jury on the subject of the pending case. The intimation was though not so decided, that this action was sufficient to have reversed the case. On this appeal it appears that the sheriff of the county, who himself was present at the time of the unusual search of defendant's house, out of which resulted the killing of Ramsey, one of the searching party approached Rev. Truman G. Burgess, one of the jurors who finally was chosen to try the case, substantially as follows:
Hamlin approached Burgess and asked if he had received summons sent him. Burgess replied he had not. Hamlin then said: "I sent you two, one for the week and a special summons for Wednesday on a murder case." Upon Burgess saying he did not want to be on that kind of case, Hamlin replied: "We need good men." Burgess said: "If I do not get them, I will not have to come Monday?" Hamlin replied Burgess said: "Maybe I won't have to be on that," and Hamlin said: "Maybe you will; we need good men that will stand by the officers in carrying out the law, to put down this whisky business."
The sheriff of the county is its chief executive officer, and as such in a high degree must exercise great influence among the people where he serves. In the exercise of the functions of his office he comes in direct contact with the people of the whole county, clothed with great authority and having with him the majesty of the law. His duties in executing the writs and summons of the courts and the impaneling of juries places him in a position of great influence, second only to the court itself, and any action on his part towards a juror, summoned to try a case in his county, that can be construed into an intimation of a wish on his part either for or against a defendant, should be critically viewed by the courts, in determining whether or not a defendant has had that fair and impartial trial, which is the Palladium of our liberties and guaranteed under the Constitution.
In this case the defendant was on trial, charged with the murder of a member of the sheriff's official family. The sheriff was a part of the court trying the defendant. The conversation between the sheriff and Burgess would have been improper in any case, but in the case at bar was highly improper, and in the opinion of this court was calculated to prevent the defendant from receiving that fair and impartial trial to which he was entitled; the rule being, as stated in Driver v. Pate, 16 Ala. App. 418, 78 So. 412, "not whether this misconduct on his part did affect the verdict," but might it have done so?
Charge 9, as requested in writing by the defendant, under the evidence in this case, asserts a correct proposition of law, but was abstract, as affecting any of
the issues involved in this case. Whether Stanford was a trespasser or not, his presence in the house was not known to the defendant until after the difficulty, and therefore that fact could not have influenced the defendant, either the one way or the other, in what he did.
It is not pretended by the sheriff that this search warrant was ever exhibited to Lakey, or that he knew of its issuance, and, indeed, as appears from the evidence, nobody seems to have known about it but the witness, and he swears that "he never executed it," and that it is lost or destroyed. Over the objection and exception of defendant, proof of the contents of this alleged search warrant was admitted in evidence. Although the solicitor stated that his purpose in offering the evidence was to contradict those witnesses who testified that Lakey asked for a search warrant, no such limitation was put upon it by the court, and by the ruling of the court it was therefore admitted generally.
In many particulars this case presents a most startling statement of facts. At 1 o'clock at night the sheriff of the county and one deputy and a federal law enforcement officer and his deputy, armed with double-barrel guns and 45-caliber Colt's pistols, went to the humble home of this defendant, about five miles in the country, where he was living with his wife, children, and widowed mother, aroused the inmates of the house from sleep, and, informing defendant that they had been informed that he had liquor in his barn demanded that they be permitted to search. Defendant said, "All right," and got his keys and went and unlocked the barn, and standing on the outside while the search was being made, in his shirt sleeves and barefooted, but having slipped on his pants when he was first aroused and having a pistol in the pants pocket, and while this was going on one of the party went into the house, where defendant's wife was in her night dress, and searched a part of the house. This is the testimony of the state, and the state construes this into a permissive search. The defendant says he demanded a search warrant, and was met by the statement that they were federal officers and needed none. But, whether this be a fact or not, it would, we...
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Houlton v. State
...if it is made apparent that the verdict might have been affected by it.' Weaver v. State, 17 Ala.App. 506, 86 So. 179; Lakey v. State, 18 Ala.App. 442, 93 So. 51; Taylor v. State, 18 Ala.App. 466, 93 So. 78; Holladay v. State, 20 Ala.App. 76, 101 So. The State introduced a witness, a man by......
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Cotney v. State
...that they are not admissible, alone, upon such a predicate as here laid, we will not repeat the rulings.' In the case of Lakey v. State, 18 Ala.App. 442, 93 So. 51, the trial court allowed the introduction of a made on the afternoon after the deceased was shot the night before. To establish......
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