Lakits v. York, Civil Action No. 02-8645.

• Decision Date: 23 April 2003
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 02-8645.
• Citation: 258 F.Supp.2d 401
• Parties: Beverly LAKITS, v. Officer Joseph YORK, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

258 F.Supp.2d 401

Beverly LAKITS, v. Officer Joseph YORK, et al.

Civil Action No. 02-8645.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

April 23, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John P. Karoly, Jr., Karoly Law Offices, P.C., Allentown, PA, for Plaintiff.

Sheila E. O'Donnell, Wright & O'Donnell, PC, Conshohocken, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

BAYLSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Beverly Lakits (herein "Plaintiff) brings this civil action against Officer Joseph York ("York"), Police Chief Laird Brownmiller ("Brownmiller"), and the Borough of Northampton ("the Borough"), alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), as well as three state law tort causes of action (Counts II-IV). Presently before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6), seeking dismissal of various claims in the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In addition, Defendants move this Court, pursuant to Rule 12(f), to strike from the Complaint any reference to a prior, unrelated lawsuit involving Defendant York. For the reasons which follow, Defendants' Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Legal Standard

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court may look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.1994). The court must accept as true all well pleaded allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec, Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir.1985). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted only when it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved by the plaintiff. See Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir.1988).

II. Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges the following facts, which, for the purpose of deciding the instant motion, will be read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. On or about November 26, 2000, at around 10:00 p.m., Plaintiff was driving her car along a road in the Borough of Northampton, when she noticed a police car in her rear view mirror with its overhead lights flashing, signaling her to pull over. See Complaint ¶ 12-14. Defendant York emerged from the police vehicle and approached Plaintiffs car. Plaintiff recognized Officer York from when she had worked at a sandwich shop, at which York was a frequent customer. The Complaint suggests, without supplying any details, that "Plaintiff had also complained to Defendant Brownmiller, as Defendant York's superior officer, about Defendant York's actions in the past." Id. ¶ 17.

As York reached Plaintiffs vehicle, Plaintiff asked "What did I do?" Id. ¶ 18. York told Plaintiff she was speeding and driving recklessly, and that she failed to make a proper stop at a stop sign. See id. ¶ 9. At first, because she was nervous, Plaintiff could not locate her license and registration. After York returned to his vehicle, Plaintiff found the documents. When Plaintiff exited her car to take the documents to York, he became angry and began screaming at Plaintiff to get back into her car. See id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff then "retreated" and "stood quietly near the right rear of the car." Id. After standing in that location for ten minutes or more, Plaintiff became concerned about her son being at home alone. Plaintiff asked Defendant York "How long will this be, cause I have to get home?" Id. ¶ 23. York then leaped from his vehicle, ran at Plaintiff and pushed her over the trunk of her car. York roughly placed handcuffs on Plaintiffs wrists and tightened them such that Plaintiff experienced extreme pain in both wrists. See id. ¶ 25. Ignoring Plaintiffs complaints about the pain, York forcefully pulled her toward the police car and into the back seat. York used brute force to push Plaintiff into the vehicle, causing her head to strike the roof line of the rear door. See id. ¶ 28. York's violent pushing also caused Plaintiff to fall sideways onto the vehicle's floor. See id. ¶ 29. York continued to ignore Plaintiffs complaints of pain.

Defendant York called for a tow truck to remove Plaintiff's vehicle. After it was towed, York drove Plaintiff to the Northampton Police Station. At the station, York released the handcuffs from Plaintiffs wrists, but then immediately restrained her again by handcuffing her to a metal pipe. See id. ¶ 37. York told Plaintiff she would be going to prison that night. Another officer was present at this time, but did not intervene or assist Plaintiff. See id. ¶ 41. Eventually, York told Plaintiff he had changed his mind and would not charge her with a misdemeanor; instead, she would be charged with the summary offense of disorderly conduct. See id. ¶ 42. York also told Plaintiff that, if she could not find someone to pick her up at the station that night, she would have to spend the night in the station's lock-up. Plaintiff eventually contacted her sister, who drove her home. See id. ¶ 46.

Plaintiff avers in the Complaint that Officer York had no legal or factual basis to stop Plaintiff in traffic, handcuff her, detain her, or charge her. The only charge ever filed was the summary offense of disorderly conduct—of which Plaintiff was found not guilty by a District Justice. See id. ¶ 49. Plaintiff further avers that the chief of police, Defendant Brownmiller, as well as the Defendant Borough,

knew or should have known, of actions and conduct on the part of Defendant York, similar to the scenario and procedure which was utilized in connection with his interaction with Plaintiff, which pre-dated November 26, 2000, and which indicated that Defendant York was likely to arrest, "manhandle," and detain persons such as Plaintiff without proper or legal cause, justification, or excuse.

Id. ¶ 51. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that, prior to November 2000, York was sued for civil rights violations stemming from his interaction with a person named Shane Zimmerman. Plaintiff further alleges that Brownmiller and the Borough, having knowledge of York's prior misconduct, "condoned and encouraged the Defendant York in his actions in regard to the Plaintiff," by failing to adequately train, monitor, discipline, discharge or supervise York. See id. ¶ 52.

III. Sufficiency of the Complaint

Defendants seek dismissal of Count II (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), Count III (Assault and Battery), and Count IV (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress), as to the Defendant Borough. Defendants also seek dismissal of Count III as to Defendant Brownmiller. Finally, Defendants seek dismissal of Counts II and IV as to Defendants York and Brownmiller, only insofar as those claims are brought against the two officers in their official capacities.¹

A. Counts II and IV

1. Count II—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In Count II, Plaintiff asserts claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against all three Defendants. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the Borough or against York and Brownmiller in their official capacities.

Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the Borough itself must fail under Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (herein "the Tort Claims Act"). The Tort Claims Act provides that "no local agency [i.e. municipality] shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person"—unless the conduct of the municipality or its employee fits into one of a few narrow categories enumerated in the Tort Claims Act. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-42. While the statute permits municipal liability for certain "negligent acts," such acts "shall not include acts or conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(a)(2).

Courts have held that intentional torts constitute "willful misconduct" under the Act, for which a municipality cannot be held liable under the Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., Talley v. Trautman, No. Civ.A. 96-5190, 1997 WL 135705, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Mar.13, 1997); Agresta v. City of Philadelphia, 694 F.Supp. 117, 123 (E.D.Pa.1988). Courts have specifically found that municipalities are immune from claims of "intentional infliction of emotional distress." See Agresta, 694 F.Supp. at 123. Accordingly, under the Tort Claims Act, the Borough cannot be held liable on Plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and Count II must be dismissed as to the Defendant Borough.

In addition, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants York and Brownmiller—in their official capacities—must be dismissed because suits against municipal employees in their official capacities are "treated as claims against the municipal entities that employ these individuals." Smith v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 112 F.Supp.2d 417, 425 (E.D.Pa.2000) (citing Hafer v. Mela, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991)). This is because, in a suit against a municipal official in his official capacity, the real party in interest is the municipal entity and not the named official. See id. at 424. See also Waites v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ.A. 00-2481, 2001 WL 484082, at *2 (E.D.Pa. March 5, 2001) (dismissing claims against city officials in their official capacities because such claims are simply another way of pleading an action against the employing government entity); DeBellis v. Kulp, 166 F.Supp.2d 255, 278 (E.D.Pa.2001) (granting summary judgment for city police officers, in their official capacities, on state law intentional tort claims, because such claims are considered to be asserted against the city); Martin v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ.A. 99-543, 2000 WL 1052150, at *13 (E.D.Pa. July 24, 2000) (same).

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