Lamar v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 33838.,33838.
• Citation: 54 A.3d 1040,138 Conn.App. 826
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Thomas LAMAR v. BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM CORPORATION et al.

138 Conn.App. 826

54 A.3d 1040

Thomas LAMAR

v.BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM CORPORATION et al.

No. 33838.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 30, 2012.

Decided Oct. 30, 2012.

Matthew E. Dodd, Cheshire, with whom, on the brief, was Matthew P. Lascelle, for the appellant (plaintiff).

James D. Moran, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Maribeth M. McGloin, Fairfield, for the appellees (defendants).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and BEACH and FOTI, Js.

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

The plaintiff, Thomas Lamar, appeals from the decision of the workers' compensation review board (board) affirming the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) denying his motion to preclude the defendant employer, Boehringer Ingelheim Corporation,¹ from contesting the payment of benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31–275 et seq. We affirm the decision of the board.

The following facts, as found by the commissioner, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On December 4, 2007, the defendant mailed a form 43 ² to contest the plaintiff's claim for benefits. As of this date, the plaintiff had not filed a notice of his claim via a form 30C. ³ The defendant's form 43 was sent by certified mail to the plaintiff, who never claimed it. In this form 43, the defendant listed the date of injury as September 6, 2007, the body part injured as lymph nodes, and the nature of the injury as sarcoidosis.⁴ The defendant also indicated the reason for the contest as: “[The plaintiff] did not suffer an injury which arose out of or in the course of his employment.”

On December 10, 2007, the plaintiff filed a form 30C. The form indicated that the injury was repetitive trauma and the date of injury as January 1, 2005, through the “present.” He also listed the body parts injured as “lungs, respiratory complaints.” On February 6, 2008, the defendant filed a second form 43, again listing the date of injury as September 6, 2007, the body parts injured as “lungs, respiratory complaints,” and the nature of the injury as “repetitive trauma/sarcoidosis.” The defendant again listed the reason for the contest as: “[The plaintiff] did not suffer an injury which arose out of [or in] the course of his employment.”

The plaintiff argued to the commissioner that both disclaimers filed by the defendant should have been precluded as a matter of law.⁵ Specifically, he claimed that, as to the first disclaimer, (1) service was improper under General Statutes § 31–321 and (2) the disclaimer failed to specify the date of the alleged injury or place him on notice of any real defense. He also argued that the second disclaimer was untimely and lacked sufficient specificity.⁶

The commissioner determined that the defendant's use of certified mail to send the first disclaimer to the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of § 31–321, despite the plaintiff's failure to claim it. With respect to the issue of the sufficiency of the first disclaimer, the commissioner stated: “I find that the form 43 received by the commission on December 12, 2007, via certified mail lists a specific date of injury as September 6, 2007. The form 30C, which was filed after the form 43, lists a range of dates from January 1, 2005, through the present, which includes the date on the form 43 of September 6, 2007. The nature of the injury is listed as sarcoidosis, and the reason for the contestment states that the [plaintiff] did not suffer an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment. I find that the [plaintiff], reading this document as a whole, was provided with sufficient information and was placed on notice that the [defendant was] denying his claim due to the condition of sarcoidosis, which developed during the time period alleged in the form 30C.” Accordingly, the commissioner denied the motion to preclude filed by the plaintiff pursuant to General Statutes § 31–294c (b).

The plaintiff appealed from this decision to the board. In its decision, the board noted that the plaintiff had not filed a motion to correct the facts found by the commissioner. With respect to the issue of the service of the first disclaimer, the board noted that § 31–321, written in the disjunctive, allows for service in three ways: personal service, certified mail or registered mail. Turning to the adequacy of the disclaimer, the board first observed that there was no statutory or precedential bar to filing a preemptive disclaimer, that is, one filed before the notice of claim. It then rejected the claim that the first disclaimer was too vague, concluding that it placed the plaintiff on notice that the defendant's position was that the injury was personal in nature, and, thus, outside the scope of the act. See General Statutes § 31–275(16)(A).⁷ It then reasoned: “When a [defendant] files a form 43 contesting liability and acknowledges a date of injury under which this commission retains jurisdiction, the initial inaccuracy as to the precise theory of recovery does not materially prejudice the claimant.... In addition ... the [plaintiff] was properly apprised as to the nature of the injury for which the [defendant] disclaimed responsibility. In the present case, the disclaimer acknowledges [that] an alleged injury occurred within the dates in which the [plaintiff] asserts he has exposure to repetitive trauma. We simply do not find [that] the form 43 in this case violates the terms of the statute governing disclaimers. As noted, it appears to clearly enunciate [that] the [defendant] is challenging the etiology of the [plaintiff's] injury and does not advance another theory of defense.” For these reasons, the board affirmed the decision of the commissioner. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Before addressing the specifics of the plaintiff's appeal, we set forth the principles relevant to our workers' compensation jurisprudence. “The purpose of the [workers'] compensation statute is to compensate the worker for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on the employer .... The [act] compromise[s] an employee's right to a common law tort action for work related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation.... The act indisputably is a remedial statute that should be construed generously to accomplish its purpose.... The humanitarian and remedial purposes of the act counsel against an overly narrow construction that unduly limits eligibility for workers' compensation.... Further, our Supreme Court has recognized that the state of Connecticut has an interest in compensating injured employees to the fullest extent possible.... In order to recover pursuant to this act, a plaintiff must prove that the claimed injury is connected causally to the employment by demonstrating that the injury (1) arose out of the employment and (2) occurred in the course of the employment.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jones v. Connecticut Children's Medical Center Faculty Practice Plan, 131 Conn.App. 415, 422–23, 28 A.3d 347 (2011).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the defendant's initial form 43 is invalid because it was not served in accordance with § 31–321. Specifically, he argues that because the defendant was aware that he had not received the notice sent by certified mail,⁸ the defendant was required to attempt personal service. We are not persuaded.

The plaintiff's claim is one of statutory interpretation. This issue presentsa question of law “over which we exercise plenary review.... The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply.... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When the language of a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to ... common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Arias v. Geisinger, 126 Conn.App. 860, 865–66, 15 A.3d 641, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 941, 17 A.3d 476 (2011).

To resolve this claim, we must consider the interplay between two statutes. “Section 31–294c (b) dictates the strict standards of an employer that seeks to contest liability. Section 31–294c (b) provides in relevant part: Whenever liability to pay compensation is contested by the employer, he shall file with the commissioner, on or before the twenty-eighth day after he has received a written notice of claim, a notice in accord with a form prescribed by the chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission stating that the right to compensation is contested, the name of the claimant, the name of the employer, the date of the alleged injury or death and the specific grounds on which the right to compensation is contested. The employer shall send a copy of the notice to the employee in accordance with section 31–321.... Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged...