Lamarche v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

Citation236 F.Supp.2d 34
Decision Date16 December 2002
Docket NumberNo. Civ. 01-123-B-H.,Civ. 01-123-B-H.
PartiesPaul H. LAMARCHE, Plaintiff v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff v. Lorna Armesto, Third-Party Defendant
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

John A. Woodcock, Jr., Weatherbee, Woodcock, Burlock & Woodcock, Bangor, ME, for Paul H Lamarche, In his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Erlinda Polvorosa Lamarche and as Trustee of the Erlinda A. Polvorosa Family Trust, plaintiff.

Jon Haddow, Farrell, Rosenblatt & Russell, Bangor, ME, for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, defendant.

ORDER AFFIRMING RECOMMENDED DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

HORNBY, Chief Judge.

The United States Magistrate Judge filed with the court on November 6, 2002 with copies to counsel, her Recommended Decision on Lorna Armesto's Motion for Summary Judgment and Related, Non-Dispositive Motions. The time within which to file objections expired on November 25, 2002, and no objections have been filed. The Magistrate Judge notified the parties that failure to object would waive their right to de novo review and appeal.

It is therefore ORDERED that the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge is hereby ADOPTED. Third-party defendant Armesto's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON LORNA ARMESTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON RELATED, NON-DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

KRAVCHUK, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case presents a contest between Paul LaMarche and Lorna Armesto over who is entitled to the proceeds of two life insurance annuity contracts issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to Erlinda Polvorosa LaMarche ("Polvorosa"). In August 2000, Armesto filed suit against Metropolitan in the Supreme Court for the State of New York, seeking to recover the proceeds of the contracts. In June 2001, Paul LaMarche initiated suit against Metropolitan in this Court, seeking, among other relief, a declaration that he, as Trustee of the Erlinda A. Polvorosa Family Trust, is the proper beneficiary of the annuity contracts rather than Armesto. In August 2001, Metropolitan haled Armesto into this Court by means of the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, which also served to stay Armesto's New York proceeding.

Currently pending are the following eight motions, only five of which are addressed in this decision:

(1) Metropolitan's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and To Dismiss all claims pending against it, Docket No. 30;1

(2) Metropolitan's Motion to Strike Expert Testimony offered by LaMarche, Docket No. 33;

(3) Metropolitan's Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 34;

(4) Armesto's Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of her cross-claim, Docket No. 37;

(5) Armesto's Motion to Amend her Cross-Claim, id.;

(6) Armesto's Motion to Strike Expert Testimony, id.;

(7) LaMarche's Motion to Strike portions of two affidavits submitted by Armesto in connection with her bid for summary judgment, Docket No. 48; and

(8) Metropolitan's Motion to Strike portions of an affidavit submitted by LaMarche in opposition to summary judgment, Docket No. 56.

I address these several motions in two groups. The instant Recommended Decision and Order addresses the latter five motions, which are raised in the filings entered under Docket Numbers 37, 48 and 56.2 I address the former three filings in a separate Recommended Decision on Metropolitan Life's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment, issued on even date herewith.

For the reasons stated herein, I RECOMMEND that the Court DENY Armesto's motion for summary judgment. I also DENY Armesto's motion to amend her cross-claim; DENY Armesto's motion to strike expert testimony; GRANT LaMarche's motion to strike; and DENY Metropolitan's Motion to Strike portions of an affidavit submitted by LaMarche in opposition to summary judgment.

Summary Judgment Standard and Local Rule 56

Summary judgment is warranted only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000). Local Rule 56 sets forth the precise manner in which motions for summary judgment are to be presented in this Court. Failure to abide by its dictates can have dire consequences for litigants and their counsel, the least significant of which being the non-consideration of otherwise material evidence. See, e.g., Liston v. Unum Corp. Officer Severance Plan, 211 F.Supp.2d 222, 226 (D.Me.2002); Learnard v. Inhabitants of Van Buren, 182 F.Supp.2d 115, 119-120 (D.Me.2002); see also Plumley v. Southern Container, Inc., 2001 WL 1188469, at *2, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16040, at *4 n.1 (D.Me. Oct. 9, 2001); Dermalogix Partners, Inc. v. Corwood Lab., Inc., 2000 WL 760732, at *1 n.1, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8009, at *1 n. 1 (D.Me. March 14, 2000); Williams v. HealthReach Network, 2000 WL 760742, at *2, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9695, at *7 (D.Me. Feb. 22, 2000).

In this case, Armesto has filed a proper motion for summary judgment supported by a proper statement of material facts. LaMarche has, likewise, responded with an opposition brief and a proper opposing statement of material fact. However, rather than setting forth his own, additional facts within his opposing statement in a "separate section [of] additional material facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs," see D. Me. Loc. R. 56(c), LaMarche has provided the Court with a separate filing captioned, "Plaintiff Paul H. LaMarche's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue to be Tried," Docket No. 49. Presumably, counsel for LaMarche thought that it would be easier for the Court if he submitted only one statement of additional material facts for both Armesto's and Metropolitan's summary judgment motions.3 In his favor, I do recognize that both Armesto and Metropolitan Life rely on similar legal arguments in support of their motions. However, Metropolitan's motion addresses claims that Armesto's does not and facts that might be material to Metropolitan's motion are not material to Armesto's. In a case such as this, where there are eight motions pending and twelve additional, related filings on the docket, it is helpful if the parties segregate their motions and filings into discrete groups, properly label their filings and comply strictly with the Local Rules.

Although LaMarche's additional facts are not properly included in his opposing statement of fact, Armesto has failed to controvert LaMarche's statement of additional material facts by means of a reply statement.4 Under normal circumstances, this omission would result in the deemed admission of LaMarche's additional facts. D. Me. Loc. R. 56(e). It is largely because of Armesto's failure to either reply or object that I have considered LaMarche's additional statement of fact for purposes of summary judgment.

FACTS5

In March 1984, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("Metropolitan") issued Flexible Annuity Contract No. 010257663AB to Erlinda Polvorosa LaMarche ("Polvorosa"). Defendant Lorna Armesto['s] Statement of Material Facts, Docket No. 38, at ¶ 3. Polvorosa designated Lorna Armesto as the beneficiary in the event of her death. Id. In August 1987, Metropolitan issued Group Annuity Contract No. 060350706VE to Erlinda Polvorosa. Id., ¶ 4. Polvorosa again designated Armesto as the beneficiary. Id., ¶ 4. Both of these policies are qualified retirement plans. Plaintiff Paul H. LaMarche's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue To Be Tried, Docket No. 49, ¶ 4.

Lorna Armesto was Polvorosa's sister. Id., ¶ 2. Paul LaMarche married Polvorosa in December 1995 and remained her husband until her death on August 22, 1998. Docket No. 38, ¶ 6; Docket No. 49, ¶¶ 6, 9.

In 1997, Erlinda Polvorosa had a falling out with Armesto. Docket No. 49, ¶ 7. Between September 1997 and the execution of her last will and testament on November 24, 1997, each of three successive drafts of the will excluded Armesto from any of the proceeds of Erlinda Polvorosa's estate. Id.; Docket No. 38, ¶ 16. The final, executed version of the will, in its fifth declaration, gives Armesto an equal share with eight other named beneficiaries in a certain Erlinda A. Polvorosa Family Trust, to be funded with "the remaining balance of any qualified retirement plan on account at Metropolitan Life Insurance Company." Docket No. 38, ¶ 17 & Ex. 12; Docket No. 49, ¶¶ 1, 2. The fifth declaration that the Trust is to be funded by "the remaining balance of any qualified retirement plan on account at Metropolitan Life Insurance Company" is a reference to Flexible Annuity Contract No. 010257663AB and Group Annuity Contract No. 060350706VE, hereinafter referred to as the "subject annuities." Docket No. 49, ¶ 5.6 As the Trustee of the Erlinda A. Polvorosa Family Trust, LaMarche is not himself a named beneficiary. Id., ¶ 1.

On October 1, 1997, two Metropolitan agents, James Brann and David Elliot, visited with LaMarche and Polvorosa in their home. Docket No. 38, ¶ 12; Plaintiff Paul H. LaMarche's Response to Defendant Lorna Armesto's Statement of Material Facts, Docket No. 47, ¶ 12; Docket No. 49, ¶ 8. Polvorosa intended to change the beneficiary designations in the subject annuities to name as beneficiary the Trustee of the Erlinda A. Polvorosa Family Trust.7 The purpose of the meeting was to inform the agents of changes to Polvorosa's will and to LaMarche's will and to sign any paperwork required to make these changes effective. Docket No. 49, ¶ 8. Although LaMarche acknowledges that he did not observe Polvorosa fill out change of beneficiary forms or hand them to the agents, he does offer an alleged admission by James Brann, which he claims was...

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