Lamarre v. Lamarre
Decision Date | 07 October 1930 |
Citation | 152 A. 272 |
Parties | LAMARRE v. LAMARRE et al. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1930.
Exceptions from Superior Court, Hillsborough County; Young, J.
Action by Eugenie Lamarre against George Lamarre. Motion by the Maryland Casualty Company to set aside consent judgment and to reopen case for trial on its merits was granted, and plaintiff excepted, and case was reported.
Plaintiff's exception to designated ruling and to order based thereon sustained, and case discharged.
See, also, 147 A. 747.
Case, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while riding in the automobile of her husband, the defendant George Lamarre. He was insured against liability by the defendant company which defended under the terms of its policy. The trial was by jury, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff for $600, which was later set aside as inadequate. Immediately following the trial the company advised the insured by letter: The company's attorney withdrew his appearance and other counsel appeared for the insured. The company then brought a bill in equity against the insured and the plaintiff for cancellation of the policy because of conspiracy, fraud, and collusion at the trial. Upon hearing the bill was dismissed, and the dismissal was sustained in this court by decision rendered January 3, 1928. 83 N. H. 206, 110 A. 174. Eight days later counsel for the insured withdrew his appearance in the superior court, and on the following day the insured appeared pro se and confessed judgment for $10,000. Thereupon the company, having obtained leave to appear, filed the motions here in issue, asking that the consent judgment be set aside, and that the case be reopened for trial on its merits, alleging as grounds therefor fraud, mistake, collusion, and conspiracy.
Upon hearing on its motions the company's letter of February 19, 1924, was introduced. Its attorney admitted that the letter was sent, and the company's appearance withdrawn, against the advice of counsel. Upon these facts and the docket entries the court found and ruled as follows: The plaintiff filed a written statement of her intention to look to the company for the satisfaction of her judgment.
Exceptions taken by the plaintiff to such findings, rulings, and orders were allowed by Young, J. So far as material to the decision, these will appear in the opinion.
Banigan & Banigan, of Manchester, for plaintiff.
O'Connor & Saidel, of Manchester, for defendant.
As the record is here interpreted, the court in effect ruled that, in the absence of a waiver of its rights, the company was not bound by the agreement for judgment between the parties of record, and rested such holding on the fact that the company was not a party thereto. The plaintiff excepted to this ruling and to the order based thereon.
The company undertook to indemnify the insured against liability. From the earlier transfer, and from concessions of counsel in argument here, it appears that the policy contained the usual provisions of such contracts, binding the company to defend or settle any suit brought to recover damages on account of any accident covered by the policy, and forbidding interference by the insured therewith, or with settlements, except by the company's consent. It appears to be conceded that the policy covers the injury in suit. Pursuant to its contract the company appeared and defended the action. Its assumption of the defense was an assumption of the liability of the insured, if any, for the injury to the plaintiff, which the company could not thereafter escape except by settlement with the plaintiff or payment to the insured. Sanders v. Company, 72 N. H. 485, 495, 496, 501, 57 A. 655, 101 Am. St. Rep. 688; Lombard v. Company, 78 N. H. 110, 111, 97 A. 892. The company's withdrawal did not deprive the plaintiff of her right to continue the prosecution of her suit in the usual course. Upon the disappearance of counsel for the defense she was at liberty to deal with the...
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