Lamb v. John Umstead Hosp.

• Citation: 19 F.Supp.2d 498
• Decision Date: 01 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 5:97CV-1019-BR3.,5:97CV-1019-BR3.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Sharon LAMB, Plaintiff, v. JOHN UMSTEAD HOSPITAL, Defendant.

19 F.Supp.2d 498

Sharon LAMB, Plaintiff, v. JOHN UMSTEAD HOSPITAL, Defendant.

No. 5:97CV-1019-BR3.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division.

September 1, 1998.

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John B. Meuser, Raleigh, NC, Deborah N. Meyer, Hollowell, Peacock & Meyer, Raleigh, NC, for Plaintiff.

Victoria L. Voight, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, NC, for Defendant.

ORDER

BRITT, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Sharon Lamb, was employed by the North Carolina Department of Human Resources which operates defendant, John Umstead Hospital, as a social worker until her discharge on 31 May 1996. On 1 June 1996, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (ADA). Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the EEOC on 29 September 1997 and filed this action on 24 December 1997.

Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (2) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars plaintiff's ADA claim and that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the ADA. Plaintiff responds that the Eleventh Amendment immunity upon which defendant relies has been legally abrogated by Congress and does not prohibit plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff also maintains that she has adequately plead her ADA claim.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant John Umstead Hospital has filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For purposes of such a motion, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true. As stated by the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957):

In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.

Id. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. "[T]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim." Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir.1989).

III. ADA's ABROGATION OF STATES' IMMUNITY

Plaintiff alleges that defendant has violated the ADA, which prohibits intentional discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities "in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA also requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for the disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) and (B). Along with employment, the statute applies to a range of activities including government services, public accommodations, and communications. The ADA covers public entities, including States, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A), and requires them to operate their programs and services in a manner readily accessible to disabled individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

Defendant, an agency of the State of North Carolina, argues that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution entitles it to immunity from an ADA suit by a private citizen.

The Eleventh Amendment states:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Under the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, a State is also granted immunity from suits initiated by its own citizens in federal court if the State has not consented to such suits. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)). However, Congress has the authority to abrogate a State's immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114.

The issue before the court is whether Congress, in enacting the ADA and attempting to abrogate the States' immunity from suit, exceeded the scope of its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court set forth a test for determining that issue in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114. First, a court must determine whether Congress has "`unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity.'" Id. (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)). Second, a court must determine "whether Congress has acted `pursuant to a valid exercise of power'" in abrogating that immunity. Id.

The ADA explicitly states that

[a] State shall not be immune under the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a state for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies at both law and equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available ... against any public or private entity other than a state.

42 U.S.C. § 12202. Because Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the States' immunity, the issue before the court is narrowed to an inquiry as to the validity of Congress's exercise of power.

Pursuant to Seminole Tribe and precedent cited therein, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, "the enforcement clause," allows Congress to abrogate States' immunity from suit guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114. Section 5 provides that "Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [that] article." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Therefore, Congress can enact legislation pursuant to Section 5 that is designed to enforce the prohibitions expressly directed at the States in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress may validly abrogate the States' immunity from suit in those circumstances. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Supreme Court wrote:

Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), the Supreme Court explained:

"Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of Congressional power."

Boerne, 521 U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2163 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-346, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1879)).

The question logically follows whether the ADA is designed to enforce the provisions expressly directed at the States in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That question must be resolved by applying the proportionality test set forth in Boerne, 521 U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2164. Defendant argues that, aside from being disproportionate to the injury it seeks to redress, the ADA is not designed to enforce the equal protection clause for two reasons: 1) the ADA protects a class of individuals who do not enjoy heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and 2) the ADA is not "remedial," but rather it creates positive rights of entitlement and provides special treatment and accommodations for the disabled as against other, nondisabled individuals and the States. (Def. Mem. at 5.)

First, the court will discuss the equal protection clause and the protection from discrimination that it confers upon the disabled in conjunction with defendant's "suspect class" argument. Second, the court will apply the proportionality test prescribed by Boerne. Third, the court will address defendant's argument pertaining to the remedial nature of the ADA.

A. The Equal Protection Clause and the Disabled

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Any law, therefore, that draws a distinction among people is susceptible to an equal protection challenge. See Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES at 527 (1997). While classifications based on race or national origin are subject to strict scrutiny, and classifications based on sex are subject to intermediate scrutiny, other classifications, like age and disability, are subject only to the rational basis test. Id. at 529. Under the rational basis test, a law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Id.

In Cleburne, the Supreme Court held that the "mentally retarded" do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny for purposes of equal protection analysis. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-446, 105 S.Ct. 3249. The Court stated, however, that its "refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does not leave...