Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp.

• Citation: 228 F.Supp.3d 28
• Decision Date: 06 January 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 16-765 (RDM)
• Parties: Jerry Goralski LAMB, Plaintiff, v. MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

228 F.Supp.3d 28

Jerry Goralski LAMB, Plaintiff,

v.MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 16-765 (RDM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed January 6, 2017

Jerry Goralski Lamb, Brandywine, MD, pro se.

Jason Todd Cohen, U.S. Attorney's Office, Heather G. White, The Federal Practice Group, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge

This case is before the Court on plaintiff Jerry Lamb's third motion for leave to amend his complaint, Dkt. 41; his motions for summary judgment on all three counts of his amended complaint, Dkts. 21, 22; his motion seeking court-appointed counsel, Dkt. 27; and his motion for entry of a default judgment against defendant the Millennium Challenge Corporation ("MCC") and to strike a declaration supporting the MCC's motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 43. MCC, in turn, moves for summary judgment on all three counts of Lamb's amended complaint, Dkt. 17, and defendant George Chiamulera moves to dismiss the claims brought against him, Dkt. 11. For the reasons explained below, Lamb's motion for leave to amend is granted in part and denied in part; his remaining motions are denied; Chiamulera's motion to dismiss is granted; and the MCC's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are either alleged in the amended complaint, which is the currently operative pleading, or are subject to judicial notice. In November 2015, Lamb applied for a job as an "Acquisition Business Analyst" with Sawdey Solutions Services, Inc. ("Sawdey"). Dkt. 9 at 2, ¶ 6. Sawdey, in turn, served as a contractor for the MCC, id. , a corporation established in the executive branch of the federal government, see 22 U.S.C. § 7703(a). The Secretary of State serves as chairperson of the Board of Directors of the MCC. Id. at § 7703(c)(5). Other members of the Board include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, the MCC's Chief Executive Officer, the United States Trade Representative, and four other individuals appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. § 7703(c)(3). The MCC is authorized to provide foreign assistance to countries that enter into a compact with the United States setting forth a plan for "achieving shared development objectives." Id. § 7708(a). The MCC "may contract with individuals for personal services, who shall not be considered [f]ederal employees for any provision of law administered by the Office of Personnel Management." Id. § 7713(a)(8).

Lamb was offered a position with Sawdey to "augment[ ]" MCC employees as a "[p]ersonal [s]ervices [c]ontractor." Dkt. 9 at 2, ¶ 6. That position, however, required "a favorable background check investigation." Id. The MCC ordinarily conducts its own background investigations for applicants "for the office in question," but "in some instances [it] may request that the United States Department of State assist in the background investigations." Id.

Lamb successfully completed the required questionnaires and was cleared to begin work as an MCC personal services contractor on February 22, 2016. Id. at 2–3, ¶ 7. On or about March 8, 2016, however, an official at "MCC security" contacted Lamb and told him that George Chiamulera, an "independent contractor to the Office of Personnel Security & Suitability [in the] Bureau of Diplomatic Security [at the] U.S. Department of State," would interview him as part of his background investigation. Id. at 3, ¶ 8. The "background investigation" was "conducted in part by [the] MCC and in part by ... George Chiamulera" and took place on March 11 and 13, 2016. Id. Upon completion of the investigation, Chiamulera forwarded the information he had gathered to the State Department's Office of Personnel Security & Suitability, which subsequently forwarded that information to the MCC on March 28, 2016. Id. at 3, ¶ 9

When Lamb arrived to work on the morning of April 18, 2016, MCC officials confiscated his government identification, removed him from the premises, and terminated his employment. Id. at 3, ¶ 10. At that time, no one offered Lamb any explanation for these events. Id. Lamb later asked a contact at Sawdey why he had been dismissed and was told that Sawdey had been "informed by someone at MCC that Mr. Lamb's security check came back unfavorable." Id. Lamb, then, sent an email to the MCC on April 21, 2016, requesting "copies of all information maintained about himself" under both the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Id. at 4, ¶ 14. The MCC responded by email that same day, assigning a request number to Lamb's FOIA request, but it did not separately acknowledge or address his request under the Privacy Act. Id. at 4, ¶ 15; see also Dkt. 1 at 12–13.

Lamb filed suit on April 26, 2016, initially alleging that the MCC had violated his rights under the Privacy Act and FOIA by failing to provide the records he requested. See Dkt. 1. He amended his complaint as of right on May 26, 2016, adding George Chiamulera as a defendant and asserting three counts: In Count 1, Lamb alleges that the MCC violated the Privacy Act and FOIA by denying him access to records, Dkt. 9 at 4–5, ¶¶ 13–18; in Count 2, he alleges that Chiamulera violated the Privacy Act by disseminating "protected health information [and] inaccurate and defamatory information regarding" Lamb, without first securing his written authorization, id. at 5, ¶¶ 19–22; and, in Count 3, he alleges that Chiamulera violated the Privacy Act by "fail[ing] to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the information and records were accurate, complete, timely and relevant for agency purposes," id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 23–27.

Since filing the amended complaint, Lamb has filed three motions seeking leave to file a second, third and fourth amended complaint. See Dkts. 26, 32, 41. The Court denied the first two of those motions as moot by minute order dated December 7, 2016. The Court now addresses Lamb's most recent motion for leave to amend, Dkt. 41; Chiamulera's motion to dismiss; Dkt. 11; Lamb's motions for summary judgment; Dkts. 21, 22; the MCC's motion for summary judgment; Dkt. 17; and Lamb's remaining motions; Dkts. 27, 43.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Pending Dispositive Motions

Before turning to the adequacy of the claims that Lamb seeks to add, the Court starts with the pending dispositive motions: Chiamulera's motion to dismiss, the MCC's motion for summary judgment, and Lamb's cross-motions for summary judgment.

1. Chimulera's Motion to Dismiss and Lamb's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

The currently operative complaint contains three counts. The first count invokes both the Privacy Act and FOIA and alleges that the MCC failed to comply with its statutory obligations to provide Lamb with the records he requested. Dkt. 9 at 4–5, ¶¶ 13–18. The second and third counts both invoke the Privacy Act. Id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 19–27. According to the second count, Chiamulera disseminated Privacy Act-protected records without Lamb's authorization, id. at 5, ¶¶ 19–22, and, according the third count, he failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that Privacy Act records were "accurate, complete, timely and relevant for agency purposes," id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 23–27.

As an initial matter, Chiamulera and Lamb dispute whether the first count, which seeks disclosure of agency records, is asserted against the MCC and Chiamulera or just the MCC. Compare Dkt. 11–2 at 3 with Dkt. 21 at 2. Given the allegations that Lamb submitted his request to the MCC and that the MCC lacked a "legal basis for the denial" of Lamb's request, Dkt. 9 at 4–5, ¶¶ 14, 18, Chiamulera has the better argument. But, even giving Lamb the benefit of the doubt as a pro se litigant, the Court concludes that none of the three claims can stand as asserted against Chiamulera. It is well-settled that "no cause of action exists that would entitle" a plaintiff to obtain relief from an individual "under the Privacy Act or FOIA." Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons , 444 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam). This conclusion follows from the indisputable premise that "[b]oth statutes concern the obligations of agencies as distinct from individual employees in those agencies." Id. The Court will, accordingly, dismiss all claims currently pending against Chiamulera.

Lamb also cross-moves for summary judgment against Chiamulera, arguing that Chiamulera should be "enjoin[ed] ... from further deprivation of [the] requested records" and required to "expunge all records or information created, compiled, adjudicated or maintained by ... Chiamulera that [are] inaccurate, illegal and/or derogatory to ... Lamb." Dkt. 21 at 2. For the same reason that Chiamulera is entitled to judgment in his favor, Lamb's cross-motion must fail. Both the Privacy Act and FOIA apply to agency records, see Martinez , 444 F.3d at 624, and only the agency has the authority or the ability to produce or correct those records.

2. The MCC's Motion for Summary Judgment and Lamb's Cross-Motion

The MCC asserts that it has disclosed all responsive records "with no redactions or withholdings," Dkt. 17 at 5, and that, as a result, Lamb's FOIA claim is moot, id. at 8–9. Although the MCC did not separately mention Lamb's Privacy Act claim seeking the disclosure of the same records in its motion for summary judgment, the same line of reasoning applies, and the MCC subsequently "clarifie[d]" that it intended to seek summary judgment on both claims.

Dkt. 37 at 1 n.1. In response, Lamb disputes that he has now received all of the records he sought, and he cross-moves for summary judgment to the extent his amended complaint seeks disclosure of those records. Dkt. 22 at 9.

FOIA requires that an agency conduct an adequate search for responsive records. "An agency fulfills [this] obligation [ ] ... if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was...