Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp.
| Decision Date | 27 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-589 (RDM) |
| Citation | 573 F.Supp.3d 346 |
| Parties | Jerry Goralski LAMB, Plaintiff, v. MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Jerry Goralski Lamb, Brandywine, MD, Pro Se.
Sean Michael Tepe, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants Millennium Challenge Corporation, James R. Blades, United States of America.
Plaintiff Jerry Goralski Lamb, appearing pro se , brings this suit against the Millennium Challenge Corporation (the "MCC") and James Blades, an MCC official. In 2016, Plaintiff worked for about two months as a personal services contractor assigned to the MCC, until he was terminated after allegedly failing a background check. Since then, Plaintiff has taken a variety of steps seeking to understand and to challenge that background check and his termination. He first filed requests for records related to his termination pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. After the MCC failed to timely respond, Plaintiff brought suit in this Court, and the MCC (and the Department of State) eventually released the disputed records. See Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp. , 334 F. Supp. 3d 204 (D.D.C. 2018) ( Lamb I ); Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp. , No. 16-cv-765, 2019 WL 4141868 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2019) ( Lamb II ); Minute Order, Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp. , No. 16-CV-765 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2020). Then, based on records he obtained in that litigation, Plaintiff brought this suit in March 2019, asserting four due process claims, two Privacy Act claims, and other ill-defined claims against the MCC and Blades. See Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp. , 498 F. Supp. 3d 104, 108 (D.D.C. 2020) ( Lamb III ). In response, Defendants moved to dismiss. Dkt. 29 at 1. The Court denied that motion with respect to Plaintiff's due process claims and one of his two Privacy Act claims, but otherwise granted the motion without prejudice. Lamb III , 498 F. Supp. 3d at 120–21.
That leads to where Plaintiff's efforts now stand. With leave of Court, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that (1) retains the claims that the Court declined to dismiss, (2) attempts to cure the defects in the Privacy Act claim that the Court dismissed, and (3) seeks to add a claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. See Dkt. 29 (1st Am. Compl.). Defendants, for their part, move to dismiss the amended Privacy Act claim and the FTCA claim. Dkt. 32. Leaving no stone unturned, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his complaint, yet again, to "clarif[y]" his Privacy Act claim and the "common law claims that underlie his FTCA claim." Dkt. 37 at 1–2.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss, Dkt. 32, and will also DENY Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint, Dkt. 37.
Given the long history of Plaintiff's litigation against the MCC and Blades, and the Court's numerous opinions leading up to the present motion, the Court will only briefly recount the relevant background. The Court assumes the truth of the allegations in Plaintiff's first amended complaint for purposes of resolving Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but will consider facts outside the pleadings for purposes of resolving Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham , 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
On February 22, 2016, Plaintiff began working for Sawdey Solutions Services, Inc., which served as a contractor for the MCC. Dkt. 29 at 3 ; see also Lamb III , 498 F. Supp. 3d at 106. The job required a favorable background check, but it did not require a security clearance or handling any classified information. Dkt. 29 at 3 . Although Plaintiff believed that he had already been "cleared" by the time he started the job, the MCC informed him two weeks after he started work that he would need to interview with someone from the State Department "as part of his background investigation." Id. (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 8). The State Department assisted in conducting Plaintiff's background investigation. Id. (1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–9).
On April 18, 2016, MCC officials "terminated [Plaintiff's] employment," "confiscated" his "government identification," and "removed him from the premises." Id. (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 9). Plaintiff later learned from Sawdey that he was terminated because his "security check came back unfavorable." Id. As a result, Plaintiff was "not permitted to continue to work on the MCC contract," and he was "debarred for 36 months by the MCC." Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was "stigmatized as a result" of the MCC's actions; that he "lost his job;" and that, despite his "best efforts," he has been unable to secure "alternative employment" as a government contractor. Id. To this day, Plaintiff "is still seeking employment." Id.
According to Plaintiff, "no one from the MCC has ever explained to him what issues or charges arose" that resulted in his unfavorable background check, and the MCC never provided "him the opportunity to respond to the agency's concerns or charges." Id. (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 10). Determined to learn what happened, Plaintiff requested "copies of all information maintained about himself" from the MCC. Id. at 4 . When the agency failed to timely respond, Plaintiff sued the MCC under FOIA and the Privacy Act. See Lamb II , 2019 WL 4141868, at *1. After three years of litigation and three opinions from this Court, the MCC (and the State Department) finally provided the requested documents to Plaintiff, and the Court closed the case in January 2020. Minute Order, Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp. , No. 16-cv-765 (Jan. 23, 2020).
The records Plaintiff obtained shed light on the reasons for his termination. According to Plaintiff, as part of his background investigation, the State Department provided the MCC with a "robust and detailed" Report of Investigation ("ROI"), which Plaintiff alleges "ended under favorable conditions." Dkt. 29 at 5 . The MCC then created an "Adjudication Worksheet" that listed four "issues" relating to Plaintiff's background. Id. (1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17); Dkt. 23-5.1 In particular, it reported that Plaintiff (1) was "removed" from his position at the Naval Air Systems Command Facility "for being absent without leave;" (2) received a one-day suspension for "[f]ailure to follow an instruction and to promote the efficiency of the service;" (3) was delinquent on a "[f]inancial [a]ccount;" and (4) received "[p]sychological [t]reatment." Dkt. 23-5 at 1. The comments section of the Adjudication Worksheet noted that the ROI "did not yield any additional information on the issues raised." Dkt. 29 at 5 ); Dkt. 23-5 at 1. The form provides a "Length of Proposed Debarment" of 36 months, Dkt. 23-5 at 1, but the "Final Action" is listed as "unfavorable determination," rather than "Agency Debarment as Proposed," id. The MCC gave Plaintiff no opportunity to contest or correct these findings, Dkt. 29 at 3 , all of which Plaintiff alleges are incorrect or misleading, id. at 5 .
On March 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the MCC and Blades, asserting four claims under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment (Counts I–IV) and two claims under the Privacy Act (Counts V–VI). Dkt 1. On November 3, 2020, the Court dismissed one of those Privacy Act claims (Count VI) and "any other claims" arguably raised in Plaintiff's complaint. Lamb III , 498 F. Supp. 3d at 120–21. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint so that he could clarify his Privacy Act claim in Count VI and assert any additional claims, if appropriate. Id. On December 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint realleging the claims in his original complaint, expanding on the Privacy Act in Count VI, and adding an FTCA claim (Count VII). See Dkt. 29. Defendants move to dismiss Count VI for failure to state a claim and Court VII for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Dkt. 32. Plaintiff opposes that motion and, in the alternative, seeks leave to amend his complaint to address the asserted deficiencies. Dkt. 37.
Although pleadings by pro se litigants are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007), they must still comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Jarrell v. Tisch , 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the Court's jurisdiction to hear a claim and may raise a "facial" or a "factual" challenge to the Court's jurisdiction. See Hale v. United States , No. 13-CV-1390, 2015 WL 7760161, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2015). A facial challenge to the Court's jurisdiction contests the legal sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations contained in the complaint, see Erby v. United States , 424 F. Supp. 2d 180, 182 (D.D.C. 2006), while a factual challenge "is addressed to the underlying facts contained in the complaint," Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft , 279 F. Supp. 2d 13, 20 (D.D.C. 2003). For factual challenges, the Court " ‘may not deny the motion to dismiss merely by assuming the truth of the facts alleged by the plaintiff and disputed by the defendant,’ but ‘must go beyond the pleadings and resolve any disputed issues of fact the resolution of which is necessary to a ruling upon the motion to dismiss.’ " Erby , 424 F. Supp. 2d at 182–83 (quoting Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola , 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ). As a result, when controverted by competent evidence, the factual allegations of the complaint...
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