Lamb v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 17 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-300-J-34PDB |
| Parties | BRADLEY R. LAMB, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Bradley Lamb, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on March 7, 2017,1 by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1). In the Petition, Lamb challenges a 2007 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for three counts of promoting a sexual performance by a child, lewd and lascivious exhibition, and soliciting a child by computer. Lamb raises seven grounds for relief. See Petition at 5-11.2 Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response; Doc. 18) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). Lamb filed a brief in reply. See Reply to Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Reply; Doc. 30). This case is ripe for review.
On May 30, 2006, the State of Florida (State) charged Lamb with ten counts of promoting a sexual performance by a child (counts one through ten), ten counts of transmission of pornography by electronic device (counts eleven through twenty), three counts of lewd or lascivious exhibition (counts twenty-one through twenty-three), and one count of soliciting a child via computer (count twenty-four). Resp. Ex. A at 27-30. On July 23, 2007, Lamb entered a negotiated guilty plea to counts one, three, four, twenty-three, and twenty-four in exchange for the State dropping the remaining counts. Id. at 46-49. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Lamb agreed to a sentencing range of five to fifteen years. Id. On September 18, 2007, the circuit court sentenced Lamb to a term of incarceration of fifteen years in prison as to counts one, three, four, and twenty-three, with each count running concurrently. Id. at 110-17. As to count twenty-four, the circuit court imposed a term of probation of five years to run consecutively to his prison sentences. Id. at 111, 121-25.
On October 15, 2007, Lamb filed a notice appealing his conviction and sentence with Florida's First District Court of Appeal. Id. at 126-40. During the pendency of his direct appeal, Lamb filed a motion to correct a sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) (First Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion), in which he argued the circuit court illegally imposed sex offender probation for count twenty-four. Resp. Ex. D at 1-3. On June 2, 2008, the circuit court granted the First Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion and imposed regular probation as to count twenty-four. Id. at 11-17. On October 1, 2008, Lamb filed another motion to correct a sentencing error pursuant to Rule 3.800(b)(2) (Second Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion), alleging that his sentences were illegal because adifferent judge sentenced him rather than the judge who accepted his plea. Resp. Ex. F at 1-3. The circuit court denied the Second Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion. Id. at 4-7. On June 25, 2008, the State filed a motion to vacate the order granting Lamb's First Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion. Resp. Ex. H at 10-13. Following a hearing, the circuit court clarified its order granting the First Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion to reflect that it removed the designation of "sexual offender" from the probation order but the terms and conditions of his probation as agreed to in the plea agreement still applied, including the requirement that Lamb register as a sexual offender. Id. at 20, 38-39.
On January 7, 2010, still during the pendency of his direct appeal, Lamb filed a third motion to correct a sentencing error pursuant to Rule 3.800(b)(2) (Third Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion), in which he argued the circuit court improperly imposed a $20 surcharge and wrongly imposed special conditions of probation that it did not orally pronounce. Resp. Ex. K at 1-13. On February 12, 2010, the circuit court granted in part and denied in part the Third Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion. Id. at 31-36. The circuit court struck the $20 surcharge and condition eleven of Lamb's probation. Id. On April 1, 2010, Lamb filed another Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion (Fourth Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion), in which he argued the circuit court impermissibly altered his plea agreement. Resp. Ex. L1 at 1-7. On June 30, 2010, the circuit court denied Lamb's Fourth Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion. Id. at 129-33.
On March 16, 2010, Lamb's appellate counsel filed an Anders3 brief. Resp. Ex. V. Thereafter, Lamb filed a pro se initial brief in which he raised the following arguments: (1) the prosecutor profiled him as a pedophile; (2) the circuit court ignored mitigationevidence; (3) changes to his plea voided it; (4) re-imposing special conditions of his probation constituted double jeopardy; (5) the sentencing judge did not have jurisdiction as a successor judge; (6) the prosecutor did not have authority; and (7) the circuit court erred in denying a motion to disqualify. Resp. Exs. X; Y. On December 15, 2010, the First DCA per curiam affirmed the convictions and sentences without a written opinion and issued the Mandate on March 16, 2011. Resp. Ex. Z. Lamb filed a motion for rehearing, which the First DCA denied on February 28, 2011. Resp. Ex. AA.
On April 21, 2011, Lamb filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c), which the circuit court denied on May 10, 2011. Resp. Ex. BB. On October 17, 2011, Lamb filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). Resp. Ex. CC at 1-25. He raised the following claims in his Rule 3.850 Motion: (1) the prosecutor lacked authority to prosecute his case; (2) the State failed to timely prosecute him; (3) the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over his case; (4) he involuntarily entered his plea; (5) counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and conduct an adversarial challenge to the State's case against him; and (6) the cumulative errors in the prosecution of his case prejudiced him. Id. The circuit court denied the Rule 3.850 Motion. Id. at 294-318. On September 7, 2016, the First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of the motion without issuing a written opinion. Resp. Ex. FF. The First DCA denied Lamb's motion for rehearing on November 1, 2016, Resp. Ex. GG, and issued the Mandate on November 18, 2016. Resp. Ex. FF.
This proceeding was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can "adequately assess [Lamb's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relieffunctions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has instructed:
[T]he federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.
If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable...
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