Lamb v. State

• Decision Date: 04 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 175S29,175S29
• Citation: 264 Ind. 563,348 N.E.2d 1
• Parties: Raymond Charles LAMB, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1

348 N.E.2d 1

264 Ind. 563

Raymond Charles LAMB, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 175S29.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 4, 1976.

Thurman M. De Moss, Franklin, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

Raymond Charles Lamb was convicted of first degree murder after jury trial in the Jefferson Circuit Court. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life. His appeal presents three issues for determination:

1. Whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion to suppress statements made by the defendant;

2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give one of defendant's instructions; and

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for mistrial, predicated upon the state's voire dire examination of prospective jurors.

I.

Procedurally, appellant challenged the admissibility of his confession through a pre-trial motion to suppress. After a hearing on the motion to suppress, at which appellant did not testify, the trial court overruled the motion. At trial when the confessions were introduced, appellant did not raise any objection other than to rely upon his earlier motion. The overruling of such motion was assigned as error in appellant's motion to correct errors, and it is that error which we review below. In so doing, we review the evidence before the trial court at the hearing on the motion to suppress together with all evidence presented prior to the admission of the confessions.

Appellant maintains that statements he made to the police on September 2d and 6th, 1973, were not voluntarily given and should have been suppressed. When the statements were given, appellant had been in jail for several months on another charge. Commencing in July, 1973, John Lasiter and Sheriff John Means, both of the Johnson County Sheriff's Department, began questioning appellant about the murder here charged. The frequency of these sessions was no more than twice a week, and the duration of each session ranged from half an hour to forty-five minutes. Appellant's Miranda rights were explained to him before each of these requiries. These sessions were discontinued sometime during the latter part of August, apparently because they were unproductive. Sheriff Means testified at the motion to suppress hearing that it had been at least two weeks, possibly three, since appellant had been qestioned about the murder prior to his confession on September 2. The ground work for appellant's confession on September 2 was laid when, on September 1, appellant sent a note asking to see Lasiter. When Lasiter responded, the appellant told him:

(CROSS-EXAMINATION OF JOHN LASITER.)

A. '. . . if I would make arrangements for him to have a telephone conversation with Bonnie Emmert, the girl he had been living with, that after asking what she thought that he would probably confess to the two homicides I had been working on. So I made these arrangments and was notified that Bonnie would return may call at 10:30 P.M. on Sunday. So that was when I went down to the jail and got him out and took him to the downstairs office and she called approximately 9:30 A.M. He talked to her for 30 to 40 minutes. After that he got up from the telephone and said 'I am ready to confess' and we went to my office and he did so.'

Appellant urges that his confession was rendered involuntary because of his fear that his common-law wife, Bonnie, might be charged as an accessory to the theft for which he was incarcerated and/or in the murder under investigation. Appellant was also concerned about the fate of his children in the event Bonnie was so charged. On this point, Sheriff Means' testimony indicates appellant was advised as some time during the interrogations of the possibility that Bonnie might be charged as a accessory to the homicide. There was absolutely no testimony presented at the motion to suppress hearing, however, which would indicate that the investigating officers directly threatened to arrest Bonnie or take away the children if appellant did not confess to the murder. The officers denied making any threats or promises to induce appellant's confession and appellant did not testify at the motion to suppress hearing.

The force upon the will of appellant of any implied threat arising from the Sheriff's statement that it was possible that appellant's wife might be charged as an accessory must be determined from facts peculiarly within the accused's own knowledge and from circumstantial evidence. Here, the circumstantial evidence linking appellant's wife to the murder was sparse, if not non-existent. To be sure, this case is not like Hall v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 606, 266 N.E.2d 16, relied upon by appellant. In Hall, the officers advised the defendant that his wife was a prime suspect. Here, officers made no such statement. In the absence of such a statement by the police, we hold that the mere advice of the possibility of an accessoryship charge, without more, did not render appellant's confession involuntary.

Appellant, however, suggests additional factors which he believes weigh upon the voluntariness of his confession. To the foregoing, appellant adds the pressures resulting from confinement and 'the psychological impact of interrogation by many.' In addition to the series of interrogations described above, appellant was also questioned on other occasions by officers from other agencies about other crimes. We can find nothing in the record, however, which indicates that any of these other...