Lamb v. Tenth Judicial Dist. Drug Task Force

• Decision Date: 03 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1:13–CV–73.,1:13–CV–73.
• Citation: 944 F.Supp.2d 586
• Parties: Susan H. LAMB, Plaintiff, v. TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT DRUG TASK FORCE, Officer David Jones individually and in his official capacity as an agent for the Tenth Judicial District Drug Task Force, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

944 F.Supp.2d 586

Susan H. LAMB, Plaintiff,

v.TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT DRUG TASK FORCE, Officer David Jones individually and in his official capacity as an agent for the Tenth Judicial District Drug Task Force, Defendants.

No. 1:13–CV–73.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee.

May 3, 2013.

H. Franklin Chancey, Chancey, Kanavos, Love & Painter, Cleveland, TN, for Plaintiff.

Amanda Shanan Jordan, Office of the Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

CURTIS L. COLLIER, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants the Tenth Judicial District Drug Task Force (“DTF”) and Officer David Jones (“Officer Jones”) (collectively, “Defendants”) (Court File No. 2). Plaintiff Susan Lamb (“Plaintiff”) filed a response in opposition to this motion (Court File No. 5), to which Defendants replied (Court File No. 8). Defendants argue Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the DTF and Officer Jones in his official capacity must fail because the DTF is an agency of the State of Tennessee, and therefore not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. They also argue Officer Jones in his individual capacity is absolutely immune from Plaintiff's state law negligence claims as an employee of the state. Plaintiff argues the DTF receives funding and operational direction from a mixture of state and local entities, and should be considered a person under § 1983. The Court concludes the answers to these questions require consideration of materials outside the scope of Plaintiff's complaint.Accordingly, Defendants' motion will be DENIED (Court File No. 2).

I. BACKGROUND

The DTF is a joint operation of a number of Tennessee counties, including Bradley County, where the events giving rise to this case occurred. The complaint alleges Officer Jones, on January 17, 2012, appeared before a magistrate of the General Sessions Court in Bradley County and sought an arrest warrant for Plaintiff. Officer Jones claimed Plaintiff had purchased 10.08 grams of medications containing pseudoephedrine/ephedrine within a thirty-day period four months previously. Section 39–17–431 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, prohibits an individual from purchasing more than 9 grams of pseudoephedrine during a thirty-day period. The magistrate issued the arrest warrant. Plaintiff alleges Officer Jones did not conduct a sufficient investigation and that a “cursory examination” of Plaintiff's “history, life style, or activities” would demonstrate she was a law-abiding citizen.

On February 10, 2012, Plaintiff was arrested for possession of Immediate Methamphetamine Precursor at her home. She was taken to the Bradley County Justice Center, where she was booked, finger printed, and detained on bond. Her photo and the charges against her appeared in various publications such as “Just Busted” as well as websites that publish booking photos of East Tennessee arrestees. On February 13, 2012, Plaintiff appeared in Bradley County General Sessions Court where it was determined the case lacked merit. The State of Tennessee entered a nolle prosequi. The record of her arrest was expunged, but Plaintiff claims her information remains in the National Crime Information Computer System.

Nearly one year later, Plaintiff filed this complaint in Bradley Count Circuit Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29–20–101 et seq. She claims her First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. She specifically alleges an unreasonable seizure, a violation of due process, and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. She also claims Officer Jones' actions constitute malicious prosecution and false imprisonment under state common law. She alleges the DTF was aware its officers, including Officer Jones, were arresting citizens without conducting effective investigations and took no effort to correct their actions. She also alleges the DTF failed to train its officers or maintain constitutionally adequate standards for officer conduct. On March 11, 2013, Defendants removed to this court and filed the instant motion to dismiss.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted when it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir.1998). For purposes of this determination, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and assumes the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. Thurman v. Pfizer, Inc., 484 F.3d 855, 859 (6th Cir.2007). The same deference does not extend to bare assertions of legal conclusions, however, and the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986).

The Court next considers whether the factual allegations, if true, would support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Thurman, 484 F.3d at 859. Although a complaint need only contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)), this statement must nevertheless contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Plausibility as explained by the Court “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges a violation of her federal rights pursuant to § 1983, and alleges state law claims of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. The Court will consider Plaintiff's federal claims and state claims separately.

A. Federal Claims

To state a general claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that a person acting under color of state law ‘deprived [her] of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.’ ” Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir.2011) (citing Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 817 (6th Cir.2005)). The United States Supreme Court has recognized the exclusion of “States and arms of the State from the definition of person” under § 1983. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 383, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)). “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.”); see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n. 24, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997).

Defendants argue the DTF constitutes a state entity. They assert Eleventh Amendment immunity and argue a state agency is not a “person” under § 1983. Because Officer Jones is an employee of a state agency, Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Officer Jones in his official capacity. If, as Defendants argue, the DTF is a state agency, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims should be dismissed because a state is not a “person” under § 1983. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055 (holding § 1983 actions do not lie against a state, and therefore Eleventh Amendment immunity does not prevent the § 1983 case against a state, rather § 1983 creates no remedy against a state).

Plaintiff argues, however, the DTF should not be considered a state agency. Plaintiff notes she has alleged the DTF is self-financing, has its own rules and regulations, and oversees its own personnel. Plaintiff has submitted a partial copy of the DTF's by-laws and suggests the Court should consider those materials. Although Plaintiff acknowledges these by-laws are “extrinsic” to the motion to dismiss, she suggests the Court should consider them regardless. Plaintiff also contends, at this point of the litigation, the Court cannot consider whether Officer Jones satisfies the statutory requirements to be considered a state employee, which include designation by the district attorney general, registration with the board of claims, and satisfaction of statutory criteria. Any such determination must be reserved for a Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 motion.

Defendants point to two published decisions from the other districts of Tennessee to establish the DTF is a state agency. In Perez v. Wade, 652 F.Supp.2d 901 (W.D.Tenn.2009), a court in the Western District concluded the Twenty–Fourth Judicial District Drug Task Force is a state agency for the purposes of § 1983. In that case, the plaintiff did not dispute that a drug task force is a state agency and even acknowledged the drug task force may be the wrong defendant. Accordingly, the court concluded a drug task force could not be sued under § 1983.

Defendants also point to an earlier decision from the Middle District. In Timberlake by Timberlake v. Benton, 786 F.Supp. 676 (M.D.Tenn.1992), the court concluded the Nineteenth...