Lambdin v. State

Decision Date16 June 1942
Citation150 Fla. 814,9 So.2d 192
PartiesLAMBDIN v. STATE.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied July 31, 1942.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pinellas County; John W Bird, judge.

Erle B Askew and L. P. Hardee, both of St. Petersburg, and B. K Roberts, of Tallahassee, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., and Donald K. Carroll, Asst. Atty. Gen for appellee.

TERRELL, Justice.

This is a disbarment proceeding pursuant to Section 4172, Compiled General Laws of 1927. The motion to disbar contained numerous charges of unprofessional conduct and was sworn to on information and belief. A demurrer, a motion to strike and a motion to dismiss were overruled. An answer was filed and on final hearing, the trial court entered an order disbarring defendant. This appeal is from the final decree.

It is first contended that the motion to dismiss should have been granted because the charges were vague, indefinite, and uncertain, that they do not allege moral turpitude and are verified on information and belief.

It appears that the complaint which is the gist of the motion to disbar was filed by the Grievance Committee of the St. Petersburg Bar Association. It was addressed to one of the Circuit Judges under oath and stated that the contents 'are true to the best of affiant's knowledge and belief'. On this point, the only requirement of the statute is that the motion to disbar be in writing and in the name of the State. No particular form of verification is required. Under such circumstances, we have held that it does not have to be under oath. Richardson v. State, 141 Fla. 218, 192 So 876. In Worthen v. State ex rel. Verner, 189 Ala. 395, 66 So. 686, the Supreme Court of Alabama has approved the like rule affecting a statute almost identical with ours. Other decisions are to like effect.

Questions two to ten inclusive have to do with the specific charges of unprofessional conduct and the evidence supporting them. Summarized, they charge defendant (1) with having falsely advised a client that his claim had been reduced to judgment execution issued thereon and returned unsatisfied when in fact the cause was still pending on demurrer; (2) with having secured moneys from a client for court costs and refusing to return the unexpended balance not used for that purpose; (3) with having collected funds for a client and giving bad checks therefor which were made good after great annoyance to client; (4) with having collected funds for a client as the agent of a corresponding attorney and forwarding said attorney a bad check for the proceeds; (5) with having solicited employment as attorney and having concealed from the one solicited the fact that he was representing another who was his real client; (6) without authority or knowledge of certain judgment creditors of having issued executions for said judgments, levied under them, held sheriff's sale in the name of a dummy corporation and receipted to the sheriff in the name of alleged clients for moneys never received by them from the sale; (7) with having attempted to pervert justice and prevent the fair trial of a divorce suit by dismissing it in one county and later bringing it in another county in order that the service be juggled.

Appellant contends that these charges are not sufficient in that they do not allege fraud or corrupt motives, moral turpitude, or bad faith so reprehensible, disgraceful, and unprincipled as to constitute a criminal act of high degree.

Charges of unprofessional conduct under Section 4172, Compiled General Laws of 1927, may be predicated on 'dishonest conduct, or habits of general immorality, or any such single act of crime or vice as may show him to be unfit for the trusts and confidence reposed in him as an attorney, or of deceit or misconduct in his office of attorney, or of suppressing or attempting to suppress any testimony in any case, or of tampering with any record, or of stirring up litigation, or being drunk while the case under his charge is being considered in court, or any unprofessional acts which unfit him for association with the fair and honorable members of the profession, * * *.' If the charge is comprehended in one or more of the provisions of the statute so quoted and is cast in clear unambiguous terms, that is sufficient. It is not essential that the certitude required in drawing an indictment to charge a crime be observed.

This is true because of the nature of the lawyer's business and the character of those who engage in it. Practice of the law is an impersonal name applied to the mechanics of administering justice through the medium of judges and lawyers. The administration of justice is a service rendered by the State to the public and exacts of those who engage in it the highest degree of confidence and good faith. No service furnished by the State more vitally affects the public. We practice law by grace, not by right. The privilege to practice law is in no sense proprietary. The State may grant it or refuse it, or it may withdraw it from those who abuse it.

The administration of justice is a composite rather than an individual concept. It is a derivative of Christian ethics and with us has attained a significance that it has no where else on earth. It contemplates the righteous settlement of every controversy that arises affecting the life, liberty, or property of the individual. Lawyers and judges are stewards of the law provided for this purpose. When the law practice leads otherwise than to justice or to social and economic adjustment, it may be generally traced to unfaithful stewardship. 'Practice of the law' and 'administration of justice' are used interchangeably in this opinion. When the 'bar' or 'members of the bar' is used, 'judges' may be comprehended.

Since the practice of the law deals with the most abiding and the most vital relations of life, we speak of it as a great and honored profession. Mr. Justice Brandeis characterized a profession as 'an occupation for which the necessary preliminary training is intellectual in character, involving knowledge and to some extent learning as distinguished from mere skill, an occupation which is pursued largely for others and not merely for one's self, an occupation in which the amount of financial return is not the accepted measure of success'. In fact, the practitioner who makes...

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9 cases
  • Sheiner v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 29, 1955
    ...288, 43 A.L.R. 102; In re Taylor, 309 Ky. 388, 217 S.W.2d 954; In re Keenan, 310 Mass. 166, 37 N.E.2d 516, 137 A.L.R. 766; Lambdin v. State, 150 Fla. 814, 9 So.2d 192, and Welanko's Case, 99 N.H. 413, 112 A.2d 50. From the cases above and others, it is contended that there is an important d......
  • State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Grant
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • February 10, 1956
    ...has read the pleadings; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it'. In Lambdin v. State, 150 Fla. 814, 9 So.2d 192, this Court 'It appears that the complaint which is the gist of the motion to disbar was filed by the Grievance Committee of......
  • State ex rel. Farber v. Williams, 34500
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • February 23, 1966
    ...either by advertising or by touter, had its origin early in the traditions of the English Bar.' [See also footnotes 17, Lambdin v. State (1942) 150 Fla. 814, 9 So.2d 192; 19, 5 Am.Jur., Attorneys at Law § 274, Annot. 14 A.L.R.2d 740; 20, State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Murrell (1954, Fla.) 74 ......
  • State v. Joubert, 3D02-1166.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 7, 2003
    ...It is clear in Florida that the State may withdraw the privilege to practice law from those who abuse it. Lambdin v. State, 150 Fla. 814, 9 So.2d 192, 193 (1942). In addition, disbarment is reserved for those who should not be permitted to associate with the honorable members of the legal p......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Who Do We Think We Are?
    • United States
    • Alabama State Bar Alabama Lawyer No. 83-5, September 2022
    • Invalid date
    ...to hear and decide cases, sometimes with the king present (as in the English Court of King's Bench discussed below).3. Lambdin v. State, 9 So. 2d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 1942) (emphasis added).4. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Drobot, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1083-84 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (emphasis added).5. H......

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