Lambert v. Energy Drilling Co.

• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT
• Citation: Lambert v. Energy Drilling Co., 313 So.3d 518 (Miss. App. 2021)
• Decision Date: 16 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2020-WC-00587-COA,2020-WC-00587-COA
• Parties: Johnny LAMBERT, Appellant, v. ENERGY DRILLING COMPANY and Great American Alliance Insurance Company, Appellees.

313 So.3d 518

Johnny LAMBERT, Appellant,

v.ENERGY DRILLING COMPANY and Great American Alliance Insurance Company, Appellees.

No. 2020-WC-00587-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

March 16, 2021

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHRISTOPHER HEDERI NEYLAND, Jackson

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: CATHERINE BRYANT BELL, ROGER C. RIDDICK

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McDONALD, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Johnny Lambert appeals the denial of his claim for workers’ compensation benefits after being injured in a one-vehicle collision on his way home to McCall Creek, Mississippi, from an oil rig in Marshall, Texas, where his employer, Energy Drilling Company, had assigned him to work. The Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission administrative judge denied Lambert benefits, and the Commission agreed. On appeal, Lambert argues that the 2012 amendment to Mississippi workers’ compensation statute is unconstitutional, that he was a traveling employee entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, and that he was acting in the scope of his employment by carrying tools in his vehicle that his crew used. Having reviewed the record and arguments of counsel, we affirm the Commission's order denying Lambert benefits.

Facts

¶2. Lambert, a fifty-nine-year-old driller, had worked with Energy in some capacity since 1988. As a driller, Lambert supervised a crew consisting of two floor hands, a motor man, and a derrick man. Lambert's job was to oversee their daily activities and order the supplies they needed.

¶3. Energy's home office was located in Natchez, Mississippi, and drilling crews like Lambert's were assigned to different oil rigs. In December 2018, Lambert and his crew were working on Rig 6, which was located in Marshall, Texas, approximately 288 miles from Lambert's home in McCall Creek, Mississippi. Rigs such as this can be moved to different geographical locations, but Rig 6 remained in the Texas area. Lambert had worked on Rig 6 for approximately four years at that location before his injury.

¶4. Lambert's work week, or "hitch," consisted of seven consecutive twelve-hour days, after which Lambert had seven days off. His workday ran from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and he was paid by the hour solely for these working hours during his hitch. After his hitch, Lambert drove home. Energy did not provide Lambert with a vehicle, nor did it pay mileage, but it did give workers a $60 per diem that could be used for gas, food, or whatever the worker desired. Workers only received the per diem on days that they worked. Energy did not pay for Lambert's time traveling to and from the rig, nor did Energy dictate the route he took. During the work week, Lambert and his crew slept in a "crew trailer" provided by Energy that was located near the drilling site, though workers had the option of staying elsewhere. Energy did not provide the workers with meals.

¶5. Around noon on December 31, 2018, the last day of his hitch, Lambert fainted while working. He rested a while and testified that his rig manager told him to go home at 2:30 p.m. But the rig manager, Brian Harper, said he had told Lambert not to leave until the end of the shift. Harper said when he learned Lambert had left, he called Lambert who said he was in town waiting on someone to come pick him up. Several days later, Lambert told Winvall Brister, another rig manager, that his brother picked him up in Marshall, but after a while, Lambert felt fine and continued to drive himself home alone. At some point, Lambert passed out again and was involved in a single-car accident at 6:47 p.m. near Utica, Mississippi. He was severely injured, including injuries to his head, face, neck, back, left wrist, left arm, ribs, right eye socket, mouth, and left hip. Lambert lost his health insurance due to his inability to work following his injury. Lambert was terminated on January 31, 2019.

¶6. Lambert filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits with his employer and its workers’ compensation carrier, Great American Alliance Insurance Company. After his claim was denied, Lambert filed a petition to controvert on January 23, 2019. Energy and Great American filed an answer denying that Lambert had sustained an injury in the course and scope of his employment. A compensability hearing was held on October 14, 2019, at the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. After briefing, the administrative judge issued an opinion and order on December 31, 2019, denying Lambert benefits because he was not injured in the course and scope of his employment with Energy. Lambert appealed to the Commission, which affirmed the AJ's decision on May 27, 2020. Lambert appealed the Commission's decision.

¶7. Lambert argues three issues: (1) the 2012 legislative amendment to Mississippi's workers’ compensation statute is unconstitutional; (2) he was a traveling employee entitled to workers’ compensation benefits; and (3) he was acting in the scope of his employment because at the time of the accident, he was carrying tools in his vehicle that his crew used on the rig.

Standard of Review

¶8. "This Court's review of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission is limited to determining whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary and capricious, was beyond the scope or power of the agency to make, or violated one's constitutional or statutory rights." Gregg v. Natchez Trace Elec. Power Ass'n , 64 So. 3d 473, 475 (¶8) (Miss. 2011). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Choctaw Resort Dev. Enter. v. Applequist , 161 So. 3d 1134, 1137 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). This Court will not reverse the Commission's decision unless we find that it is "clearly erroneous and contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Smith v. B.C. Rogers Processors Inc. , 743 So. 2d 997, 1002 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). We review the Commission's application of the law de novo. Gregg , 64 So. 3d at 475 (¶9).

Discussion

I. Whether Lambert was a traveling employee and entitled to WC benefits.

¶9. Lambert contends that he was a "traveling employee" and, therefore, entitled to workers’ compensation benefits from the injuries he incurred while driving home. Energy and Great American argue that because Lambert had a fixed place of employment, the injuries he incurred going to or from work are not compensable.

¶10. "[I]njuries received while in transit to or from the job are generally not deemed a compensable injury under workers’ compensation laws." Bouldin v. Miss. Dep't of Health , 1 So. 3d 890, 895 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). This is known as the "going and coming rule," which says that "hazards encountered by employees while going to or returning from their regular place of work and off the employer's premises are not incident to employment and accidents arising therefrom are not compensable." Gas v. Edmonds , 167 So. 3d 1258, 1262 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). An exception is made, however, for a "traveling employee." Id. at 1263 (¶18). A "traveling employee" has been defined as follows: "an employee whose work takes him away from the employer's premises," Sims v. Delta Fuel , 308 So.3d 859, 863-864 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020), cert. denied , 302 So. 3d 645 (Miss. 2020) ; or "one who goes on a trip to further the business interests of his or her employer such as a traveling salesman or a person attending a business conference for the benefit of his employer," Bouldin , 1 So. 3d at 895 (¶11) ; or "an employee for whom travel is an integral part of their job."

The traveling employee differs from the ordinary commuter and by virtue of their employment are exposed to greater risks than those encountered by the traveling populace. Therefore, a traveling employee's travel is deemed a work-related risk.

King v. Norrell Servs. Inc. , 820 So. 2d 692, 694 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

¶11. Merely commuting out of town for work does not make an employee a "traveling employee" for workers’ compensation purposes. In King , 820 So. 2d at 695 (¶10), we affirmed the denial of workers’ compensation benefits to a temporary employee living in Batesville, Mississippi, who was injured while driving home from her job in Oxford. We noted that the Mississippi Supreme Court had set forth six exceptions to the noncompensability of going and coming to the workplace in Wallace v. Copiah County Lumber Co. , 223 Miss. 90, 99, 77 So. 2d 316, 318 (1955). King , 820 So. 2d at 695 (¶19) These are:

(1) where the employer furnishes the means of transportation, or remunerates the employee; or (2) where the employee performs some duty in connection with his employment at home; or (3) where the employee is injured by some hazard or danger which is inherent in the conditions along the route necessarily used by the employee; or (4) where the employer furnishes a hazardous route or (5) where the injury results from a hazardous parking lot furnished by the employer; or (6) where the place of injury, although owned by one other than the employer, is in such close proximity to the premises owned by the employer as to be, in effect, a part of such premises.

Id . We found that King had met none of these exceptions. Id . at (¶10). In addition, when King sought an exception to the "going and coming" rule because she worked for a temporary employment agency and had no fixed place of employment, we noted that her commute was not part of her job at Norrell Services. Id . at 696 (¶14). Moreover, the accident happened at the end of the day, after her fixed working hours, and not during a time when she was paid by Norrell. Id . at (¶15). Her employer derived no special gain from her commute. Id . at (¶16).

¶12. Lambert's case is similar to King , although the commute was much longer. Lambert's facts fit none of the six exceptions articulated in Wallace : Lambert was driving his own vehicle, not a company vehicle; Energy did not reimburse him for mileage; he was performing no duty for...