Lambert v. McFarland
| Decision Date | 18 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. C83-1131A. |
| Citation | 612 F. Supp. 1252 |
| Parties | Terry S. LAMBERT, Plaintiff, v. R.T. McFARLAND, Individually and as a City of Atlanta Police Officer; T.B. Powell, Individually and as a City of Atlanta Police Officer; M.V. Johnson, Individually and as a City of Atlanta Police Officer; City of Atlanta, Georgia; Morris Redding, In His Official Capacity as Chief of the Bureau of Police Services, Department of Public Safety, City of Atlanta, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
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Mark A. Hall, Bondurant, Miller, Hishon & Stephenson, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.
George R. Ference, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.
The plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, with several pendent state law claims. Paragraph 29 of the complaint alleges that the defendants have violated plaintiff's rights under the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The complaint further alleges that the defendants are liable to the plaintiff under Georgia law for false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious use of process, malicious abuse of process, and negligence. Complaint, ¶¶ 33-35. The defendants are three City of Atlanta police officers (Johnson, Powell, and McFarland), the Chief of the Bureau of Police Services of the Atlanta Department of Public Safety (Redding), and the City of Atlanta. The three police officers are sued both individually and in their official capacities; defendant Redding is sued only in his official capacity. The case is now pending before the court on cross motions for summary judgment.
The relevant undisputed facts appear as follows. On September 11, 1982, plaintiff Lambert was one of seven persons arrested without a warrant by defendants McFarland, Powell, and Johnson. At the time of the arrest, the officers seized several handrolled cigarettes or cigarette butts containing a leafy substance, three plastic bags containing yellow powder, and a plastic bag containing other small bags filled with white powder. State Crime Lab Report, Attachment 11 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The arrestees were placed in a police wagon and taken to the city jail. Lambert Deposition at 204-06. On arrival, the back door to the wagon was jammed, apparently due to tampering by one or more of the occupants, and the officers removed the arrestees through the front of the van. Lambert Deposition at 202. Lambert was charged with four offenses: disorderly conduct under section 17-3001(6) of the City Code of Ordinances (presence in a location with illegal narcotics); possession of marijuana, section 17-8003 of the City Code of Ordinances; criminal damage to property, section 17-1001(a) of the City Code of Ordinances; and violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, Schedule I. Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's First Interrogatory Number 2.1
The date of plaintiff's arrest, September 11, 1982, was a Saturday. At the time of the arrest Officer McFarland completed a summons which set the plaintiff's court date to be Monday, September 13, at 3:00 p.m. Exhibit 5 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. It is the City of Atlanta's policy that the arresting officer sets the time for the initial hearing at the time of the arrest. Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's First Interrogatory Number 24. The plaintiff was taken before Judge Mickle, a municipal court judge, at 3:00 p.m. on Monday, September 13. At that time, bond was set for the four offenses with which plaintiff was charged as follows: On the disorderly conduct charge, $100; for possession of marijuana, $300; for criminal damage to property, $300; for the violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, $500. Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's First Interrogatory Number 3. The officer scheduled to appear at the preliminary hearing, Officer McFarland, was not present since Monday was his day off. Transcript of Hearing of September 13, 1982, Exhibit 8 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. At that hearing, Judge Mickle declined to hear the facts of the case since the arresting officer was not present. Also at the hearing on September 12, one of plaintiff's co-defendants requested an analysis of the suspected drug substances by the State Crime Lab. Exhibit 8 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to a motion by the city solicitor, Judge Mickle reset the date for the preliminary hearing until October 27, 1982. Plaintiff Lambert, being indigent, was unable to make bond and was held in the city jail until October 27, 1982. Lambert Deposition, p. 211.
The City Code of Ordinances, a certified copy of which is attached as Exhibit G to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, provides at section 3-1071 that: "Where the ends of justice may require, all cases may be continued; provided, however, that in ruling upon requests for continuances, the judge shall use his sound discretion in applying the general rules governing continuances." It is the practice of the municipal court that when defendants charged with drug-related offenses request an analysis of the substance by the State Crime Lab, the case is reset for six to eight weeks to allow time for the analysis and the report. Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's First Interrogatory Number 32. In responding to plaintiff's second set of interrogatories, number 19, the City elaborated:
Probable cause hearings are delayed if the defendants request a crime lab analysis. The request is considered a legal reason for a continuance. It is extremely rare for a hearing to proceed if the request is made. The only instance in which this request may be denied is if the defendant or his attorney has stipulated that the alleged substance is what the prosecution purports it to be at a previous court appearance.
Whether a defendant requests a lab analysis of a suspected drug substance or not, all suspected drug substances contained in evidence packages bearing the name of an arrested person are sent by the City of Atlanta Police for analysis. Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's First Interrogatory Number 9(d).
The suspected drug substances in the Lambert case were delivered to the State Crime Lab on September 16, 1982. Exhibit 11 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The State Crime Lab issued its report on October 2, 1982, which concluded that none of the submitted substances were illegal drugs. Exhibit 11 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The only known copy of this report was sent to Officer McFarland. Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's First Interrogatory Number 16. His copy of the crime report was picked up from the State Crime Lab on October 7, 1982, and was routed to the appropriate officer on October 7, 1982. Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Second Interrogatory Number 7. Officer McFarland did not notify anyone of the negative crime lab analysis of the suspected drug substance in the Lambert case until October 27, 1982, Lambert's next scheduled court date. McFarland Deposition at p. 216-17. Neither the prosecuting solicitor nor the court was informed that the crime lab report was negative until October 27, 1982. Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's First Interrogatories Numbers 17 and 18. According to the City's usual practice and procedure, neither the court, the city solicitor, the defendant, or the defendant's attorney is informed that a crime lab report is negative until the next regularly scheduled hearing date. Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory Number 10. It is also the policy of the City of Atlanta that all drug-related charges are dismissed upon learning that the crime lab analysis was negative. Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Second Interrogatory Number 17.
On October 27, 1982, a second hearing was held in plaintiff's case. At that time, the three drug-related charges (disorderly conduct, possession of heroin, and possession of marijuana) were dismissed because of the negative crime lab analysis. Exhibit 5 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Lambert was convicted on the charge of criminal damage to property and sentenced to ten days, which he had already served. Exhibit 9 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. On April 27, 1983, Municipal Judge Harris reconsidered and retried the criminal damage to property charge and dismissed it upon Lambert's offer of evidence that one of his co-defendants had inflicted the damage on city property (i.e., the police van). Exhibit 10 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The primary disputed factual area in this case relates to the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the seven defendants on September 11, 1982. In their pleadings, both parties acknowledge that there are disputed questions of material fact with respect to the circumstances surrounding the arrest; however, the City of Atlanta has moved for summary judgment as to its liability for plaintiff's arrest, arguing that plaintiff's version of the facts does not establish that any illegality in the arrest was a result of a city policy or practice.
The plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment on the question of liability for his confinement. Plaintiff's brief in support of his motion for partial summary judgment contains a succinct statement of his contentions:
Plaintiff now moves for partial summary judgment, to establish as a matter of law that his six-week confinement was unconstitutional and that Defendants City of Atlanta, Police Chief Morris Redding, and Officer R.T. McFarland are liable therefor. The most blatantly unconstitutional portion of Mr. Lambert's confinement is the final three weeks, because, pursuant to City...
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