Lambeth v. Board of Commr's of Davidson County, Nc

Decision Date13 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-1753.,04-1753.
Citation407 F.3d 266
PartiesCharles F. LAMBETH, Jr.; Michael D. Lea, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF DAVIDSON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

George Daly, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants. James Redfern Morgan, Jr., Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

ON BRIEF:

John W. Gresham, Ferguson, Stein, Chambers, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants.

Before WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges, and Henry F. FLOYD, United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the opinion, in which Judge WIDENER and Judge FLOYD joined.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Charles F. Lambeth, Jr. and Michael D. Lea appeal the district court's dismissal of their complaint in this civil action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs have alleged, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the Board of Commissioners of Davidson County, North Carolina (the "Board"), violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment when it authorized the phrase "In God We Trust" to be inscribed on the facade of the Davidson County Government Center (the "Government Center"). The district court, upon analyzing the Plaintiffs' allegations, concluded that they failed to assert a violation of the Establishment Clause, as measured by the test prescribed by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) (the "Lemon test"). As explained below, we affirm.

I.

Plaintiffs Lambeth and Lea are lawyers who regularly practice in the Government Center, located in the City of Lexington, the county seat of Davidson County, North Carolina. On June 24, 2003, the Plaintiffs filed this civil action against the Board under § 1983, alleging a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.1 They maintain that, around December 31, 2002, the Board unconstitutionally decided to inscribe the national motto, "In God We Trust," on the Government Center (the "display"). According to the Plaintiffs, Board members and the public spoke both in favor of and against the proposed display at the crucial Board meeting, emphasizing the religious nature of the words "In God We Trust," and observing that the display depicted the national motto. The display has since been installed on the front facade of the Government Center in eighteen-inch block letters.

On August 21, 2003, the Board moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Soon thereafter, on September 15, 2003, the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"). On October 2, 2003, the Board filed another Rule 12(b)(6) motion, asserting that the Complaint was legally deficient and incorporating by reference the contentions made in the Board's initial motion to dismiss.

On May 25, 2004, the district court dismissed the Complaint, concluding that it failed to state a claim of a First Amendment violation on which relief could be granted. Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 321 F.Supp.2d 688 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (the "Memorandum Opinion"). In so ruling, the court determined that the allegations of the Complaint fail, under the Lemon test, to demonstrate a violation of the Establishment Clause. Memorandum Opinion at 706. The Plaintiffs have timely appealed, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F.3d 769, 772 (4th Cir.2003). Under controlling principles, a district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) issue, we accept as true the factual allegations of the challenged complaint, see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990), and we view those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). On appeal, our inquiry is limited to whether the "pleadings adequately state a set of facts which, if proven to be true, would entitle [the plaintiff] to judicial relief." Duckworth, 332 F.3d at 772.

III.
A.

Under our precedent, the Establishment Clause issue presented here is properly analyzed (as the district court did in making its challenged ruling), under the Lemon test enunciated by the Supreme Court. See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir.2003) (applying Lemon test to analysis of Establishment Clause challenge to state university's supper prayer). In Lemon, the Court considered a state statute benefitting parochial school teachers, and assessed the constitutionality of the statute by examining whether it satisfied three conditions: first, whether there was a secular purpose behind the statute; second, whether the statute's principal or primary effect was one that neither advanced nor inhibited religion; and third, whether the statute fostered an "excessive government entanglement with religion." 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105. To pass muster under the Establishment Clause, a challenged government action must satisfy each of the Lemon test's three criteria. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 367. In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court elaborated on the Lemon test by examining whether the governmental use of an object with religious meaning (there, a crèche) had the effect of "endorsing" religion. 492 U.S. 573, 593-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989). As we recognized in Mellen, we have treated County of Allegheny's "endorsement" test as an "enhancement of Lemon's second prong." See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 370-71.

In this proceeding, the district court concluded that the Complaint failed to adequately allege that the display contravened any of the Lemon test's three prongs. First of all, the court determined, under the first prong, that the Complaint failed to allege an entirely religious purpose behind the Board's installation of the display. Memorandum Opinion at 697-700. Next, the court determined, under the second prong, that the display could not have the primary effect of advancing religion in the eyes of a reasonable, informed observer. Id. at 700-704. Finally, the court concluded that the display of the national motto did not result in an "excessive entanglement" of government with religion, and thus that it did not contravene the third prong. Id. at 704-705.

On appeal, the Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in its application of the Lemon test, and that the allegations of the Complaint are sufficient to proceed to discovery. They maintain that the Complaint alleges that the Board's "dominant" purpose in approving the display was religious, which, they contend, is sufficient to allege that the display fails the Lemon test's first prong; that the effect of the display is to advance or endorse religion, prohibited by the Lemon test's second prong; and that the display results in an excessive entanglement of government with religion, precluded by the Lemon test's third prong. Pursuant to Lemon and its progeny, we assess de novo the alleged constitutional defects of the display.

1.

We first assess, under prong one of the Lemon test, whether the Complaint sufficiently alleges that the Board's adoption of the challenged display lacked a secular intent. As the district court observed, the Complaint alleges that both secular and religious aspects of the display were discussed at the crucial Board meeting. Memorandum Opinion at 607-700. The Complaint alleges that Board members, and members of the public as well, "emphasized" at the Board meeting the religious nature of the phrase "In God We Trust," and that the display was thereafter adopted. Complaint at ¶ 3(u)-(v). The Complaint further alleges that one Board member observed that voting against the installation of the display would be perceived by the public as a vote against God. Id. at ¶ 3(y). Finally, the Complaint also alleges that "the fact that these words are also the national motto was mentioned but not emphasized at the meeting at which defendant authorized the display." Id. at ¶ 3(w).

Although the Plaintiffs contend that their allegations are sufficient in this regard, we are constrained to disagree. Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, a "legitimate secular purpose" supporting a challenged governmental action will suffice to satisfy the Lemon test's first prong. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984). And, as we have previously observed, the demonstration of such a legitimate secular purpose is "a fairly low hurdle." Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir.2001). Indeed, we will deem the first prong of the Lemon test to be contravened "only if [the action] is `entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion.'" See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985)).

A legitimate secular purpose is thus sufficient to pass muster under the first prong of the Lemon test, unless the alleged secular purpose is in fact pretextual. See Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308-09, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000); see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) ("The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular...

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