Lambright v. Kidney Servs. of Ohio

• Citation: 998 F.Supp.2d 676
• Decision Date: 21 February 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:12–CV–00594.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
• Parties: Marlene LAMBRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. KIDNEY SERVICES OF OHIO, et al., Defendants.

998 F.Supp.2d 676

Marlene LAMBRIGHT, Plaintiff,

v.KIDNEY SERVICES OF OHIO, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:12–CV–00594.

United States District Court,

S.D. Ohio,

Eastern Division.

Feb. 21, 2014.

Marlene Lambright, Utica, OH, pro se.

Susan Porter, Ice Miller, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

ALGENON L. MARBLEY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on the Parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Pro se Plaintiff Marlene Lambright brings this action for alleged employment discrimination on the bases of race, gender, and disability, arising from her application for employment with Defendants Kidney Services of Ohio, Inc., and Thrift Stores of Ohio, Inc. Defendants move the Court for summary judgment in their favor on all counts. (Doc. 41). Plaintiff requests the same in her favor. (Doc. 42). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) is DENIED. This case is hereby DISMISSED.

II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff filed this action on July 26, 2012 (Doc. 3), having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1). Defendants answered, and, on August 23, moved to dismiss Plaintiff's age discrimination claim on account of her failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. 10). On September 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint styled as “Plaintiff Restates Claim and Complaint.” (Doc. 14). In light of this Amended Complaint, which no longer asserted a claim for age discrimination, the Court denied Defendants' Motion as moot. (Doc. 20).

On June 28, 2013, after the close of discovery, Defendants timely filed their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41); on July 1, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42). Both Parties filed Response briefs (Doc. 44, 45), and Defendants filed a reply brief in support of their Motion (Doc. 46). On August 30, Plaintiff filed a 37–page “Motions to Strike and Deny” Defendant's reply, which also remains pending before the Court.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff brings her claim for workplace discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), ( Amended Complaint, Doc. 14, ¶ I(A)), arising out of her application for employment with Defendants in late 2010. Ohio Thrift is a for-profit retailer of new and used products at locations throughout Central Ohio. ( Affidavit of Jennifer Alinkas, Doc. 41–1, ¶ 4). Ohio Thrift obtains its merchandise through personal donations, non-profit organizations, and other sources, and offers discounted prices to the public. ( Id.). Defendant Kidney Services is a related non-profit entity which employs “home solicitors,” who work from home to solicit donations. ( Id., ¶ 5). In 2010–2012, Defendants also operated a call center that employed solicitors at this central location. ( Id., ¶ 6).

In early November 2010, Plaintiff responded to a posting on Craigslist, an online message board, advertising part-time, work-at-home employment with Defendant Ohio Thrift. ( Plaintiff's Deposition, Doc. 40, at 112). She received a response to her email inquiry and communicated with Defendant's Human Resources department. ( Id. at 113–114). In particular, Plaintiff asked whether Ohio Thrift “hired handicapped workers,” and whether the work she was applying for “c[ould] be done at home.” ( Id. at 114, 138). On November 5, 2010, Faye Tewell, General Manager of Home Solicitors with Ohio Thrift, responded affirmatively, and sent to Plaintiff an application packet to work as a home scheduler. ( Id. at 115–16; Affidavit of Faye Tewell, Doc. 41–3, ¶ 3). Ms. Tewell later interviewed Plaintiff by phone, and hired her to work as a home solicitor. ( Plaintiff's Dep. at 118, 120, 129–30; Tewell Aff., ¶ 4). Plaintiff informed Ms. Tewell that she was also interested in the possibility of a call center job, instead of the home solicitor position. ( Plaintiff's Dep. at 123).

Ms. Tewell advised Plaintiff that she would need to come in person to Defendants' offices to complete her Form I–9 identity verification before she could begin work. ( Id. at 122, 128). Plaintiff explained that she used a walker, making it hard for her to travel to Ohio Thrift's West Broad Street office during regular hours. ( Id. at 124, 138). Ms. Tewell suggested that Plaintiff go to Ohio Thrift's call center location to complete her I–9, which was at a more convenient location for Plaintiff. ( Id. at 124–25, 132, 135). Ms. Tewell also informed Plaintiff that, while there, she could speak with Nichol Noeth regarding her interest in a call center job, and that Ms. Noeth could assist her with the I–9 verification. ( Id. at 124–25, 132, 136–37). Ms. Tewell reminded Plaintiff that she should ask Ms. Noeth to fax the I–9 to Ms. Tewell after it was completed, if she opted for the home solicitor job rather than working at the call center. ( Email Chain between Lambright and Tewell, December 11, 2010, Doc. 40–8).

On December 17, 2010, Plaintiff travelled to the Call Center location in order to complete her I–9. ( Plaintiff's Dep. at 140–41). Plaintiff met with Ms. Noeth, and discussed her preference for working from home. ( Id. at 141, 145). On this first trip, however, Plaintiff had forgotten her Social Security Card, so she could not complete her I–9. ( Id. at 141, 143). Plaintiff returned within a few days with proper documentation. ( Id. at 147). During her second visit, on December 20, Plaintiff did not speak with Ms. Noeth; rather, she presented her documentation to the office assistant, Rachel Rausch, who made copies of Plaintiff's identification and took her completed Form I–9. ( Id. at 147–48; Affidavit of Rachel Rausch, Doc. 41–4, ¶ 3; Lambright Form I–9, Doc. 40–9). Ms. Rausch then sent Plaintiff's Form I–9 to Ohio Thrift's Human Resources Department for payroll processing, which was standard procedure. ( Rausch Aff., ¶ 4; Alinkas Aff., ¶ 10). She did not forward the documents either to Ms. Tewell or Ms. Noeth. ( Rausch Aff., ¶ 5). Plaintiff did not inform Ms. Rausch that the documents needed to be sent to Ms. Tewell ( Plaintiff's Dep. at 148), and so, because Ms. Tewell worked from home, she never received Plaintiff's I–9 ( Tewell Aff., ¶ 8).

Defendants contend that, as a result of Ms. Tewell never receiving Plaintiff's paperwork, Plaintiff was never assigned work with Defendants. ( Id.). According to Ms. Tewell, it was not uncommon for Ohio Thrift to offer a job to a prospective employee, only to have them fail to complete the Form I–9. ( Id., ¶ 9).

After her trips to Defendants' offices, Plaintiff again contacted Ms. Tewell via email, to inform her that she had completed the paperwork, and to ask about her start date. ( Plaintiff's Dep. at 160). Plaintiff told Ms. Tewell that she had given her documentation to Ms. Noeth, assuming that the office assistant who had helped her, Ms. Rausch, would forward it to Ms. Tewell. ( Id.). Ms. Tewell thanked Plaintiff, and said that she would contact Ms. Noeth to follow up. ( Id. at 161; Email Chain between Lambright and Tewell, December 21, 2010, Doc. 40–10).

Plaintiff communicated with Ms. Tewell again on January 6, 2011, when she wrote to inquire if the position was still open. ( Plaintiff's Dep. at 162–64; Email Chain between Lambright and Tewell, January 6, 2011, Doc. 40–11). Ms. Tewell answered that the position was available, and asked again for Plaintiff's completed application. ( Id.). Plaintiff informed Ms. Tewell that she “gave everything to Nicole [Noeth],” [sic], and Ms. Tewell thanked her for completing everything. ( Id.).

Plaintiff emailed for the final time roughly a week later, on January 13, 2011. Plaintiff wrote to thank Ms. Tewell for her time, and said that “[a]lthough [she] was not hired,” she intended to “refer[ ] some friends to apply.” ( Email Chain between Lambright and Tewell, January 13, 2011, Doc. 40–11). Plaintiff did not email again. ( Plaintiff's Dep. at 177–78).

On June 27, 2011, Plaintiff filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC”), alleging substantially the same facts as described above. ( OCRC Charge, Doc. 40–12). On February 23, 2012, after its investigation, the OCRC issued its Letter of Determination, where it concluded that it could found “no information or records that would raise an inference that [Defendants] unlawfully discriminated against [Plaintiff] due to her race, Black, sex, female, and disability.” ( OCRC Letter of Determination, Doc. 40–13). The OCRC found specifically that Plaintiff was “inadvertently not placed on the work schedule due to paperwork issues and not due to her race, sex, or disability,” and determined that there was no probable cause to issue a complaint against Defendants. ( Id.).

After Plaintiff filed her OCRC complaint, Defendants again offered Plaintiff a job as a home solicitor. ( Alinkas Aff., ¶ 14; Plaintiff's Dep. at 209). Plaintiff declined the offer. ( Plaintiff's Dep. at 209–10). According to Plaintiff, she “felt like [she] wasn't really wanted,” and that it “would have probably been a bad thing for me to file a complaint and then go work for a company.” ( Id.).

Plaintiff filed suit on July 5, 2012, asserting claims for race, gender, and disability discrimination for failure to hire. Plaintiff seeks $550,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages, as well as costs and attorneys' fees. (Doc. 3 at 3; Doc. 45 at 16).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A fact is deemed material only if it “might affect the outcome of the...