Lambright v. Lewis

Decision Date09 July 1996
Docket NumberNo. CIV 87-235 TUC RMB.,CIV 87-235 TUC RMB.
Citation932 F. Supp. 1547
PartiesJoe Leonard LAMBRIGHT, Petitioner, v. Samuel A. LEWIS and Robert Goldsmith, Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Arizona
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David P. Tiers, Thomas E. Higgins, Tucson, AZ, for petitioner.

Grant Woods, Attorney General, Phoenix, Eric J. Olsson, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, for respondent.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BILBY, District Judge.

Joe Lambright, under sentence of death, seeks habeas corpus relief. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 22 U.S.C. ž 2241 and 22 U.S.C. ž 2254, and herein denies the petition.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In early 1980, Joseph Leonard Lambright, Robert Douglas Smith and Kathy Foreman began a cross country driving trip from Texas, to Florida, and then on to California, stopping in Arizona. Foreman was Lambright's lover who frequently engaged in sexual intercourse with Lambright in Smith's presence. The trio stopped outside Tucson and camped for the night. Smith became angry when he observed Lambright and Foreman once again having sex. He complained that Lambright, unlike Smith, had all the sex he wanted and that it was not easy to find someone.

The following day, the three drove into Tucson and went to a restaurant. Smith again spoke about wanting a woman, and Lambright spoke about wanting to "kill somebody just to see if he could do it." Lambright then told Foreman that they were going to go find someone for Smith.

After driving around town for quite a while, the trio saw a young woman hitchhiking near the University of Arizona campus. Twenty-nine year old Sandy Kay Owen explained to them that she was trying to get to the food stamp office. They drove Owen to the food stamp office and parked behind the building. Lambright jumped into the back seat with Owen and told her to "shut up and be quiet and she wouldn't get hurt." Smith moved to the driver seat and headed toward the freeway.

At some point during the drive toward California, Lambright began driving, with Smith in the back seat with Owen. Smith had sex with Owen in the back seat, on the freeway, heading northwest. Owen asked if they would let her go.

The group later left the freeway and proceeded on a dirt road in a mountainous area of Pinal County. They left the car at the end of the dirt road and traveled on foot to a level area on a mountain. At the level area, Lambright and Foreman again had intercourse and Smith again had sex with Sandy Owen.

Smith began choking Sandy and she collapsed to the ground. Lambright said that she had to be killed so that she could not report their crimes. He took Foreman's knife and began stabbing Ms. Owen in the torso and chest, twisting the knife around inside her. Smith and Foreman each held one of her arms, as the victim tried to resist. Smith attempted to break her neck by twisting her head, but was unsuccessful. Lambright, and possibly Foreman, then began cutting into Ms. Owen's neck. Sandy Owen was still alive and was trying to lift herself up on one arm. At that point, Lambright threw a large rock at Sandy's head, yelling, "Die, bitch."

The trio took some jewelry from the victim's body then covered it with rocks, and headed toward San Diego. In the car they played a song on tape entitled "We are the Champions." In San Diego, they pawned Owen's ring before driving on to Anaheim, Las Vegas and finally back to Texas.

About a year later, law enforcement received a tip about the crime and the three were separately questioned. Each made statements to the police. Foreman was granted immunity from prosecution for her testimony against Lambright and Smith, who were returned to Arizona for prosecution.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Joe Leonard Lambright, was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree, kidnapping and sexual assault. Although Pima County Superior Court Judge Michael V. Brown severed the cases of Lambright and Smith, there was a single trial with two juries. Evidence that was relevant to both was presented to both juries and evidence admissible against only one, was presented before only that jury. The court sentenced Lambright to death for the murder and to twenty-one years imprisonment to run consecutively on each of the remaining convictions.

Lambright appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction and sentence in Arizona v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 673 P.2d 1 (1983). The United States denied certiorari in Lambright v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 267, 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984).

Pursuant to ARIZ.R.CRIM.P. 32, the Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief in the trial court. Finding the claims to be either precluded or not colorable, the trial court denied relief. Following denial of his request for rehearing in the trial court, the Petitioner then sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court. That court denied the petition for review on July 9, 1986 and set execution for April 29, 1987.

Mr. Lambright filed his original habeas corpus petition in this Court on April 14, 1987 and this Court promptly stayed the execution. The State of Arizona moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of procedural default and the presence of unexhausted claims. This Court granted the Respondents' motion and dismissed the mixed petition without prejudice, but retained jurisdiction and continued the stay of execution.

After nearly two years of apparent inactivity, Lambright was appointed new counsel, who filed another Rule 32 petition in state court. The trial court denied the Petitioner's amended Rule 32 petition, and the Supreme Court denied review without comment.

The Petitioner then sought authorization from this Court for expenditure of funds. He wanted to employ various experts and investigators in order to develop the claim that trial counsel's failure to present evidence of the Petitioner's mental health status was ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court considered Lambright's request three times, and three times denied it, concluding that Lambright had not established cause and prejudice to overcome procedural default.

Lambright filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 23, 1995. He also subsequently filed another Rule 32 notice in state court, for the first time raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. The trial court refused to allow such a claim, finding it barred by failure to raise it in the two previous post-conviction relief proceedings. The Respondents then filed an answer to Lambright's amended habeas petition on August 22, 1995, and Lambright filed his reply on November 29, 1995. The Court denied, without prejudice, Lambright's motion for evidentiary hearing and oral argument on February 8, 1996. On April 22, 1996, this Court received a certified copy of the state record. Following months of effort by this Court to obtain a complete state court record, Lambright's petition for relief is appropriate for federal habeas review.

DISCUSSION

The Petitioner raises thirty grounds for relief in the Amended Petition, arranged under the headings of (1) ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (2) trial claims; and (3) sentencing claims. The Court considers the claims in turn, and for clarity and for convenience to the reader, organizes the issues in the same manner as the Amended Petition.

I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS (Claims 1-4)

As mentioned above, the Petitioner previously moved this Court for authorization of funds for experts and investigators in order to develop an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. The Petitioner's theory is that trial counsel's failure to present evidence of the Petitioner's mental health status was ineffective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner posited that at the time of trial evidence existed, but was not presented, that would have demonstrated significant mental health problems. This evidence allegedly includes, post traumatic stress syndrome episodes as a result of combat service in Vietnam, two suicide attempts, and an emotional breakdown after his father's death and during the decline of his marriage. Despite the Court's previous rulings finding the claims procedurally defaulted, the Petitioner continues to press his assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Specifically, Lambright complains that trial counsel failed to investigate, develop and present mitigation evidence with respect to his mental health, family background and military service. Counsel did not attend and did not prepare Lambright for the presentence interviews or psychological evaluation. Counsel did not consult with Lambright regarding sentencing procedures and did not employ a presentence investigator or mental health expert for use at sentencing. He did not advocate on Lambright's behalf at the sentencing and did not request a pretrial competency hearing. He did not make an opening statement and did not consider the possible effect of sustained drug use on the case. Trial counsel also failed to request a jury instruction on lesser included offenses to first degree murder. The Court concludes, however, that these claims cannot be considered on the merits.

A. The Doctrine of Procedural Default and the Exhaustion Requirement

A state court prisoner's federal habeas petition must be dismissed if he has not exhausted remedies available in the state. 28 U.S.C. ž 2254(b); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). See also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (holding that federal claims must first be fairly presented to state courts before being presented to federal courts); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.1985) (stating that...

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  • Lambright v. Stewart
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 26 Enero 1999
    ...court deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights. The district court denied the habeas petition. See Lambright v. Lewis, 932 F.Supp. 1547 (D.Ariz.1996). Smith filed his first Rule 32 petition in 1984, which the state court denied. In 1987, Smith filed a habeas petition in t......
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    • 11 Julio 2022
    ...law constitutes a violation of the federal constitutional right of due process. Doc. 25 at 3. But this is simply what the petitioner in Lambright not what the court held. See Lambright, 932 F.Supp. at 1568. The Lambright court in fact rejected this argument, finding that the alleged violati......

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