Lambrix v. State, SC16–8

• Decision Date: 09 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. SC16–8,No. SC16–56,SC16–8,SC16–56
• Citation: 217 So.3d 977
• Parties: Cary Michael LAMBRIX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Cary Michael Lambrix, Petitioner, v. Julie L. Jones, etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

217 So.3d 977

Cary Michael LAMBRIX, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Cary Michael Lambrix, Petitioner,

v.Julie L. Jones, etc., Respondent.

No. SC16–8

No. SC16–56

Supreme Court of Florida.

[March 9, 2017]

Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region,

William McKinley Hennis, III, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Martin J. McClain, Special Assistant, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, and Jessica Leigh Houston, Michael Chance Meyer, and Bryan E. Martinez, Staff Attorneys, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Scott Andrew Browne, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and C. Suzanne Bechard, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Robert Arthur Young, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Public Defender Association

Billy Horatio Nolas, Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of Florida

Nancy Gbana Abudu, Miami, Florida, and Norman Adam Tebrugge, Tampa, Florida, for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Capital Punishment Project and the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida

Sonya Rudenstine, Gainesville, Florida, and Karen Marcia Gottlieb, Florida Center for Capital Representation, Florida International University College of Law, Miami, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

PER CURIAM.

Cary Michael Lambrix is a prisoner under sentence of death for whom a death warrant was signed. This Court stayed the death warrant as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , –––U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 619, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), to determine if that opinion was entitled to retroactive application to a death sentence that was final in 1986.

Lambrix was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1983 first-degree murder of two victims after Lambrix had invited them to his trailer to eat dinner. Lambrix v. State , 494 So.2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 1986). On direct appeal, this Court upheld Lambrix's two convictions of first-degree murder and his two death sentences. Id. at 1148.

After the Governor signed a death warrant on November 30, 2015, and the execution was set for February 11, 2016, this Court entered a scheduling order, providing a deadline by which Lambrix could file any successive motions for postconviction relief. Lambrix filed both a successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and a motion for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. On December 21, 2015, the postconviction court summarily denied both Lambrix's successive motion for postconviction relief and his motion for DNA testing. Lambrix appealed these orders to this Court and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. After the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hurst v. Florida , 136 S.Ct. 616, this Court stayed his execution and permitted supplemental briefing and oral argument in order to fully consider the impact of Hurst v. Florida in this case. In accordance with our opinion in Asay v. State , 210 So.3d 1, 2016 WL 7406538 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2016), we conclude that Lambrix is not entitled to a new penalty phase based on Hurst v. Florida , and our opinion in Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), and we further reject the other grounds for relief that he raised as devoid of merit. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief and also deny Lambrix's separate petition for habeas corpus.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case are set forth in Lambrix's direct appeal of his conviction and sentence of death:

On the evening of February 5, 1983, Lambrix and Frances Smith, his roommate, went to a tavern where they met Clarence Moore, a/k/a Lawrence Lamberson, and Aleisha Bryant. Late that evening, they all ventured to Lambrix' trailer to eat spaghetti. Shortly after their arrival, Lambrix and Moore went outside. Lambrix returned about twenty minutes later and requested Bryant to go outside with him. About forty-five minutes later Lambrix returned alone. Smith testified that Lambrix was carrying a tire tool and had blood on his person and clothing. Lambrix told Smith that he killed both Bryant and Moore. He mentioned that he choked and stomped on Bryant and hit Moore over the head. Smith and Lambrix proceeded to eat spaghetti, wash up and bury the two bodies behind the trailer. After burying the bodies, Lambrix and Smith went back to the trailer to wash up. They then took Moore's Cadillac and disposed of the tire tool and Lambrix' bloody shirt in a nearby stream.

Lambrix , 494 So.2d at 1145. Lambrix raised four issues on direct appeal, which this Court denied.¹

The Governor signed a death warrant for Lambrix, scheduling his execution for November 30, 1988. In response to the death warrant, Lambrix then filed an initial postconviction motion, which was summarily denied. This Court affirmed the summary denial, concluding that even taking all of Lambrix's allegations as true, there was no prejudice.² Lambrix v. State , 534 So.2d 1151, 1153–54 (Fla. 1988). The dissent asserted that an evidentiary hearing should have been held. Id. at 1154 (Kogan, J., dissenting). Lambrix also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise numerous claims, including: (1) the trial court erred in denying a motion for individual and sequestered voir dire concerning the effect of pretrial publicity; (2) it was error for Lambrix not to be present during a part of voir dire; (3) it was error for the court to have approved certain stipulations in Lambrix's absence while the jury was being selected; and (4) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to voluntary intoxication. Lambrix v. Dugger , 529 So.2d 1110, 1111–12 (Fla. 1988). This Court denied relief. Id. at 1112.

In addition, either through counsel or in a pro se capacity, Lambrix has filed numerous successive petitions for postconviction relief and successive habeas petitions before the trial court and this Court—all of which have been denied. See, e.g. , Lambrix v. State , 559 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1990) (affirming the summary denial of a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed with the trial court, in which Lambrix asserted that his collateral counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of juror misconduct because one of the jurors in his second trial failed to disclose that she had been on the venire prior to Lambrix's first trial); Lambrix v. Singletary , 641 So.2d 847, 848–49 (Fla. 1994) (denying a successive habeas petition that asserted an entitlement to relief based on Espinosa v. Florida , 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), challenged various aggravators, and raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Lambrix v. State , 698 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied , 522 U.S. 1122, 118 S.Ct. 1064, 140 L.Ed.2d 125 (1998) (affirming the summary denial of a successive postconviction motion that raised new ineffective assistance of counsel claims and alleged a Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), violation); Lambrix v. State , 39 So.3d 260, 275 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied , 562 U.S. 1145, 131 S.Ct. 917, 178 L.Ed.2d 766 (2011) (affirming the denial of multiple claims including newly discovered evidence claims); Lambrix v. State , 124 So.3d 890, 904 (Fla. 2013), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1789, 188 L.Ed.2d 760 (2014) (affirming the denial of two successive postconviction motions and denying a writ petition in a consolidated opinion). Lambrix also filed numerous other pleadings in this Court that have been denied or dismissed.³

Lambrix has likewise filed federal pleadings before the federal district court, including a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 1988. After granting an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the federal district court denied relief and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief. Lambrix v. Dugger , No. 88–12107–CIV–Zloch (S.D. Fla. May 12, 1992), aff'd 72 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1996). In these federal proceedings, Lambrix challenged whether he was entitled to relief based on his Espinosa claim. The United States Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the denial of relief on that claim, holding that Espinosa was not dictated by then-existing precedent, but announced a "new rule" as defined in Teague ,⁴ and does not apply retroactively. Lambrix v. Singletary , 520 U.S. 518, 528, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997).

In addition, Lambrix filed numerous other pro se pleadings in federal court that have been denied. See, e.g. , Lambrix v. Jones , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 537, 193 L.Ed.2d 432 (2015) (denying petition for writ of certiorari); In re Lambrix , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 541, 193 L.Ed.2d 451 (2015) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus); In re Lambrix , 563 U.S. 1007, 131 S.Ct. 2907, 179 L.Ed.2d 1263 (2011) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus); In re Lambrix , 776 F.3d 789, 793 (11th Cir. 2015) (denying Lambrix's application for leave to file a successive § 2254 petition, because the claims were precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine and/or the prior-panel-precedent rule); Lambrix v. Sec'y, Fla. Dept. of Corrs. , 756 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court's denial of Lambrix's motion for substitute counsel and denying his assertion that he was entitled to raise procedurally-defaulted claims in a successive § 2254 habeas...