Lambrix v. State

• Decision Date: 25 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 65203,65203
• Citation: 494 So.2d 1143,11 Fla. L. Weekly 503
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 503 Cary Michael LAMBRIX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1143

494 So.2d 1143

11 Fla. L. Weekly 503

Cary Michael LAMBRIX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 65203.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 25, 1986.

J.L. "Ray" LeGrande and Barbara LeGrande of LeGrande & LeGrande, Ft. Myers, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and James H. Dysart, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

ADKINS, Justice.

Cary Lambrix appeals his conviction on two counts of first-degree murder and the imposition of two sentences of death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm both convictions and sentences.

On the evening of February 5, 1983, Lambrix and Frances Smith, his roommate, went to a tavern where they met Clarence Moore, a/k/a Lawrence Lamberson, and Aleisha Bryant. Late that evening, they all ventured to Lambrix' trailer to eat spaghetti. Shortly after their arrival, Lambrix and Moore went outside. Lambrix returned about twenty minutes later and requested Bryant to go outside with him. About forty-five minutes later Lambrix returned alone. Smith testified that Lambrix was carrying a tire tool and had blood on his person and clothing. Lambrix told Smith that he killed both Bryant and Moore. He mentioned that he choked and stomped on Bryant and hit Moore over the head. Smith and Lambrix proceeded to eat spaghetti, wash up and bury the two bodies behind the trailer. After burying the bodies, Lambrix and Smith went back to the trailer to wash up. They then took Moore's Cadillac and disposed of the tire tool and Lambrix' bloody shirt in a nearby stream.

On Wednesday, February 8, 1983, Smith was arrested on an unrelated charge. Smith stayed in jail until Friday. On the following Monday, Smith contacted law enforcement officers and advised them of the burial.

A police investigation led to the discovery of the two buried bodies as well as the recovery of the tire iron and bloody shirt. A medical examiner testified that Moore died from multiple crushing blows to the head and Bryant died from manual strangulation. Additional evidence exists to support a finding that Lambrix committed the two murders in question.

In accordance with the jury's recommendation, the trial judge imposed two sentences of death on appellant, finding five aggravating and no mitigating circumstances in regard to the murder of Moore and four aggravating and no mitigating circumstances in regard to the murder of Bryant. Appellant now contends that numerous errors occurred during the guilt phase of the trial. We disagree.

Appellant's first contention on appeal concerns the constitutionality of death-qualified juries. Appellant asserts that the exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty results in juries that are not representative of the community and conviction prone. The Eighth Circuit accepted this argument in Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.1985). However, the United States Supreme Court recently overruled Grigsby, in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). Further, this assertion has already been raised and rejected by this Court. Dougan v. State, 470 So.2d 697 (Fla.1985). Once again, we reject this contention.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in excluding juror Mary Hill for cause in violation of the standards set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The problem with appellant's argument is that the United States Supreme Court has recently rejected the standards set forth in Witherspoon. In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the Court held that the proper standard for excluding jurors in death cases is the test enunciated in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). In Adams, the Court held that:

[A] juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.

488 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526.

Unlike the Witherspoon standard, the standard set forth in Witt to determine whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 852.

The transcript of voir dire indicates that Mrs. Hill repeatedly waivered when questioned about her ability to vote in favor of the death penalty. The relevant voir dire testimony is as follows:

MR. GREENE (Prosecutor): Let's go to phase two. If you did in fact come back with a guilty of one or both counts of first degree murder, then we go to the penalty phase. At that point, the jury makes a recommendation to Judge Stanley as to life imprisonment or death penalty. Could you vote for the death penalty if you were convinced by the evidence and the instructions the Judge gave you?

MRS. HILL: No.

MR. GREENE: Under any circumstances, could you consider the death penalty?

MRS. HILL: I don't think so. Life imprisonment yes, but--

MR. GREENE: If you gave me an "if possible", I know it's hard for you to do. Could you give me a possibly as a definite answer, as possibly to yes or no? Could you, under any circumstances, vote for the death penalty?

MRS. HILL: No.

MR. GREENE: You would never consider the death penalty?

MRS. HILL: No, I could never.

MR. GREENE: Are you sure of that?

MRS. HILL: Yes. I worked with children too much. That's one of the reasons why I couldn't do it.

MR. GREENE: Your Honor, based on her answers, the State would ask that she be excused for cause.

THE COURT: You may inquire.

MR. JACOBS (Defense Attorney): Ma'am do you feel that you could consider the guilt or innocence in this case if you were asked to decide whether my client was guilty or not guilty? Do you think you could do that?

MRS. HILL: Yes.

MR. JACOBS: Regardless of your views on the death penalty, you could do that?

MRS. HILL: Yes.

MR. JACOBS: Okay. Do you feel that after listening to Judge Stanley's instructions, you could follow the law, and consider--that's not saying you have to return a death recommendation--all the law requires is that you consider it?

MRS. HILL: Yes.

MR. JACOBS: You feel that you could consider it?

MRS. HILL: Yes.

Following a recess, the court questioned Mrs. Hill and the following transpired:

THE COURT: Mrs. Hill, having to do with the death penalty, under any circumstances, could you vote for the death penalty?

MRS. HILL: No.

THE COURT: Ma'am, you may step down for cause.

Mrs. Hill told the prosecutor that she could not consider the death penalty under any circumstances and told the defense attorney that she could follow the instructions of the judge and consider the death penalty. Both attorneys, being capable advocates, led Mrs. Hill down the path of their choosing. Thus, the most pertinent portion of Mrs. Hill's voir dire testimony is her response to questions asked by the trial judge, the ultimate symbol of neutrality. The fact that Mrs. Hill told the trial judge that she could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances is controlling.

The above quoted testimony indicates that Mrs. Hill's feelings concerning capital punishment would substantially impair her ability to act as an impartial juror. Further, we pay great deference to a trial judge's finding in this regard because, unlike a reviewing court, he is in a position to observe the juror's demeanor and credibility. Valle v. State, 474 So.2d 796 (Fla.1985). Thus, the trial judge did not err in excluding Mrs. Hill for cause.

Appellant next argues that the trial court violated his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses by limiting his cross-examination of the state's key witness, Francis Smith. We disagree. As noted earlier, Francis Smith was with Lambrix on the night the murders occurred. Smith was arrested a few days after the murder on the charge of aiding and abetting a fugitive. The fugitive was Cary Lambrix, who had earlier escaped from state prison.

Ms. Smith's testimony at trial allegedly conflicted with a statement she made during her short period of incarceration. Defense counsel sought to bring out this inconsistency but was denied that opportunity when the court sustained an objection made by the state. At trial, in a proffered cross-examination outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel sought to bring out the inconsistency as follows:

MR. JACOBS (Defense Attorney): Miss Smith, have you made the statement to any police officer you were not with Cary Lambrix from the 1st to the 5th of February and that you did not see him until the 9th of February 1983?

MS. SMITH: I don't remember any statement like that.

MR. JACOBS: Judge, that's the only question I have. And I don't know for the record--I don't know where that opens any doors. I don't know where that would be considered opening any doors. That's why I want it proffered.

The statement defendant refers to was made by Smith to a police officer during her...