Lambrix v. State

• Citation: 124 So.3d 890
• Decision Date: 17 October 2013
• Docket Number: SC11–1845,Nos. SC10–1845,SC12–6.,s. SC10–1845
• Parties: Cary Michael LAMBRIX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Cary Michael Lambrix, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Cary Michael Lambrix, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

124 So.3d 890

Cary Michael LAMBRIX, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Cary Michael Lambrix, Petitioner,

v.State of Florida, Respondent.

Cary Michael Lambrix, Appellant,

v.State of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. SC10–1845, SC11–1845, SC12–6.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 27, 2013.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 17, 2013.

William M. Hennis III, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel–South, and Craig J. Trocino and Neal Andre Dupree, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsels, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Carol M. Dittmar, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We have consolidated all of Cary Michael Lambrix's pending cases before this Court for the purposes of this opinion. The current proceedings involve the summary denial of Lambrix's fourth successive motion for postconviction relief (SC10–1845) and the summary denial of his fifth successive motion for postconviction relief (SC12–6), both filed on the basis of newly discovered evidence. In addition, Lambrix filed a separate petition for a writ of prohibition, challenging the postconviction court's denial of his motion to disqualify the judge (SC11–1845).

We conclude that both Lambrix's fourth and fifth successive motions for postconviction relief are completely devoid of merit, as is his separate petition for a writ of prohibition. Further, as to Lambrix's specific claim that the postconviction court abused its discretion in not allowing him to proceed without a lawyer, Lambrix's pattern of conduct in postconviction proceedings alone demonstrates why Lambrix's request for self-representation was properly denied.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As we recognized when reviewing the denial of relief as to Lambrix's third successive postconviction motion, “[t]his death case, which has been in the judicial system for a substantial period of time, has a lengthy procedural history.” Lambrix v. State, 39 So.3d 260, 262 (Fla.2010). With these most recent filings, we observe that the lengthy procedural history is in part due to the continued attempts by Lambrix to file pleadings both with the postconviction court and with this Court that do not establish any viable claim pertaining to his guilt or the validity of the death penalty imposed, and his failure to provide any facts that would undermine confidence in the outcome of either the guilt or penalty phase of his trial.

Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death for the 1983 murders of Clarence Moore and Aleisha Bryant, and we affirmed Lambrix's convictions and sentences of death in 1986. Lambrix v. State, 494 So.2d 1143, 1148 (Fla.1986). In our latest opinion denying Lambrix postconvictionrelief, we detailed Lambrix's extensive history of successive postconviction motions, all of which have been rejected as lacking in merit. See Lambrix, 39 So.3d at 264–65. In addition, up to the present, Lambrix has filed numerous extraordinary writ petitions, both through counsel and pro se, which this Court has either denied or dismissed. See, e.g., Lambrix v. State, No. SC10–1517, 2011 WL 2440379 (Fla. June 16, 2011) (unpublished order denying petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition); Lambrix v. State, 944 So.2d 345 (Fla.2006) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus); Lambrix v. State, 900 So.2d 553 (Fla.2005) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus); Lambrix v. State, 766 So.2d 221 (Fla.2000) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus as moot); Lambrix v. State, 727 So.2d 907 (Fla.1998) (denying petition for writ of prohibition); Lambrix v. Reese, 705 So.2d 902 (Fla.1998) (denying petition for writ of mandamus).

Not only has Lambrix initiated numerous successive postconviction proceedings and petitions for extraordinary relief in this Court, but he has also filed successive petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. In 2010, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Lambrix failed to make a prima facie showing for filing his second federal habeas petition because he failed to show that the underlying factual predicate for any of the twelve claims presented in that proceeding could not have been discovered earlier through due diligence. In re Lambrix, 624 F.3d 1355, 1368 (11th Cir.2010).

Turning to the current proceedings, Lambrix has three cases currently pending before this Court. In case number SC10–1845, Lambrix's appeal from the denial of his fourth successive motion for postconviction relief asserts that he is entitled to relief because two hairs on the murder weapon, which was wrapped in a shirt, are consistent with a key State witness, who helped him dispose of the bodies and the weapon. In case number SC12–6, the appeal of the denial of his fifth successive motion for postconviction relief that was also filed on the basis of newly discovered evidence, Lambrix contends that he recently discovered the whereabouts of his ex-wife, who could testify in greater detail regarding an injury that Lambrix suffered while he was in the army's basic training, and that the effect of this injury should have been discussed in greater detail during his penalty phase. Finally, in case number SC11–1845, Lambrix filed a separate petition for a writ of prohibition, challenging the postconviction court's denial of his motion to disqualify the judge—a claim that is also raised on appeal from the denial of his fourth and fifth successive motions for postconviction relief in both case number SC10–1845 and case number SC12–6. We address each proceeding separately below, concluding that all of these proceedings are utterly without merit.

ANALYSIS

SC10–1845: Fourth Successive Postconviction Proceeding

In the appeal of the postconviction court's denial of his fourth successive motion for postconviction relief, case number SC10–1845, Lambrix asserts that his private investigator discovered new records belonging to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and that information within these records appears to demonstrate that there were two hairs found on the murder weapon that may match Frances Smith—a key State witness who was at the general location when the murders occurred and who helped to bury the bodies and hide the murder weapon (a tire iron). According to Lambrix, if the only biological materials found on the tire iron belong to Smith, this supports his theory raised in prior postconviction proceedings that Smith was involved in a sexual affair with State Attorney Investigator Bob Daniels and helped to fabricate the murder weapon. Specifically, Lambrix raises the following claims: (1) he should be entitled to DNA testing of these hairs; (2) he is entitled to relief based on the newly discovered lab notes from the FDLE and evidence pertaining to the hairs and the shirt that were found with the murder weapon; and (3) the State committed a Brady/Giglio¹ violation when it failed to provide a complete set of FDLE lab notes and records to Lambrix. Lambrix also asserts that he was denied the opportunity to proceed pro se during the postconviction proceedings before the postconviction court, despite the fact that the court found him to be competent; that the judge erred in denying his motion to disqualify; and that section 119.19, Florida Statutes (2012), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 are unconstitutional.²

As to the substance of the allegations, Lambrix attempts to resurrect his allegations from prior postconviction proceedings that there was a conspiracy against him because the State's main witness, Frances Smith, allegedly had a one-time sexual encounter with the State's investigator at some point. Lambrix now claims that the two conspired to fabricate evidence for trial. However, he fails to recognize that this Court already rejected his allegation that an affair occurred and concluded that, even if it had occurred, no prejudice was established because, based on the testimony presented at prior postconviction proceedings, the alleged incident occurred during Lambrix's second trial and Smith's testimony at the second trial was substantially similar to testimony that she had previously given. Lambrix, 39 So.3d at 269–70. In addition, this Court further detailed the significant evidence against Lambrix, including his own testimony during an evidentiary hearing where even Lambrix acknowledged that he was present and had “struck one of the victims using a tire iron, although he denied that he intended to kill either victim.” Id. at 273.

In the first claim we address on appeal, Lambrix seeks DNA testing on the hairs pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. The postconviction court denied this request, finding that Lambrix's allegations were facially or legally insufficient because “he has failed to demonstrate how testing the hair[s] would exonerate him or mitigate his sentence,” particularly since Lambrix asserted he acted in self-defense and his theory of the hairs did not disprove any theory in this case. We review this ruling de novo. See Van Poyck v. State, 961 So.2d 220, 224 (Fla.2007).

In reviewing the postconviction court's denial of the request in light of Lambrix's allegations, we affirm the denial of relief. As this Court has recognized, “[i]t is the defendant's burden to explain, with reference to specific facts about the crime and the items requested to be tested, how the DNA testing will exonerate the defendant of the crime or will mitigate the defendant's sentence.” Scott v. State, 46 So.3d 529, 533 (Fla.2009) (quoting Robinson v. State, 865 So.2d 1259, 1265 (Fla.2004)). Lambrix has completely failed to explain how finding Smith's hair on the murder weapon would help exonerate him or even cast Smith's testimony into doubt. Smith was at the murder scene after the murders occurred. According to her trial testimony, Lambrix was carrying the tire iron when he returned to the...