Lametta v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.

• Decision Date: 04 November 1952
• Citation: 139 Conn. 218,92 A.2d 731
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: LAMETTA v. CONNECTICUT LIGHT & POWER CO. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 731

92 A.2d 731

139 Conn. 218

LAMETTA v. CONNECTICUT LIGHT & POWER CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 4, 1952.

Ernest L. Josem, South Norwalk, for appellant.

Walter F. Torrance, Jr., Waterbury, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

BROWN, Chief Justice.

This action was brought May 22, 1947, on behalf of the plaintiff, a minor, by his father and next friend to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained on October 17, 1944, through the defendant's negligence. In a special defense, the defendant pleaded that the action was not brought within one year from October 17, 1944, the date the injury was claimed to have been inflicted. The plaintiff replied that at the time of the injury he was a minor, that he 'has not yet attained his majority or emancipation,' and therefore that he was not obliged to bring this action within one year. The defendant demurred to this 'because the governing statute makes no exception of minors and therefore is applicable to the instant case and is a complete bar thereto.' The court sustained the demurrer and, upon the plaintiff's refusal to plead over, rendered judgment for the defendant.

The statute in question is § 8324 of the General Statutes, entitled 'Limitation of action for injury to person or property.' The pertinent provisions are: 'No action to recover damages for injury to the person * * * caused by negligence * * * shall be brought but within one year from the date of the act or omission complained of * * *.' There is no provision exempting infants from the statute's operation. The sole question for determination is whether the statute is to be construed as embodying an exception by implication in favor of an unemancipated minor. The question has never been passed upon by this court.

The plaintiff cites no authority to support his contention that such an exception should be implied. He argues that, since his cause of action is at common law and not of statutory origin, it does not fall within the principle enunciated in De Martino v. Siemon, 90 Conn. 527, 97 A. 765. That was an action for damages for death under the statute wherein it was held that the limitation is a condition which attaches to and forms a part of the right of action itself. The contention of the plaintiff cannot not avail him. Obviously, the De Martino case is no authority for the converse proposition that an action at common law is not subject to the express terms of such a general statute of limitations as § 8324. The further claim that the express exception in favor of infants contained in other of our statutes of limitation, such as §§ 8313, 8314, 8315 and 8318, discloses a state policy to protect minors, and that, therefore, since § 8324 contains no such express exception in their favor, one should be implied, is hardly convincing. On the contrary, this situation constitutes strong reason for not adopting the construction urged by the plaintiff. It is more reasonable to suppose that had the General Assembly intended such an exception it would have inserted it in § 8324. The plaintiff's final argument, predicated upon § 6855 of the General Statutes, is likewise without merit. Section 6855, as amended by § 1243b of the 1951 Cumulative Supplement, provides: 'No parent of a minor child [or] guardian of the person of a child * * * shall receive or use any property belonging to such child * * * to an amount exceeding * * * one thousand dollars in value unless appointed guardian of the estate of such minor.' That statute by no means precludes action on behalf of a minor to recover for injuries and, therefore, shows no reason for implying in § 8324 an exception in his favor. Under our common law an infant may sue either by next friend or by guardian, if one has been appointed. The powers and responsibilities of each in prosecuting a suit for the infant are the same. Williams v. Cleaveland, 76 Conn. 426, 431, 56 A. 850. The infant in a suit by his next friend is fully protected, "for the court, under whose inspection the suit is prosecuted, is bound to take care for the infant." Id., 76 Conn. 434, 56 A. 854. Furthermore, an infant is entitled from the date of a judgment in his favor to the immediate possession and enjoyment of the full amount of damages allowed him, although his rights must be exercised by a guardian of his estate. Rutkowski v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 100 Conn. 49, 55, 123 A. 25. In view of these rights of the infant to sue and the practical probability that a parent or other interested person will see that they are asserted, § 6855 affords no basis for the plaintiff's contention.

'[O]ne great object of statutes of limitation is 'to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims, concerning which persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution.' Miller v. Calume[t] Lumber & Mfg. Co., 121 Ill.App. 56, 66.' Anderson v. City of Bridgeport, 134 Conn. 260, 266, 56 A.2d 650, 654. "The statute of limitations is a statute of repose. At times, it may bar the assertion of a just claim. Then its application causes hardship. The Legislature has found that such occasional hardship is outweighed by the advantage of outlawing stale claims.' Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co., supra, 270 N.Y. at page 302, 200 N.E. at page 827 .' Kennedy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 135 Conn. 176, 179, 62 A.2d 771, 773. The practical need for adopting these principles might well be vividly demonstrated if the plaintiff's contention were to prevail. To allow a one-year-old child, for example, to wait out his minority before asserting a claim for personal injuries would be to allow the enforcement, by reason of § 8324, of claims against persons truly thrown off guard by want of prosecution. Under such circumstances few, if any,...