Lamkin v. Hamburg Twp. Bd. of Trs.
| Decision Date | 19 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 328836,328836 |
| Parties | Mary Ann LAMKIN, Plaintiff–appellant, v. HAMBURG TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES And Hamburg Township Zoning Administrator, Defendants–appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Mary Ann Lamkin in propria persona.
Matecun, Thomas & Olson, PLC (by Daniel W. Mabis ), East Lansing, for defendants.
Before: Ronayne Krause, P.J., and O'Connell and Gleicher, JJ.
Gleicher, J.Plaintiff, Mary Ann Lamkin, is a resident of Hamburg Township in Livingston County. Acting in propria persona , she filed a complaint in the circuit court, alleging that the Hamburg Township zoning administrator and the Hamburg Township Board of Trustees unlawfully failed to pursue a zoning violation action against one of her neighbors. Lamkin claims the neighbor unlawfully operates an industrial business involving sealcoating on property zoned as waterfront-residential. She seeks an order of mandamus or, alternatively, orders of superintending control or to show cause.
Six days after Lamkin filed her complaint and before it was served, the circuit court sua sponte dismissed it, invoking MCR 2.116(C)(5) (), and MCR 2.116(I)(1), which permits a court to render summary disposition on the pleadings. In a written opinion and order, the circuit court explained that Lamkin "lacks standing to assert the claims alleged in the Complaint" as she "failed to establish that [the neighbor's conduct] results in special damages not common to other property owners similarly situated." The court opined that "[b]ecause Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claims in her Complaint, this Court is not required to afford Plaintiff notice or an opportunity to be heard, and summary dismissal is appropriate under MCR 2.116(I)(1) and MCR 2.116(C)(5)."
We agree that Lamkin's complaint lacks any allegations of special damages. We cannot agree that the circuit court was entitled to dismiss the complaint without affording Lamkin notice and an opportunity to be heard. Further, dismissal on the pleadings was inappropriate under MCR 2.112(A)(1)(a).
We begin with the process that Lamkin and every other litigant is due. MCR 2.116(I)(1) states:
If the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or if the affidavits or other proofs show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court shall render judgment without delay.
In Al–Maliki v. LaGrant , 286 Mich.App. 483, 489, 781 N.W.2d 853 (2009), this Court recognized that under MCR 2.116(I)(1), "the trial court has the authority to grant summary disposition sua sponte...." We emphasized, however, that "the trial court may not do so in contravention of a party's due process rights." Al–Maliki , 286 Mich.App. at 489, 781 N.W.2d 853.
"[T]here can be no question that, at a minimum, due process of law requires that deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication must be preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard." Bonner v. Brighton , 495 Mich. 209, 235, 848 N.W.2d 380 (2014). This basic and fundamental concept indisputably applies in the context of summary proceedings; this Court so held quite clearly in Al–Maliki . Sua sponte motions for summary disposition are permitted under the court rules, but no exception to basic due-process requirements exists in MCR 2.116(I)(1) or elsewhere. "It is a matter of simple justice in our system for a party to be given fair notice and an opportunity to be heard before the boom is lowered." DKT Mem. Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l. Dev. , 281 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 887 F.2d 275, 301 n. 3 (1989) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Federal district courts, too, may grant summary judgment sua sponte. In so doing, however, a district court must "determine that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered has had a full and fair opportunity to meet the proposition that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried ...." Schwan–Stabilo Cosmetics GmbH & Co. v. Pacificlink Int'l. Corp. , 401 F.3d 28, 33 (C.A. 2, 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This rule comports with the United States Supreme Court's observation in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), that "district courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that [it] had to come forward with all of [its] evidence ." (Emphasis added.) Here, the circuit court's failure to notify Lamkin that it was contemplating summary disposition of her claims constitutes a fatal procedural flaw necessitating reversal.1
The circuit court made a second error when it granted summary disposition based on Lamkin's failure to plead her standing to sue. The circuit court ruled that Lamkin did not "establish" that her neighbor's actions resulted in special damages, and therefore that Lamkin lacked standing to challenge the zoning administrator's decisions. At the pleading stage, however, Lamkin was required only to set forth "[a] statement of the facts, without repetition, on which the pleader relies in stating the cause of action, with the specific allegations necessary reasonably to inform the adverse party of the nature of the claims the adverse party is called upon to defend [.]" MCR 2.111(B)(1). And under MCR 2.112(A)(1)(a), Lamkin simply was not required to allege in her complaint her "capacity" to sue. This court rule recognizes that standing to sue, for example, is a fact-bound concept more amenable to proof rather than to pleading. The court rules invite the production of such proof by way of a motion for summary disposition supported with facts, followed by the requisite evidentiary response.2
The end result of the circuit court's race to eliminate this case is that we are left with nothing to substantively review. On remand, the circuit court must allow the parties to develop a reviewable record before reaching a judgment, summary or otherwise.
We vacate the order of summary disposition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
I write separately to state that the trial court, in its effort to be efficient, may have set a new land speed record for disposing of a case. While efficiency is an excellent goal for trial courts to obtain, it may collide with a plaintiff's right to notice and an opportunity to be heard and prevent this Court from being able to engage in meaningful appellate review.
In this case, plaintiff, acting in propria persona, filed her law suit on July 29, 2015. Two days later on July 31, 2015, before defendants were even served and perhaps even before the ink was dry on the complaint, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the suit. The resulting scant lower court record does not reflect how plaintiff's issues were raised, argued, or presented to the lower court, and it is devoid of any answer by defendants. The trial court's order consists of six conclusory paragraphs with a very limited recitation of the court's factual conclusions. The trial court's order does not provide sufficient information for this Court to evaluate the reasons for the dismissal or the merits of plaintiff's case.
Clearly, the trial court was frustrated by the numerous (and possibly frivolous) lawsuits that the plaintiff has filed. While I appreciate efficiency, I conclude that plaintiff was completely denied her day in court and her opportunity to present her case in a reasonable manner. Though due process may take a little time and patience on the part of the trial court, it is necessary to a fundamentally fair court system. See Al–Maliki v. LaGrant , 286 Mich.App. 483, 485–486, 781 N.W.2d 853 (2009).
I agree with Judge GLEICHERthat we must vacate the lower court decision and direct that on remand the trial court should give plaintiff an opportunity to present her case and create a reviewable lower court record.
I wholeheartedly agree with Judge GLEICHER'S observation that a party's right to seek redress in this Court does not depend on whether they moved for reconsideration in the trial court. However, while I understand my colleagues' reaction to the trial court's nearly immediate disposition of this case, I disagree that the trial court was not permitted to summarily dismiss plaintiff's case sua sponte without providing plaintiff advance notice that it was considering doing so. Furthermore, I find my colleagues' concerns about the sufficiency of the trial court's order baffling. Under the circumstances of this case, I nevertheless find the possibility that the trial court deprived plaintiff of her due-process rights by preventing her from filing a motion for reconsideration sufficiently troubling that I would remand for an evidentiary hearing on that issue.
Plaintiff's complaint sought a writ of mandamus, an order of superintending control, and an order to show cause, because defendants purportedly failed to enforce a zoning ordinance that plaintiff's neighbors were allegedly violating. This Court looks to the substance of pleadings rather than the formal names or labels given by the parties. Hartford v. Holmes , 3 Mich. 460, 463 (1855) ; Norris v. Lincoln Park Police Officers , 292 Mich.App. 574, 582, 808 N.W.2d 578 (2011). It is clear from the complaint that plaintiff's "show cause" count really is a request for a preliminary injunction, not a true cause of action. It is therefore entirely dependent on the validity of her other two counts.
The distinction between a claim for mandamus and a claim for superintending control is an often confused. See Choe v. Flint Charter Twp. , 240 Mich.App. 662, 665–667, 615 N.W.2d 739 (2000). However, they both seek to accomplish essentially the same result and on essentially the same bases:...
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Lamkin v. Hamburg Twp. Bd. of Trs.
...318 Mich.App. 546899 N.W.2d 408Mary Ann LAMKIN, Plaintiff–appellant,v.HAMBURG TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES And Hamburg Township Zoning Administrator, Defendants–appellees.No. 328836Court of Appeals of Michigan.Submitted November 2, 2016, at Lansing.January 19, 2017, at 9:05 a.m.Mary Ann Lamki......