Lamont v. Grand Lodge Iowa Legion of Honor

• Citation: 31 F. 177
• Parties: LAMONT v. GRAND LODGE IOWA LEGION OF HONOR and another.
• Decision Date: 20 June 1887
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

31 F. 177

LAMONT v. GRAND LODGE IOWA LEGION OF HONOR and another.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division.

June 20, 1887

James A. Reed and Charles Ogden, for complainants.

Wright Baldwin & Haldane, for Emily R. Graft.

SHIRAS J.

On the seventh day of April, 1883, J. P. Heulett became a member of the organization known as the 'Iowa Legion of Honor;' a certificate of membership being issued to him, reciting that, as member of the Garfield Lodge No. 126, he was 'entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership in the Iowa Legion of Honor, and to participate in the beneficiary fund of the order to the amount of two thousand dollars, which sum shall, at his death, be paid to his daughter Mary H. Heulett Lamont. ' In the constitution of the order it is declared that the business and object of this order are to promote fraternity, and to afford financial aid and benefit to the widows, orphans, and heirs or devisees of the deceased members of the order. Article 1, Sec. 2. By article 7, Sec. 1, it is provided that, 'upon the death of a member in good standing of this order, such person or persons as said member may have directed, subject to the limitations of article 1, Sec. 2, of this grand lodge, shall be entitled to receive of the beneficiary fund of this order the sum of two thousand dollars: provided, ' etc. And by article 8, Sec. 11, that 'any member holding a beneficiary certificate, desiring at any time to make a new direction as to its payment, may do so by authorizing such a change in writing on the back of such certificate, in the form prescribed attested by the recording secretary with the seal of the lodge attached, and the recording secretary shall at once report such action to the grand secretary.'

On the thirtieth day of July, 1884, the said Heulett, on the back of the original certificate issued to him, signed the following revocation:

'I J. P. Heulett, to whom the within certificate was issued, do hereby revoke my former direction as to the payment of the beneficiary fund due at my death, and now authorize and direct such payment to be made to Emily R. Graft.

'Witness my hand and seal this thirtieth day of July, 1884.

'J. P. HEULETT. (Seal.)

'Attest: A. VAN ORDER, Recording Secretary. ' (Seal Garfield Lodge.)

On the twenty-fifth day of August, 1884, a new certificate was issued by the grand lodge to Heulett, in which it is declared that the amount of his interest in the beneficiary fund, to-wit $2,000, shall at his death be paid to Emily R. Graft. August 11, 1885, the said Heulett died at Atlantic, Iowa, and, as both Mr. Lamont and Mrs. Graft claimed the sum provided to be paid out of the beneficiary fund of the order, the present proceeding was instituted for the purpose of deciding the question, the grand lodge on its part paying the full sum, $2,000, into court, thus leaving the litigation to be carried on by the other parties.

Mrs. Lamont is a daughter of the deceased, and Mrs. Graft is not a relative of deceased, but only a personal friend.

On behalf of the complainant it is claimed, in the first place, that when she was named in the original certificate of membership issued to J. P. Heulett as the person to whom the beneficiary fund was to be paid, an interest was thereby vested in her, and that she could not be deprived thereof, save with her own consent. That such is the rule when a contract of insurance is entered into between a life insurance company and a third party, whereby the company agrees to pay the amount due on the policy to such third party, is not questioned. In such cases the third party or beneficiary is a party to the contract of insurance. When, however, a person joins a mutual benefit association of the character of the Iowa Legion of Honor, his rights in the beneficiary fund, and his control over the same, are usually determined by the constitution of the order. The contract by which Heulett became interested in the benefit fund of defendant was between him and the order, and is evidenced by the constitution of the association, by which it is, in substance, provided that each member in good standing is entitled to have the sum of $2,000 paid at his death to such person as he may designate, and that he may at any time make a new direction or selection of the person to whom such sum shall be paid.

The fact that when Heulett joined the Iowa Legion a certificate of membership was issued to him, in which his daughter was named as the person to whom payment was to b' made of the $2,000, did not change the contract between the order and Heulett, nor deprive him of the right, secured by the constitution, of making a new selection of a beneficiary.

Mrs. Lamont acquired no interest therein which would prevent Mr. Heulett from revoking the selection made in the first instance, and designating another as the person to whom payment was to be made.

It is also urged on behalf of complainant that, under the constitution of the order, Heulett could not select as a beneficiary one who was not a member of his family; that the object of the order is to make provision for the widow and orphans of deceased members; and that the order is not bound to make payment to any one not occupying this relation. The order, however, is not questioning its liability to pay. It has paid the amount into court, and the litigation is not over the question whether the order is bound to pay to any one not a member of the family of a deceased member, but over the question of the respective rights of Mrs. Lamont and Mrs Graft. The constitution does not, however, limit the selection of a beneficiary to the family of members. Financial aid is to be afforded 'to the widows, orphans, and heirs or devisees of the deceased members of the order. ' It is evident that the word 'heirs' is used, not in its restricted sense, but to include any one to whom the estate of the deceased might pass by operation of law; and thus would, in many cases, include persons who were but distantly related by blood to the deceased member, who had not in fact ever been members of the family, and with whom, perhaps, he had no personal acquaintance. But, in addition to the widows, orphans, and heirs, it is also provided that aid may be afforded to 'devisees.' It is clear that this word cannot be intended to bear the technical legal meaning of one to whom real estate is given by the last will of another. There is nothing in the constitution of the order from which it can be inferred that it was one of the purposes of the order to provide a beneficiary fund to be paid to such person as should, under the last will of a deceased member, have devised to him the whole or part of the realty owned by such testator. It is, however, entirely clear, from the provisions of the constitution, that it was one of the objects of the order to create a beneficiary fund to be paid to such person as the members might designate; and the...