Lamonte v. City of Hampton

CourtUnited States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Georgia
Citation576 F.Supp.3d 1314
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO: 1:19-cv-3227-AT
Parties Danny LAMONTE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HAMPTON, GEORGIA, Defendants.
Decision Date30 September 2021

James D. Durham, Griffin Durham Tanner & Clarkson LLC, Savannah, GA, for Plaintiff.

Allison Averbuch, Pearson Kern Cunningham, Russell Alan Britt, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Amy Totenberg, United States District Judge

In this employment action, Plaintiff Danny Lamonte brings claims against his former employer, the City of Hampton, for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"); retaliation in violation of the Georgia Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4 ; breach of contract; attorney's fees; and punitive damages. The City of Hampton has moved for summary judgment [Doc. 82]. After full briefing by the Parties, the Magistrate Judge recommends granting summary judgment to Defendant on all claims. [Report & Recommendation ("R&R"), Doc. 106.] Plaintiff Lamonte filed specific objections to the R&R but only as to the Georgia Whistleblower Act claim [Doc. 108]. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge's R&R and Plaintiff's objections are now before the Court.

I. Standard of Review

After conducting a careful and complete review of a magistrate judge's findings and recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate judge's report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) ; Williams v. Wainwright , 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court reviews any portion of the R&R that is the subject of a proper objection on a de novo basis and any non-objected portion for plain error. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) ; Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 154, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). The district judge must "give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party." Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. Of Educ. Of Ga. , 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990). A district judge retains "ultimate adjudicatory power over dispositive motions" and the "widest discretion" over how to treat a report and recommendation. Gonzalez v. United States , 981 F.3d 845, 851 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Williams v. McNeil , 557 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) ).

In review, the Court applies the standards for grant of summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) and its progeny. The district court should resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in [her] favor."

United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop. in Greene & Tuscaloosa Cntys. in State of Ala. , 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc ) (citations and punctuation omitted). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co. , 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied , 16 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc ).

II. Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge

After reviewing the relevant facts and the Parties’ arguments, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 82) be granted in full. (R&R, Doc. 106 at 2.) Plaintiff Lamonte does not object to the R&R's recommendations that summary judgment be granted to the City on his Title VII race discrimination and breach of contract claims. In accordance with the standard of review outlined above, the Court reviews these findings for plain error. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly analyzed the facts in light of the governing law with respect to the Title VII and breach of contract claims. Consequently, finding no error, the Court ADOPTS these specific findings and the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the City of Hampton as to the Title VII and breach of contract claims (Counts I and III).

The Magistrate Judge also recommends granting summary judgment to the City of Hampton on Lamonte's Georgia Whistleblower Act Claim (Count II). Specifically, the R&R finds that Lamonte did not establish a prima facie case under the Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4, because he did not engage in protected activity (R&R at 40-41), and, even if he had, he failed to proffer any evidence that the City's legitimate nonretaliatory reasons were pretextual (id. at 41-43). The Magistrate Judge also recommends that summary judgment be granted on Plaintiff's attorney's fees and punitive damages claims, which are dependent on the substantive claims. (Id. at 48-49.)

III. Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court acknowledges that, having adopted the R&R's recommendation to grant summary judgment to Defendant on the sole federal claim in this matter, the Court must determine whether to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction in this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. "The policy of supplemental jurisdiction is to support the conservation of judicial energy and avoid multiplicity in litigation. Having a state court rehash issues that have already been argued in federal court is [ ] likely to cause multiplicity in litigation." Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc. , 468 F.3d 733, 746 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Rosado v. Wyman , 397 U.S. 397, 405, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970) ). In assessing whether to retain or reject supplemental jurisdiction, courts consider the factors set out by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). See West v. City of Albany, Georgia , 830 F. App'x 588, 597 (11th Cir. 2020). These factors include judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Id. (citing Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Laboratories, Inc. , 803 F.3d 518, 537 (11th Cir. 2015) ).

This case was originally filed in federal court. At this juncture, Plaintiff does not ask the Court to reject its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Defendant, however, urges the Court to retain the Whistleblower Act claim, as the Parties have conducted full, extensive discovery, including the exchange of 7,000 pages of documents and 10 depositions, and have fully briefed all issues. (Reply to Obj., Doc. 109 at 15.) The City also maintains that, because Plaintiff originally filed this case in federal court and has not asked the Court to reject jurisdiction, the Gibbs fairness factor does not weigh against retention. (Id. ) Finally, the City asserts that the remaining Whistleblower Act issue is not novel or complex.

The City's reasoning is sound and supported by the relevant legal authority. See West , 830 F. App'x at 597. Retaining jurisdiction here serves the goals of conserving judicial resources and avoiding a rehashing of the same issues in state court. Accordingly, the Court turns to Plaintiff's objections regarding his Whistleblower Act claim.

A. Georgia Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4

The Georgia Whistleblower Act prohibits a public employer from retaliating against an employee for engaging in protected activity by making a protected disclosure or objection, as follows:

(2) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee for disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or government agency, unless the disclosure was made with knowledge that the disclosure was false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.
(3) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee for objecting to, or refusing to participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the public employer that the public employee has reasonable cause to believe is in violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation.

O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2)-(3) (emphasis added). Courts apply the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis used in Title VII retaliation cases to Georgia Whistleblower Act claims. Baptiste v. Mann , 360 Ga.App. 345, 861 S.E.2d 212, 217 (2021) ; Coward v. MCG Health, Inc. , 342 Ga.App. 316, 802 S.E.2d 396, 399 (2017).

To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under the Georgia Whistleblower Act ("GWA"), "a public employee must demonstrate that (1) he was employed by a public employer; (2) he made a protected disclosure or objection; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there is some causal relationship between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Albers v. Georgia Bd. Of Regents of University System of Georgia , 330 Ga.App. 58, 766 S.E.2d 520, 523 (2014) ; Baptiste , 861 S.E.2d at 217 (same).

i. Protected Disclosure or Objection

Here, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff Lamonte did not establish that he made a protected disclosure or objection. (R&R at 40-41.) Plaintiff objects. The issue of Plaintiff's protected disclosure revolves around a discussion Plaintiff had with the mayor of the City of Hampton, Steve Hutchison, on September 6, 2018. But before delving into the details of this discussion, the Court rewinds to provide necessary background information.

In his first days of employment, Plaintiff was tasked by City Manager Coney with looking at the City's finances, including budgets, transactions, credit card statements and more. (Deposition of Danny Lamonte ("Lamonte Dep."), Doc. 84-1 p. 93:1-12.) This was because City Manager Coney had concerns about discrepancies and irregularities in the City's finances. (Id. p. 93:14-16.) In conducting his review, Lamonte found questionable credit cards and credit card charges, for example, a credit card for a boot company (id. p. 99:14-22) and charges for foot massages (id. p. 118:23-24); 30 to 40 credit cards and merchant accounts in the former city clerk's desk drawer (id. p. 119:14-20); an alarming number of unsupported budget amendments (id. p. 101:12-13); former employees still listed on City...

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  • Local Government
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 74-1, September 2022
    • Invalid date
    ...Baptiste, 360 Ga. App. at 354-55, 861 S.E.2d at 221.179. Id. at 356, 861 S.E.2d at 222.180. Id. at 355-56, 861 S.E.2d at 221-22. 181. 576 F. Supp. 3d 1314 (N.D. Ga. 2021).182. Id. at 1331.183. Id. at 1320-21.184. Id. at 1318 (quoting O.C.G.A.§ 45-1-4(d)(3)).185. Lamonte, 567 F. Supp. 3d at ......

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