Lamore v. Inland Div. of General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. C-1-76-426.,C-1-76-426.
• Citation: 550 F. Supp. 1005
• Parties: George LAMORE, Plaintiff, v. INLAND DIVISION OF GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and United Rubber Workers Local 87, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

550 F. Supp. 1005

George LAMORE, Plaintiff, v. INLAND DIVISION OF GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and United Rubber Workers Local 87, Defendants.

No. C-1-76-426.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, W.D.

October 14, 1982.

George Lamore, pro se.

Sorrell Logothetis, Dayton, Ohio, for defendants.

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING UNITED RUBBER WORKERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TERMINATION ENTRY; FINAL JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED UPON DEFENDANTS' FILING A PROPERLY CERTIFIED COPY OF APPLICABLE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

RICE, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment (doc. # 72) which has been filed by Defendant United Rubber Workers Local 87 (Local 87), under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The history of this litigation is set forth in the Order and Remand filed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this matter (doc. # 61). The pertinent facts are as follows: Plaintiff was hired at the Inland Division of General Motors Corporation (Inland) in 1964, and soon joined Local 87. During 1971, he was suspended four times by Inland, but did not file a grievance in timely fashion following any of the suspensions. Plaintiff did attempt to file a grievance in March, 1972 based on the 1971 suspensions, but it was rejected as untimely. On October 5, 1972, Inland discharged Plaintiff for insubordination for overstaying a coffee break by 25 minutes and for refusing to sign a suspension notice. Plaintiff never filed a grievance thereafter concerning his discharge.

Plaintiff filed the present action on July 23, 1975, under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, alleging that Local 87 breached its duty of fair representation and that Inland breached the collective bargaining agreement. Local 87 moved for summary judgment, but Judge Timothy Hogan overruled the motion, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the Local's alleged failure to properly represent Plaintiff during his suspensions and after his discharge (doc. # 41). The Court rejected Plaintiff's allegation that he failed to file a grievance after his discharge because of his "depressed state of mind," id. at 7 n. 2, although it did find that other disputed facts might support a finding of futility. Id. at 6-7. However, after additional briefing, Judge Hogan reconsidered his previous ruling, and sustained Local 87's motion (doc. # 49), finding that, based on the record, it would not have been futile for Plaintiff to file a grievance regarding the suspensions or discharge. He ultimately dismissed the entire lawsuit (doc. # 54).

Plaintiff appealed that ruling to the Sixth Circuit, and, in an order dated May 28, 1981, a panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with the order. See, Lamore v. Inland Division of General Motors Corp., 659 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir.1981) (hereinafter Appellate Order).¹ In particular, the Order stated that:

Although the district court considered the futility issue after receiving special briefing, we believe that additional fact finding is warranted in this case. Lamore's case of meningitis may have affected him emotionally as well as leaving him physically incapacitated. Lamore's emotional difficulties, when coupled with the fact that he has prosecuted this action pro se, require a more fully-developed record than would normally be the case. Lamore should be given the opportunity to more fully develop his claim that it would have been futile for him to have filed a grievance because of the attitudes of union leaders to him.

The scope of the union's duty to this disabled member can only be determined by considering all the relevant facts surrounding his dismissal. These include evidence of the attitude of union leaders toward Lamore when they processed his prior grievances, and their knowledge of the events which resulted in his dismissal. This does not require the district court to predict what the union would have done had Lamore filed a grievance, but does require a finding of whether the union acted in bad faith, or indicated to Lamore that it would not adequately pursue his grievance.

The district court properly dismissed the action against Inland. The evidence of insubordination was good cause for Lamore's discharge.

Id. at 4-5.

On September 2, 1981, this case was transferred from the docket of Judge Hogan to the docket of this Court. (doc. # 63). Local 87, the remaining Defendant, thereupon moved for summary judgment (doc. # 72), based on the following grounds: (1) that following the remand, recovery against the union in a § 301 suit was impossible when no breach of contract could be proved; and (2) that the record before the Court, in any event, indicated that it would not have been futile for Plaintiff to file a grievance following his discharge.

It is true, of course, that a district court may not deviate from any specific issues ruled upon by an appellate court, pursuant to which a mandate has been issued. In re United States Steel, 479 F.2d 489, 493-94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859, 94 S.Ct. 71, 38 L.Ed.2d 110 (1973). However, the Court can reach issues left open by the mandate. Abell v. Anderson, 148 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 731, 66 S.Ct. 39, 90 L.Ed. 435 (1945). In the present case, the Court feels that the effect, if any, of the Sixth Circuit's dismissal of Inland as a party defendant has not been expressly or impliedly addressed by the Order and Mandate. For this reason, the Court asked the parties to further brief the point (doc. # 74). Local 87 filed an additional brief, and also raised therein the defense that the Plaintiff's action may be barred by the statute of limitations (doc. # 75). Plaintiff has not responded either to Local 87's most recent motion for summary judgment, or to the Court's request for further briefing.

Having carefully reviewed the issues of law presented by Local 87's renewed motion for summary judgment and those matters presented in Local 87's additional memorandum, the Court finds that the present action must be dismissed based on Plaintiff's failure to commence this action within the time limits set forth in Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2711.13. Accordingly, there will be no need for further development of the record herein by the parties, despite the mandate's directive of additional fact-finding on the issue of futility.

II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Congress did not enact a statute of limitations governing actions brought under § 301, and to determine the timeliness of such suits, a federal court must "apply the most analogous state statute" of limitations. Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir.1982) (Badon). See also, International Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1112-13, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966) (Hoosier Cardinal). In United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981) (Mitchell), the Supreme Court considered the issue of which statute of limitations might appropriately be selected in a § 301 action wherein the employee's grievance had been submitted to arbitration. Although the Court of Appeals in Mitchell had applied the state statute of limitations for actions involving a breach of contract, see, id. at 59, 101 S.Ct. 1562, the Supreme Court concluded that the suit involved was "more analogous to an action to vacate an arbitration award than to a straight contract action." Id. at 62, 101 S.Ct. at 1564. Because the employee in Mitchell was required to illustrate a breach of the union's duty of fair representation prior to reaching the merits of his contract claim, see, id., and because the unfair representation claim was considered by the Court to be "more a creature of `labor law' as it has developed since the enactment of § 301 than it is of general contract law," id. at 63, 101 S.Ct. at 1564, the Supreme Court applied the pertinent state statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards rather than the state statute of limitations for actions based on contracts. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and accepted the District Court's decision to bar Mitchell's action by virtue of the application of the ninety day limitations period contained in the New York State statute on vacation of arbitration awards. See, id. at 59, 64, 101 S.Ct. at 1562, 1564.

In Badon, 679 F.2d 93 (6th Cir.1982), the Sixth Circuit considered the potential application of Mitchell in an action involving a grievance which had not been submitted to arbitration, but which nonetheless had become "final through the operation of the collectively bargained-for private system of dispute resolution." Id. at 98. Despite the fact that unlike the grievance in Mitchell, Badon's claim had never been processed beyond the point of the original denial of his claim by the company, see, id. at 95, the Sixth Circuit concluded that it would apply the rule in Mitchell, which required selection of the state statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards, if such a statute existed.² Specifically, the Sixth Circuit stated:

Unlike Badon's complaint, Mitchell's grievance had been submitted to arbitration. We do not, however, feel that this difference distinguishes the underlying rationale of Mitchell. Where the parties have contracted to settle claims among themselves, their final decisions should not be exposed to collateral attack for long periods but should become final rather quickly.

Id. at 98. Based on this reasoning, the Court concluded:

Accordingly, where an employer's decision has become final through the operation of the collectively bargained for private system of dispute resolution, the rule of Mitchell applies and the state statute of limitations pertaining to vacation of arbitration awards will be utilized in subsequent federal court proceedings. This rule applies to Badon's

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