Lampley v. Big Discount Food Store, Inc.
| Decision Date | 24 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. C-86-148-WS. |
| Citation | 687 F. Supp. 211 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Dorothy Jean LAMPLEY, Plaintiff, v. BIG DISCOUNT FOOD STORE, INC., d/b/a Joe's Fine Foods and Joe's Shoprite, Defendant. |
Robert M. Elliot, Winston-Salem, N.C., for plaintiff.
William A. Blancato, Gray Robinson, Winston-Salem, N.C., for defendant.
At the trial of this case on April 11, 1988, Plaintiff pursued claims against the Defendant for alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act for failure to pay her for hours worked in a work week in excess of forty (40) at a rate not less than one and one-half (1½) times her regular rate, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), and for retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, as a result of her filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Fair Labor Standards Act claim was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict on the issues submitted as follows:
1. Did the Defendant fail to pay the Plaintiff overtime compensation as required by law?
YES ___________ (Yes or No)
(If "Yes," go to Issue No. 2; if "No," stop here and do not go on to any other issue.)
2. Was the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff the required overtime compensation a willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act?
YES ___________ (Yes or No)
3. What amount of damages, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled to recover?
$ 6,500.00 __________ (Amount)
Upon the finding by the jury that the Defendant failed to pay the Plaintiff the required overtime compensation, the court will award the Plaintiff liquidated damages in an amount equal to the jury verdict of $6,500.00. Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), an award of liquidated damages is mandatory unless the employer proves that he acted in good faith and with reasonable grounds for believing he was not in violation of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 260; Donovan v. Bel-Loc Diner, Inc., 780 F.2d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir.1985); Richard v. Marriott Corp., 549 F.2d 303, 305 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1977). Since the court finds that Defendant's president admitted he knew the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and also knew his pay arrangement with the Plaintiff was in violation of that Act, the court declines to reduce the liquidated damage award.
As the prevailing party, Plaintiff is also entitled to recover her reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Although pre-judgment interest was not prayed for in the Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff's counsel raised this issue during the trial. The court holds that pre-judgment interest is unnecessary in this case because liquidated damages "compensate employees for losses they might suffer by reason of not receiving their lawful wage at the time it was due." Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir.1982) (citing Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 86 L.Ed. 1682 1942).
Upon the discharge of the jury, the court permitted the parties to present any additional evidence that they considered relevant on Plaintiff's Title VII claim, which was tried to the court. Both parties presented additional evidence. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the exhibits, and the stipulations of the parties, and upon the court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, the court makes the following findings of fact.
1. Plaintiff is a forty-three-year-old female and was employed by the Defendant from 1980 until April 1985.
2. Defendant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of North Carolina with its principal place of business in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. During the time period pertinent to this action the Defendant was engaged in the retail grocery business and operated three stores in Winston-Salem. Joe W. Choplin is the president and primary shareholder of the Defendant corporation. The Defendant is an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
3. Until April 1985 Plaintiff was employed as the meat market manager at the Defendant's Bowen Boulevard store. Her rate of pay was $8.00 an hour. She earned approximately $16,000.00 a year for her straight-time work. On April 20, 1985, Keith Choplin, the store manager and son of Joe W. Choplin, Defendant's president, advised Plaintiff that she was going to be transferred to Defendant's South Main Street store to replace an employee who had taken a leave of absence. Plaintiff would work for the meat market manager at that store, Sam Van Hoy. Plaintiff was told to report on Monday, April 22, 1985.
4. Upon being advised of the transfer, Plaintiff became very upset, began crying, and took the afternoon off 5. Plaintiff reported as scheduled at the South Main Street store on April 22, telling the meat market manager, Sam Van Hoy, upon arrival that, "You don't like me and Bill Choplin don't and I won't be here long." During the morning her work performance and attitude were bad, and she was obviously upset. She did not return after lunch, and her husband called Van Hoy and told him that he had taken her to the doctor. Van Hoy told Joe Choplin of his experience with Plaintiff that morning.
6. Plaintiff went to the doctor on Monday afternoon, April 22, 1985, explained that she was upset about the transfer, and received medication. Her doctor wrote a note for her husband to take to the South Main Street store. Plaintiff's husband later called Joe Choplin and advised him that Plaintiff would be out for two weeks because of her anxiety and nerves.
7. At the beginning of Plaintiff's two-week absence, Defendant temporarily transferred a woman from its office to assist Van Hoy in the meat market.
8. On Wednesday, April 24, 1985, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that she had been demoted and transferred because of her sex and age. Joe Choplin received a copy of the charge in the mail from the EEOC three or four days later.
9. On Saturday, May 4, 1985, before Plaintiff was scheduled to return to work on May 6, she called Joe Choplin at work and told him that she wanted to talk to him. Choplin advised her that he was working at a produce sale in the Patterson Street store parking lot all day and that he could not talk to her then, but perhaps could talk to her in the late afternoon.
10. The Plaintiff drove to the store in the late afternoon and Choplin walked over to her car to talk to her. Plaintiff advised Choplin that she had heard from a neighbor that she no longer had a job. Choplin said that before she returned to work they were "going to have to have `a long word of prayer'" because other things had developed since she had been out sick; that they would have to have a "good understanding" before she went back to work. Plaintiff asked what he meant, and Choplin replied that he meant she went to the EEOC, that she had no right to go to the EEOC and file a complaint, and that she had no reason to do that. He said that since she had filed a complaint he was not going to put her back to work just because she was ready to go back. He said that he could not talk to her further that night because his family was waiting for him to come home to go to the races.
11. Choplin testified that he was upset when he received a copy of Plaintiff's EEOC complaint, and expressed his displeasure to others. He said that he thought her complaint to the EEOC "was a lie," and that if she pursued her claim "she was a liar, and I don't want a liar working for me."
12. After Plaintiff's discussion with Choplin in the parking lot on May 4, she had no further discussions with him and did not report to work on May 6. Plaintiff called Choplin two or three times on the telephone, but could not get him to come to the telephone. Based on Choplin's statements on Saturday, his failure to give her a time to report on Monday, and his failure to answer or return her calls, Plaintiff understood that she was discharged.
13. But for Plaintiff's filing of the EEOC charge, she would have been allowed to return to work as scheduled on May 6 without any restrictions. Choplin's actions on May 4 and his failure to meet with or talk to the Plaintiff, which was the minimum prerequisite for her return to work, were equivalent to a discharge.
14. Back pay is appropriate to restore the Plaintiff to the position she would have occupied were it not for the Defendant's unlawful discrimination. Reinstatement is also appropriate.
15. After May 6, 1985, Plaintiff sought other employment. She went to several grocery stores and meat markets seeking a position as a meat market manager, but was unsuccessful. She also went to the Employment Security Commission. She began drawing unemployment compensation in September 1985 for five or six months.
16. Plaintiff's only earnings during 1985 were the $5,788.00 she earned from the Defendant prior to her termination. Plaintiff was reasonably diligent in seeking equivalent work and was available for work during the remainder of that year. Plaintiff is entitled to back pay of $10,240.00 for 1985. (32 weeks at $320.00 per week $8.00 an hour for 40 hours).
17. Plaintiff's testimony concerning the times and places she sought work after May 6, 1985, was vague; she could not give any specific information about dates, places, and interviews. She did not apply at several large employers in her area, including Piedmont Airlines and Stroh's Brewery. Although she had worked as a cashier in her own meat market, and as a cashier for Joe Choplin in the 1970's, she did not apply for any cashier jobs.
18. During 1986 Plaintiff reported for tax purposes earning...
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