Lampley v. City of Harvey
| Decision Date | 06 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22 C 03761 |
| Parties | Tocorra Lampley, Plaintiff, v. City of Harvey, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Tocorra Lampley, as administrator of the estate of Sinica Price, brought an action against the City of Harvey (“the City”) alleging wrongful death and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to conduct by its police officers that allegedly led to Price's death. The City now files a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 11. For the following reasons, that motion is denied.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 555 (2007). This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).
On May 18, 2021, two young men confronted Price “near his home” in Harvey, Illinois, over his refusal to move his vehicle upon their request, telling him that they “ran” the “block.” Pl. Am. Compl., R. 1-2 ¶ 6. The next day, they ran into Price while he was out with his minor son. Id. ¶ 7. They called his son a “bitch” and told Price that they had “switches on their guns,” which is an apparent reference to illegal aftermarket switches that convert semiautomatic handguns to fully automatic machine guns. Id. Later that day, they again encountered Price and shot at him multiple times but missed. Id. ¶ 8. Price reported the incidents and described the offenders to the Harvey Police Department (“HPD”). Id. ¶ 9. Based on his description, the HPD were able to identify the offenders and apprehended them several hours later. Id. ¶¶ 1011. The HPD drove the offenders to Price's home, called him, and asked him to come outside. Id. ¶ 12. Price exited and was “stunned to learn” that the HPD brought the offenders to his home instead of arranging for a line-up at the police station or asking Price to identify them in a photo array. Id. ¶¶ 12, 13. In the offenders' presence, the officers asked Price to positively identify them. Id. According to the Amended Complaint, because of this “show up” procedure, the offenders learned where Price lived and that he was a cooperator with the HPD against them. Id. ¶ 14. Despite Price's positive identification of the offenders, the HPD released them from custody. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. On June 6, 2021, the offenders returned to Price's home, where they shot and killed him. Id. ¶ 19. This was confirmed by shell casings which matched those from the prior shooting. Id. ¶ 20. The Amended Complaint does not allege whether the offenders were ever charged with Price's murder.
On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed this case in the Circuit Court of Cook County against the City, alleging wrongful death and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See R. 1-1. The City removed it to this Court. See R. 1. The Amended Complaint principally alleges that bringing suspects accused of violent crime to a victim's home for identification is a “gross departure from generally accepted policing practices and evinces a deliberate indifference to the victim's safety,” and “created a danger to Mr. Price that would not exist absent the HPD officers' conduct.” Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. The City filed the instant motion to dismiss each count in the Amended Complaint. R. 11.
Count I is a wrongful death claim based on the HPD's allegedly willful and wanton conduct in “transport[ing] violent offenders to Mr. Price's home without his permission,” “violat[ing] generally-accepted police practices,” and “revealing to violent offenders the home address of the victim and that the victim was cooperating with the police.” Id. ¶ 26. As to this claim, the City argues that it is immune from liability under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (“the Act”). It alternatively contends that it cannot have acted willfully or wantonly because a show up is a generally accepted police practice and because the City was not executing or enforcing any law at the time of Price's death. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
Under Section 2-202 of the Act, public entities in Illinois are immune from liability with the exception of “willful and wanton conduct” arising out of executing or enforcing the law. 745 ILCS 10/2-202. But state actors enjoy absolute immunity pursuant to Section 4-102 of the Act for failing to:
provide police protection service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes, failure to detect or solve crimes, and failure to identify or apprehend criminals.
745 ILCS 10/4-102. Similarly, § 4-107 of the Act completely immunizes public entities from claims related to “injur[ies] caused by the failure to make an arrest or by releasing a person from custody.” 745 ILCS 10/4-107. The absolute immunity conferred by §§ 4-102 and 107 is unaffected by § 2-202 because these sections do not explicitly contain an exception for willful and wanton conduct. DeSmet v. Cnty. of Rock Island, 219 Ill.2d 497, 515 (2006).
Illinois courts have “applied section 4-102 to immunize police officers from civil suit where they are performing some function other than traditional law enforcement.” Agwomoh v. Vill. of Dolton, 2022 IL App (1st) 210892, ¶ 56. The Illinois Supreme Court has thus outlined the confines of § 4-102 immunity to include “weapons detection, traffic control, and crowd security and control.” Doe v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 213 Ill.2d 19, 26 (2004); see also Regalado v. City of Chicago, 40 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1999). But where a claim involves officers “responding to a call that a crime may have just been committed, or . . . investigating a crime . . ., making an arrest or issuing a citation, or quelling a public breach of peace,” § 4-102's blanket immunity does not apply. Love v. City of Chicago, 363 F.Supp.3d 867, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (quoting Est. of McIntosh v. City of Chicago, No. 15 C 1920, 2015 WL 5164080, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2015)). Put simply, “[s]ection 4-102 immunity may apply in the context where police officers are simply ‘providing [or failing to provide] police services,' but section 2-202 immunity requires more particular circumstances for its application, i.e., an act or a course of conduct ‘in the execution or enforcement' of law.” Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill.2d 273, 282 (1991).[1] “Generally, the question of whether a police officer is executing and enforcing the law under section 2-202, rather than providing police protection or service under section 4-102, is a factual determination which must be made in light of the circumstances involved.” Payne v. City of Chicago, 16 N.E.3d 110, 119 (Ill.App.Ct. 2014) (citing Pouk v. Vill. of Romeoville, 405 Ill.App.3d 194, 197 (2010)). A court may decide this question as a matter of law only “when the facts alleged support only one conclusion.” Payne, 16 N.E.3d at 119.
The City argues that it is totally immunized from liability under §§ 4-102 and 107 of the Act. Plaintiff, however, asserts that her allegations are not encompassed by those provisions. According to the Amended Complaint, the HPD responded to a crime-the shots fired at Price by two young men. The HPD then acted to execute and enforce the law by arresting the offenders based on Price's description of them. While conducting its investigation of the crime, the HPD took the acts which are the subject of Plaintiff's allegations, namely, transporting the offenders to Price's home for an in-person show up. Taking the facts as alleged, the HPD's conduct was associated with “responding to a call that a crime may have just been committed, . . . investigating a crime . . ., [and] making an arrest,” or in other words, the enforcement of the law under § 2-202, and not the failure to provide adequate police protection services under § 4-102. Love, 363 F.Supp.3d at 874.
Though the “police protection services” immunized under § 4-102 include crime prevention, see Regalado 40 F.Supp.2d at 1017, Plaintiff does not allege that the HPD was willful and wanton in failing to prevent Price's murder, failing to solve a crime, failing to offer police protection, or failing to arrest the offenders. Nor does she allege that the HPD wrongfully released the offenders from custody. Rather, the crux of her allegations is that the HPD was willful...
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