Lampman v. Ternus
| Decision Date | 11 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. C10-3025-MWB,C10-3025-MWB |
| Parties | AMY LAMPMAN, AMY LUTGEN, JACKIE THOMPSON SCHAFFNER, JESSICA SAVITS, KIMBERLY KURTH, JODI VANDERHEIDEN, and SUSAN HANAN, Plaintiffs, v. MARSHA K. TERNUS, DAVID K. BOYD, LINDA A. NILGES, SCOTT S. HAND, LEESA A. MCNEIL, KENT v. WIRTH, ELIZABETH J. BALDWIN, CARROLL EDMONDSON, HOWARD THOMAS, and DEBORAH M. DICE, all in their individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE
IOWA SUPREME COURT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
This litigation raises unresolved questions of Iowa law. Specifically, who has authority to discharge or permanently reduce the work hours of court reporters working in the Iowa District Courts, and whether such actions, when taken as part of a reduction in force caused by state budgetary constraints, constitutes "good cause" under Iowa law for the employment actions. Neither of these first impression questions of Iowa law is presently before me for resolution. Instead, defendants' Motion to Certify Questions to the Iowa Supreme Court requires me to determine whether these issues should be resolved by myself, or the Iowa Supreme Court.
On December 7, 2010, plaintiffs, court reporters who are or were employed by the State of Iowa, filed an Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they were terminated or had their hours reduced in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On June 30, 2011, defendants, the former Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, the Iowa State Court Administrator, and the Court Administrators for each of the eight Iowa judicial districts, filed their Motion to Certify Questions (docket no. 26). Defendants request certification of the following questions to the Iowa Supreme Court:
Defendants' Mot. at 2. Defendants assert that I should grant their motion because the questions they seek to certify are unresolved and the Iowa Supreme Court should be permitted to decide such questions of first impression concerning Iowa law. Plaintiffs resisted the motion on July 22, 2011. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Iowa courts have not addressed the issues raised here, but argue the statutes in question are unambiguous and I do not need the assistance of the Iowa Supreme Court in interpreting them. Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion on July 29, 2011.
Both Iowa law and this court's Local Rules permit me, on the motion of a party or sua sponte, to certify a question of state law to the Iowa Supreme Court. Iowa's certification statute provides:
The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by the supreme court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States, a United States district court or the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of another state, when requested by the certifying court, if there are involved in a proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the appellate courts of this state.
IOWA CODE § 684A.1. Local Rule 83 of the Northern District of Iowa provides:
When a question of state law may be determinative of a cause pending in this court and it appears there may be no controlling precedent in the decisions of the appellate courts of the state, any party may file a motion to certify the question to the highest appellate court of the state. The court may, on such motion or on its own motion, certify the question to the appropriate state court.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that:
Certification procedure . . . allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State's highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative response.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997); see Lehman Bros. v. Shein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (). Thus, "[t]aking advantage of certification made available by a State may 'greatly simplif[y]' an ultimate adjudication in federal court." Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976)).whether a federal district court should certify a question of state law to the state's highest court is a matter "committed to the discretion of the district court." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 881-82 (8th Cir. 1996); Schein, 416 U.S. at 391 (); see Babinski v. American Family Ins. Group, 569 F.3d 349, 353 (8th Cir. 2009) () (quoting Johnson v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also Anderson v. Hess Corp. , 649 F.3d 891, 891 (8th Cir. 2011); Jung v. General Cas. Co., 651 F.3d 796, 796 (8th Cir. 2011); Packett v. Stenberg, 969 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1992).
I previously articulated the following factors to be considered in determining whether to certify a question to a state's highest court:
(1) the extent to which the legal issue under consideration has been left unsettled by the state courts; (2) the availability of legal resources which would aid the court in coming to a conclusion on the legal issue; (3) the court's familiarity with the pertinent state law; (4) the time demands on the court's docket and the docket of the state supreme court; (5) the frequency that the legal issue in question is likely to recur; and (6) the age of the current litigation and the possible prejudice to the litigants which may result from certification.
Leiberkneckt v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. , 980 F. Supp. 300, 310 (N.D. Iowa 1997); accord Erickson-Puttmann v. Gill, 212 F. Supp.2d 960, 975 n. 6 (N.D. Iowa 2002); see Olympus Alum. Prod. v. Kehm Enters., Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 1295, 1309 n.10 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (citing Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 866 F. Supp. 1221, 1225 & n. 5 (N.D. Iowa 1994)). In Leiberkneckt, I also considered a seventh factor; "whether there is any split of authority among those jurisdictions that have considered the issues presentedin similar or analogous circumstances." Leiberkneckt, 980 F. Supp. at 311. I will address each of these factors seriatim.
The initial certification factor considers whether the issue is "unsettled" by state courts. See Leiberkneckt, 980 F. Supp. at 310; see also Erickson-Puttmann, 212 F. Supp.2d at 975 n.6; Olympus Alum. Prod., 930 F. Supp. at 1309 n.10. Here, there is no dispute between the parties that the issues are unsettled. Rather, the parties dispute the complexity of the legal questions, and which court should be called upon to answer them.
Plaintiffs allege defendants terminated their employment or permanently reduced their hours, as court reporters. Plaintiffs assert these employment actions violated their right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants contend plaintiffs' due process rights were not violated because the employment actions taken against them were on orders of the Iowa Supreme Court as a result of severe budget deficits.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee applies only to public employees who have a "property interest" in the terms or conditions of their employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997). "'A person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her employment to have a property interest in it.'" Mulvenon v. Greenwood, 643 F.3d 653, 657 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 20 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 1994). "Typically, this interest arises from contractual or statutory limitations on the employer's ability toterminate an employee." Winegar, 20 F.3d at 899 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976)). "Whether the employee had a legitimate claim of entitlement—and thus, a constitutionally protected property interest—depends on state law and the terms of his employment." Mulvenon, 643 F.3d at 657 (citing Kozisek v. Cnty. of Seward, Neb., 539 F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir. 2008)); see Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344 (...
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