LaMunion v. State

Decision Date19 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. 25A04-0006-CR-227.,25A04-0006-CR-227.
PartiesRyan LaMUNION, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

James Korpal, South Bend, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Grant H. Carlton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BROOK, Judge

Case Summary

Appellant-defendant Ryan LaMunion ("LaMunion") appeals his convictions of possession of cocaine,1 a Class D felony, possession of a schedule II controlled substance,2 a Class D felony, and possession of marijuana,3 a Class A misdemeanor. We reverse.4

Issue

LaMunion presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search conducted after the premises were secured.

Facts and Procedural History

On January 2, 1999, at approximately midnight, five individuals broke into the trailer home occupied by LaMunion and his girlfriend. Some of the intruders beat LaMunion while others pushed his girlfriend onto a couch and searched the trailer for drugs to steal. Eventually, LaMunion struggled free, grabbed a rifle, and fired a shot. The bullet struck and killed William Schmidt ("Schmidt"), one of the intruders. At that point, the other intruders fled.

Having no phone, LaMunion and his girlfriend asked a neighbor to call 911. Fulton County Police Officer Walker Conley, who arrived at 12:50 a.m., was the first to respond to the call. Thereafter, other state and county police responded, and LaMunion was taken to a hospital. Around 1:00 or 1:30 a.m., a deputy, who was going to transport LaMunion's girlfriend to the sheriff's department, was asked to obtain a search warrant for LaMunion's trailer.

Having not yet received any response regarding the effort to obtain a warrant by 3:30 a.m., the officers began searching the trailer. During the search, Indiana State Police Trooper Rick Grisel ("Grisel") lifted a mattress in LaMunion's bedroom and found a compact case beneath it. Thinking the compact might be drug paraphernalia, Grisel opened it and found a white residue on its mirror. The residue was later determined to be cocaine and methamphetamine. During the same search, marijuana was found in a silverware drawer in the kitchen. Although the search continued until around 5:00 a.m., a judge did not sign the search warrant until 4:57 a.m. Later that morning, LaMunion and his girlfriend gave their consent to search the trailer. However, the police did not enter the trailer again.

The State charged LaMunion with voluntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, possession of cocaine, possession of a schedule II controlled substance, and possession of marijuana. LaMunion filed and the trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence of the compact case. A jury found LaMunion guilty of the three possession counts, but acquitted him of the other counts. We heard oral argument of LaMunion's appeal on November 16, 2000, in South Bend, Indiana.

Discussion and Decision

LaMunion admits that the police were justified when, upon their arrival, they secured the crime scene by briefly looking for victims and perpetrators and collecting any evidence in plain view. However, he claims that the extensive warrantless search, which began around 3:30 a.m. and uncovered the compact case, violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches. LaMunion further asserts that the facts of his case do not fall into any of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule.5

The State first6 counters that the police were responding "to a 9-1-1 call LaMunion placed himself," thus implying that he consented to the search. The State next contends that the warrantless search was proper as part of the overall crime scene investigation. On a related note, the State asserts that exigent circumstances existed. Finally, the State claims that the timing of the signature did not make the warrant invalid or the search illegal because "probable cause existed and the judge or magistrate intended to issue the warrant."

The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Johnson v. State, 710 N.E.2d 925, 927 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. Our federal and state constitutions prohibit warrantless entry into a person's home for the purpose of arrest or search. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IND.CONST. art. 1, § 11.7 There are, however, certain narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)

.

One of the established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search conducted pursuant to consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)

; see also Harper v. State, 474 N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ind.1985). "When the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the State demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied." State v. Jorgensen, 526 N.E.2d 1004, 1005 (Ind.Ct.App.1988). Whether valid consent was given is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances existing at the time of the search. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49,

93 S.Ct. 2041.

Here, neither LaMunion nor his girlfriend "manifest[ed] by word or deed [their] consent to the search" before it was performed. See Jorgensen, 526 N.E.2d at 1007

. They clearly did not assist in the search, as neither was even present. LaMunion had been taken to the hospital, and his girlfriend had been taken to the police station. They did not inquire about the search's progress. They did ask their neighbor to call 911. However, this can hardly be acquiescence, let alone consent, to a full search of their home. See Jorgensen, 526 N.E.2d at 1006-08.

The State cites, and we find, no authority for what it terms the "overall crime scene investigation" exception to the warrant requirement. We can only assume the State is referring to the exigent circumstances exception. Police officers may enter a home without a warrant to aid a person in need of assistance. See Stewart v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Ind. 1997)

. Further, "when the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). "The need to preserve or protect life justifies what would otherwise be illegal if exigency or emergency did not exist." Green v. State, 575 N.E.2d 296, 299 (Ind.Ct.App.1991),

trans. denied. Officers have an interest in assuring themselves that the home is "not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). Hence, law enforcement officers may make a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found to secure the crime scene and ensure their safety. Id. Furthermore, police officers may seize any evidence that is found in plain view during their protective sweep. Id.

In the instant case, the police received a call that LaMunion had shot one of several intruders who had broken into his home looking for drugs to steal. When the various officers arrived between 12:50 a.m. and 1:30 a.m. at LaMunion's home, they quickly took control of the situation. The body was located; a protective sweep was performed; LaMunion was sent to the hospital; his girlfriend was taken to the station; a deputy was sent to obtain a warrant; and a couple of officers waited at the home for the warrant. The procurement of any evidence found in plain view during the initial cursory protective search of the crime scene did not violate LaMunion's Fourth Amendment rights despite the lack of a warrant. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392,

98 S.Ct. 2408; Buie, 494 U.S. at 333,

110 S.Ct. 1093. However, by 3:30 a.m., when the extensive warrantless search was started, LaMunion's home had been secure for a long period of time. Accordingly, that same securing-the-crime-scene/exigent circumstances rationale did not justify that search. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393,

98 S.Ct. 2408 (noting that "a warrantless search must be `strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation' ") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984) (holding that although seizure of evidence found in plain view during the limited "victim-or-suspect" search would have been appropriate, the "victim-or-suspect" search had been completed at the time investigators arrived, and therefore evidence obtained during warrantless search was inadmissible).8

In support of its argument that the timing of the signature of the warrant did not make the search illegal because probable cause existed and the judge intended to issue the warrant, the State cites Cutter v. State, 646 N.E.2d 704, 712 (Ind. Ct.App.1995),trans. denied, and State v. Smith, 562 N.E.2d 428, 429 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990). We distinguish both cases. In Cutter, the police sought and obtained a telephonic search warrant. 646 N.E.2d at 707-09. After the warrant was served and the search conducted, it was discovered that the testifying officer had not signed the transcript and that the issuing judge had not certified the tape. Id. at 709. The oversights were later corrected, and we concluded that no reversible error occurred. Id. at 707-13. In Smith, a judge held a hearing, determined there was probable cause,...

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