Lancashire v. Garford Manufacturing Company
| Decision Date | 29 April 1918 |
| Citation | 203 S.W. 668,199 Mo.App. 418 |
| Parties | SARAH H. LANCASHIRE, Appellant, v. THE GARFORD MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Respondent |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court.--Hon. Thomas B. Buckner, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Judgment affirmed.
Lathrop Morrow, Fox & Moore for appellant.
Kennish & Smith and O. M. Edmondson for respondent.
This is a suit for rent. The judgment and verdict was against plaintiff and she has appealed.
The evidence shows that plaintiff was the owner of premises located at 1708-10 Walnut Street, Kansas City, Missouri. These premises consisted of a two-story brick building. On the lower floor were two storerooms and the entire upper floor was made up of rooms rented out for boarding house or hotel purposes. On August 13, 1914, plaintiff by written lease demised to defendant one of the storerooms for a period of two years from April 1, 1914. The rooms on the second floor were vacant when defendant moved into the premises about April 1, 1914, and remained vacant until December of that year when they were rented by plaintiff's agent to a Mrs. Anna Murphy, a woman of bad reputation for chastity. About March 1, 1915, Mrs. Murphy telephoned plaintiff's agent that she had sold out to a Mrs. Clara Davis, another woman who was a notorious prostitute.
Without going into the evidence in detail it is sufficient to state that it shows without any doubt that the place was conducted by the Murphy and Davis women as a house of prostitution and under the management of the latter it became a notorious bawdyhouse where thieves resorted. The evidence shows that the boisterous conduct of the inmates of the upstairs rooms was such as to be heard by the employees of the defendant; that there was an electric piano almost continually in operation; that women would shout down the rear stairway soliciting men from the alley; that automobiles and taxicabs stopped in front of defendant's place of business at all times of the day and night and men and women in a drunken condition were taken therefrom to the upstairs and that almost daily beer by the case was delivered through the back stairway. At one time the place was raided by the police. The upstairs had many windows on all sides and the storeroom occupied by the defendant likewise had large windows and openings. Defendant had several men employees and two or three young ladies.
Defendant complained to plaintiff's agent of the tenants upstairs in the spring of 1915 and the agent promised that if conditions continued he would see that the upstairs tenants were put out. These were tenants from month to month. In April or May, 1915, defendant's manager testified that "they had apparently had a hilarious time upstairs, and had allowed water to run, and flooded our storeroom, and a large piece of the ceiling fell." Thereupon defendant's manager called up plaintiff's agent and described what had taken place and told him that the defendant could not stand the conditions any longer and that they would have to be changed. During this conversation defendant's manager explained to plaintiff's agent the character of the place being conducted upstairs. Plaintiff's agent did nothing to remedy the evil but instead he stated that he thought defendant's manager must be mistaken; that he had never heard any adverse reports; that he thought everything would be all right.
About the middle of July a woman rushed downstairs into defendant's office clad in a Kimona only, called up the police, and with a long oath stated to the police that some "fellow" was trying to shoot her. The oath used involved the mother of the person who was trying to do the shooting and was uttered in the presence of two young lady stenographers employed by defendant. The next day defendant's manager called up plaintiff's agent and told him about this last incident and said, "This is the last; we cannot stand it any longer and will simply have to move out." He told plaintiff's agent that he would come down to see him, which he did the next day. At this last interview with plaintiff's agent the agent told defendant's manager that he (the agent) had to be very careful about preferring charges against a tenant, saying that he had had an experience of that kind once and that it cost him a lawsuit and that he had trouble in proving his statement. However, he told defendant's manager that he had mailed a notice the day before notifying the Davis woman to vacate on or before September 1, 1915. Defendant immediately vacated the premises, defendant's manager giving as the reason therefor that he had no assurance that plaintiff's agent would be able to get the Davis woman out on account of plaintiff's agent expressing doubts about the matter, as detailed above.
Plaintiff's contention is that there was no eviction of defendant from the premises and that defendant, having voluntarily moved, is responsible for the rent for the balance of the term. The general rule as to what constitutes eviction, under circumstances such as those presented in this case, is stated in 11 Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 471 (2 Ed.), and approved by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Delmar Investment Co. v. Blumenfield, 118 Mo.App. 308, 318, 94 S.W. 823, as follows:
That an eviction is not necessarily an actual, forcible taking possession of the demised premises by the landlord but may be established by showing an intentional or injurious...
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