Lancaster v. Adams
| Decision Date | 26 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-2498.,01-2498. |
| Citation | 324 F.3d 423 |
| Parties | Burt LANCASTER, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Stanley ADAMS, Warden, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Kenneth M. Mogill (argued and briefed), Mogill, Posner & Cohen, Lake Orion, MI, for Petitioner-Appellee.
Brad H. Beaver (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Habeas Corpus Division, Lansing, MI, for Respondent-Appellant.
Before: COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge.*
Respondent-Appellant Stanley Adams appeals the district court's order conditionally granting a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on behalf of Petitioner-Appellee Burt R. Lancaster. On appeal, Respondent argues that the district court erred in concluding that the decisions of the Michigan state courts were contrary to and unreasonable applications of United States Supreme Court precedent as set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) and Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). Although Petitioner has not cross-appealed and the district court did not issue a certificate of appealability, in his brief Petitioner argues that the decisions of the Michigan state courts were contrary to or unreasonable applications of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) and other cases — an issue that the district court found to have been procedurally defaulted. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Petitioner was charged in Michigan state court with violating Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated § 750.316, first-degree premeditated murder, and Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated § 750.227, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The charges arose out of an April 23, 1993 incident in which Petitioner shot and killed his girlfriend, Toni King, in the parking lot of a Southfield, Michigan shopping plaza. At trial, Petitioner did not dispute that he had killed King, but raised insanity and diminished capacity defenses and argued that the murder was not premeditated. A jury convicted Petitioner of both charges. Petitioner was sentenced to serve life in prison without parole for the murder conviction to be followed by a sentence of an additional two years imprisonment for the firearms conviction.
On June 23, 1998, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence in an unpublished per curiam decision. See People v. Lancaster, No. 184033, 1998 WL 1991149 (Mich.Ct.App. June 23, 1998). On February 25, 1999, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals in a brief order. See People v. Lancaster, No. 112594, 459 Mich. 951, 616 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. Feb. 25, 1999).
On February 8, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the "Petition") in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Petition requested relief upon six grounds, including the two that are the subject of this appeal: (1) whether the decisions of the Michigan state courts finding that Petitioner had not satisfied his burden of proving that the prosecutor purposefully discriminated in exercising his peremptory challenges was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent as set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) and its progeny; and (2) whether the Michigan state appellate court's decision that Petitioner was not denied his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law when the prosecutor elicited testimony that he had remained silent during custodial questioning on the advice of counsel was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent as set forth in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) and other cases.
In a September 25, 2001 decision, the district court conditionally granted the Petition, finding Petitioner's Batson claim meritorious. The district court concluded that Petitioner's Doyle claim had been procedurally defaulted and denied his other claims. Respondent now appeals the district court's decision and concomitant judgment granting Petitioner relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the Batson claim. As mentioned above, though Petitioner seeks to inject the Doyle claim into this appeal, he has neither lodged a cross-appeal nor obtained a certificate of appealability from the district court on this issue. The district court stayed the grant of the writ of habeas corpus pending this appeal.
This Court reviews a district court's decision to grant habeas corpus relief de novo. Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir.1999). We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. Id.; Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1999).
Because the Petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), our review of the decisions of the state trial and appellate courts is governed by AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 323, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (); Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir.1999).
In AEDPA, Congress provided that:
An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or an involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States....
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory standard for reviewing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In particular, the Court explained that a state court decision is "contrary to" the Supreme Court's precedent "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law" or "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the result reached by the Supreme Court]." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 2002).
A state court decision may be an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... case" or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Williams, 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see Lewis, 307 F.3d at 418 (discussing standard).
In reviewing Petitioner's Batson claim, which presents a mixed question of law and fact, our review necessarily focuses on the reasonableness of the decisions of the state courts — that is, whether those decisions constituted an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 327 (6th Cir.1997) (). We are mindful, however, that the question of "[w]hether a prosecutor intended to discriminate on the basis of race in challenging potential jurors is, as Batson recognized, a question of historical fact." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 367, 111 S.Ct. 1859. Under AEDPA, "[p]rimary or historical facts found by state courts are `presumed correct and are rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence.'" Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 736 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 413 (6th Cir.1999)); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ( ).1
On November 7, 1994, the Michigan trial court conducted jury selection for Petitioner's trial. After one African-American, Michael Hurd, was selected and another African-American, Alvin Mitchell, was excused for cause, the following colloquy took place between the trial court and another potential juror, Jackie Bowden, who is also African-American.
The Court: Thank you. With regard to Mr. Bowden. How are you today, sir?
Juror Bowden: All right.
The Court: Where do you work, sir?
Juror Bowden: I drive a semi-truck for a flea market.
The Court: For?
Juror Bowden: A western flea market.
Juror Bowden: It was like a motel.
The Court: Okay. Now, are you familiar with the scene of the alleged crime?
Juror Bowden: Um, yes.
The Court: Okay. Do you know any of the individuals here?
Juror Bowden: Um, no.
The Court: Can you be fair. [sic]
Juror Bowden: Yea, I can be fair.
The Court: Would you want you as a juror?
Juror Bowden: Um, I think so.
The Court: That's an underwhelming response. We'll delve into that. Can you be fair?
Juror Bowden:...
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