Lancaster v. City of L.A.

• Decision Date: 18 December 2019
• Docket Number: B288383
• Parties: WALTER LANCASTER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

WALTER LANCASTER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

B288383

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE

December 18, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC597828)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard Fruin, Judge. Affirmed.

Walter Lancaster, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Blithe S. Bock, Assistant City Attorney, and Matthew A. Scherb, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiff and appellant Walter Lancaster (Lancaster) appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained without leave to amend defendant City of Los Angeles's (City's) demurrer to his second amended complaint. We consider whether Lancaster alleged facts demonstrating or excusing timely compliance with statutes that require presenting a claim for damages to City officials before filing a lawsuit.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The City Impounds Lancaster's Automobile

The facts set out in this section of our opinion are those alleged in Lancaster's operative complaint. (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 156-157.)

In August 2013, while Lancaster sat in his Dodge Caravan using his laptop computer, uniformed officers from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) approached him. He was asked to exit his vehicle and he was placed in handcuffs.

As police officers searched Lancaster's vehicle, they "dishevel[ed]" the vehicle's interior and "destroyed," among other things, the material lining of the interior's ceiling. The officers issued Lancaster a citation for having an expired registration and impounded his vehicle.

Two days later, a City hearing officer issued a written determination that the City had "No Probable Cause" for impounding Lancaster's vehicle. Eventually, Lancaster received a refund check for the full amount of the impound fees.

B. Lancaster Sues the City

Five months after his Caravan was impounded, Lancaster filed a claim for damages with the County of Los Angeles(County)—not the City—using a pre-printed County claim form. The County denied the claim.¹

Later, more than two years after his car was impounded, Lancaster sued the County, the LAPD, and one of its officers—but not the City—for monetary, emotional, and psychological harm he purportedly suffered when his vehicle was impounded. Lancaster subsequently dismissed the County from the lawsuit and named the City as a defendant.

The City demurred to what, at the time, was Lancaster's first amended complaint, arguing all of Lancaster's claims were barred by his failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act (the Act). As the City explained, the Act "requires the timely presentation of a written claim for money or damages directly to a public entity, and the rejection of that claim, as a condition precedent to a tort action against . . . the public entity."

In opposing the City's demurrer, Lancaster cited a provision of the Act now codified at Government Code section 905.1 to argue he was not required to present a pre-lawsuit claim for damages to the City. In relevant part, that statute provides: "No claim is required to be filed to maintain an action against a public entity for taking of, or damage to, private property pursuant to Section 19 of Article I of the CaliforniaConstitution."² The trial court sustained the City's demurrer and, although Lancaster had not requested it, granted leave to amend the first amended complaint.

In a subsequently filed second amended complaint (the operative complaint), Lancaster asserted 10 causes of action: conspiracy, trespass, conversion, fraud-deceit, duress, undue influence, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He sought $2.5 million in compensatory damages plus unspecified punitive damages.

Regarding compliance with the Act, the operative complaint averred Lancaster submitted a pre-lawsuit claim for damages to the County and attached a copy of that claim as an exhibit. The operative complaint did not allege, however, that Lancaster had ever presented a pre-lawsuit claim for damages to the City. Instead, drawing on and quoting from Government Code section 905.1, Lancaster asserted he was not required to present such a claim because the damage to his vehicle qualified as a taking of, or damage to, private property under the aforementioned constitutional eminent domain provision.³

The City demurred to the operative complaint, arguing as it had in its previous demurrer that all of Lancaster's claims were barred by Lancaster's failure to present a pre-lawsuit claim for damages to the City as required by the Act. As before, Lancaster responded by arguing no timely presentation of an administrative claim for damages was required because the causes of action asserted against the City fell within the scope of section 905.1's exemption for eminent domain and inverse condemnation cases. Lancaster's opposition to the City's demurrer did not request further leave to amend the operative complaint and did not identify any facts he could allege to avoid dismissal of his claims for failure to comply with the Act's claim presentation requirements.

At a hearing in August 2017, the trial court found "[Lancaster] fail[ed] to allege compliance with the pre-lawsuit requirements" of the Act.⁴ On that basis (and other legal grounds we need not discuss), the court sustained the City's demurrer without leave to amend. A judgment of dismissal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Lancaster maintains, as he did in the trial court, that he was under no obligation whatsoever to timely present an administrative damages claim to the City for the damageallegedly done to his vehicle when it was impounded. Lancaster is wrong about that. The Act does require presentation of such a damages claim and Government Code section 905.1, which provides an exception to claim presentation requirements for eminent domain or inverse condemnation challenges, has no application to the causes of action brought by Lancaster in his operative complaint. Because Lancaster has not alleged facts showing he complied with the Act or was excused from complying, the trial court correctly sustained the City's demurrer to the operative complaint. Lancaster made no showing of how he could amend his pleading to cure the defect in the trial court or in this court, so we shall affirm the judgment of dismissal.⁵

A. Standard of Review

"In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory." (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 162.) "If the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we consider whether there is a 'reasonable possibility' that the defectin the complaint could be cured by amendment. (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742 [ ].) The burden is on plaintiff[ ] to prove that amendment could cure the defect. (Ibid.)" (King v. CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1050.)

B. Tort Claim Presentation Requirements

"[Government Code s]ection 905 requires the presentation of 'all claims for money or damages against local public entities'" to the responsible public entity before a lawsuit is filed. (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 737-738.) The term "local public entity" includes a city. (Gov. Code, § 900.4; Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 374.) A claim relating to a cause of action for personal injury or injury to property, i.e., the sort of claims Lancaster advances in the operative complaint, must be presented to the local public entity "not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action." (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).)

Under the Act, "failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity." (State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239, fn. omitted (Bodde); accord, Gov. Code, § 945.4; see also City of Stockton v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 738 ["'It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity's actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim'"].) "'[T]he filing of a claim for damages "is more than a procedural requirement, it is a condition precedent to plaintiff's maintaining an action against defendant, in short, an integral part of plaintiff's cause of action."'" (Bodde, supra, at p. 1240.) "[F]ailure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliancewith the claim presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action." (Id. at p. 1239, fn. omitted.)

C. The Trial Court Correctly Sustained the Demurrer

The operative complaint does not allege Lancaster ever presented a pre-lawsuit claim for damages to the City, much less presented one within the applicable statutory deadlines. Instead, the operative complaint, Lancaster's opposition to the City's demurrer, and Lancaster's appellate briefing only assert he need not comply with the claim presentation statutes because such compliance is not required under Government Code section 905.1 for causes of action concerning eminent domain or inverse condemnation. That argument fails.

Our Supreme Court has held article I, section 19 of the state Constitution (Section 19) applies only in the realm of eminent domain—that is, where the government physically takes or damages...