Lancaster v. Smith

• Citation: 262 S.W. 74
• Decision Date: 14 May 1924
• Docket Number: (No. 502-3919.)
• Parties: LANCASTER et al. v. SMITH et ux.
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

262 S.W. 74

LANCASTER et al. v. SMITH et ux.

(No. 502-3919.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

May 14, 1924.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Eighth Supreme Judicial District.

Action by H. L. Smith and wife against J. L. Lancaster and others, receivers. Judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals (244 S. W. 1076), and defendants bring error. Affirmed.

R. E. Huff and J. T. Montgomery, both of Wichita Falls, for plaintiffs in error.

P. B. Cox and Chas. W. Keirsey, both of Wichita Falls, for defendants in error.

GERMAN, P. J.

The judgment in this case was in favor of defendants in error for the sum of $2,300, the value of a trunk and contents. The shipment was from Fort Worth, Tex., to El Paso, Tex., under a ticket purchased February 18, 1921, over the Texas & Pacific Railway. This is one of the railroads that was under federal control during the period of federal administration. During the period of federal control the Director General of Railroads promulgated certain rates, rules and regulations, including rule 10 of the Western Passenger Bureau Baggage tariff No 25-2. Under and by authority of this rule liability for the loss of the trunk and contents here in question was limited to $120; it being found that no excess value was declared and no additional charges for excess value paid. We have held in the case of Pearl McConnell v. John Barton Payne, Agent, 262 S. W. 72, which has been under consideration with this case, that during the period of federal control the rates, rules, and regulations of the United States Railroad Administration superseded all other rates and regulations as to intrastate shipments as well as to interstate, and that article 708 of our Revised Statutes, which provides that no common carrier shall limit or restrict its liability as at common law, was suspended for the time being by the paramount authority of the federal regulations. Federal control of the railroads ended February 29, 1920. We are called upon in this case to determine the effect of section 208 (a) of the Transportation Act of 1920 (U. S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10071¼d), and answer whether or not in view of that act, the provisions of article 708 of our statutes remained suspended after the termination of federal control, and were so suspended at the time of the transaction in question, to wit, February 18, 1921.

The section of the Transportation Act referred to is as follows:

"All rates, fares, and charges, and all classifications, regulations, and practices, in anywise changing, affecting, or determining, any part or the aggregate of rates, fares, or charges, or the value of the service rendered, which on February 29, 1920, are in effect on the lines of carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, shall continue in force and effect until thereafter changed by state or federal authority, respectively, or pursuant to authority of law; but prior to September 1, 1920, no such rate, fare, or charge shall be reduced, and no such classification, regulation, or practice shall be changed in such manner as to reduce any such rate, fare, or charge, unless such reduction or change is approved by the Commission."

It goes without question that without the foregoing enactment by Congress, or a similar one, all state laws and regulations which had been suspended by federal control would have automatically taken effect at the end of the suspension; that is, at the termination of the federal control. Tua v. Carriere, 117 U. S. 201, 6 Sup. Ct. 565, 29 L. Ed. 855. The intention of Congress that such automatic reversion should not occur, as to rates and charges not fixed by statute, is manifest. It has been held by very eminent authorities that Congress had the constitutional power to enact this statute, making it applicable to intrastate matters, and the...