Lancaster v. State
| Decision Date | 28 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-235.,00-235. |
| Citation | 43 P.3d 80,2002 WY 45 |
| Parties | James LANCASTER, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender, and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, Representing Appellant.
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] James Norman Lancaster appeals his convictions for the first-degree premeditated murder of Dana Penn and the attempted first-degree premeditated murder of Monte Hanson. Finding harmless error in the trial court's admission into evidence of a videotaped re-enactment of the crimes, finding either no error or harmless error in the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and finding that defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress evidence, we affirm.
[¶ 2] Three issues are presented in this appeal:
The State of Wyoming phrases the issues in substantially the same manner.
[¶ 3] In May 1999, James Lancaster (the appellant) and Monte Hanson (Hanson) lived in separate apartments in the Star Apartments in Casper. Hanson's friend, Dana Penn (Penn), often visited Hanson. On May 16, 1999, Hanson and Penn spent the day drinking beer at Hanson's apartment. At about 10:00 p.m., the appellant invited Hanson and Penn to his apartment to drink whiskey.
[¶ 4] Upon arriving at the appellant's apartment, the trio began drinking double shots of whiskey while watching television and talking. Hanson and Penn were in the appellant's apartment for thirty minutes to an hour. As they talked, Hanson and the appellant sat on the couch; Penn sat on the floor. At some point, the appellant showed Hanson and Penn two knives, one "a big knife, real big knife" and one "a littler knife... like a Bowie knife, maybe," according to Hanson. Penn eventually fell asleep or passed out on the floor.1
[¶ 5] Hanson and the appellant, both of whom testified at trial, told vastly different stories as to how the evening's events came to an end. Hanson testified that he decided it was time to leave, so he tried to awaken Penn. Suddenly, and with no provocation, the appellant stabbed Hanson and cut his throat. The two then battled throughout the apartment, with Hanson trying to escape and the appellant continuing to stab him. During a lull in the attack, as Hanson hid behind a door, he feared that the appellant had "gone after" Penn. Hanson then ventured back toward the living room, only to encounter the appellant holding a rifle.2 Hanson testified that the appellant began shooting at him, hitting him once in the neck. Hanson grabbed the gun, and as they wrestled over it, Hanson was able to pull the trigger until the gun was empty. The appellant then disappeared and Hanson escaped to the landlord's apartment, where the police were called.
[¶ 6] The appellant's version of these events differed significantly from Hanson's. The appellant testified that, as he and Hanson talked on the couch and Penn slept on the floor, Hanson asked to see the appellant's rifle and inquired about purchasing it. The appellant retrieved the loaded rifle from its accustomed location in the bedroom closet. Not being comfortable handing a loaded rifle to anyone, the appellant commenced to unload it the only way he knew how—by pulling the bolt back "until bullets jump out of it." As he did so, Hanson grabbed the barrel without warning, and the gun fired. The two then began fighting for the rifle, with the appellant's hands on the stock, Hanson pulling the trigger, and the rifle firing. The appellant then grabbed a knife and "cut" Hanson to get him to release the rifle. When the rifle was empty, Hanson let go of it. The appellant then fled the apartment, but only after stopping to reload the rifle, which he took with him.
[¶ 7] Police officers responding to the Star Apartments found Penn lying dead on the appellant's living room floor. An autopsy determined that Penn bled to death from twelve stab wounds to the upper body and a gunshot wound to the head, the gunshot wound occurring after the stab wounds.
[¶ 8] On May 24, 1999, Hanson accompanied police officers to the Star Apartments, where a videotape was made of his actions and statements during a re-enactment of the crimes. The videotape, which is approximately eighteen minutes in length, shows Hanson moving about in the appellant's apartment, alternatively making statements and answering the officers' questions. At the beginning of the videotape, Hanson removes his shirt, the result being that his considerable knife and bullet wounds are visible throughout the taping.
[¶ 9] Prior to trial, the appellant filed a Motion to Exclude Evidence directed in part to this videotape.3 The motion alleged that the videotaped statement was hearsay and that its introduction into evidence would violate W.R.E. 801(c).4 The motion was set for hearing on May 3, 2000. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that the videotape would not be offered as evidence by the State "absent rehabilitation or a prior consistent statement...."
[¶ 10] Hanson testified at trial and was cross-examined by defense counsel. At the end of redirect examination, the State offered the videotape into evidence and asked that it be played for the jury. Defense counsel objected. After hearing arguments on the objection, and after viewing the videotape, the trial court overruled the appellant's objection and allowed the videotape to be played for the jury. At defense counsel's request, the trial court then gave the following limiting instruction:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the videotape statement of Mr. Hanson, which you just viewed, is offered to you and should be considered by you only for the limited purposes of evaluating the credibility of the declarant, Mr. Hanson. It should not be considered by you for any other purpose, and I'm specifically instructing you that it should not be considered directly as proof of the matters asserted within that tape.
[¶ 11] The standard for reviewing a trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence is well known. Such decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Story v. State, 2001 WY 3, ¶ 9, 15 P.3d 1066, 1068 (Wyo.2001); Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889, 892 (Wyo.2000). Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo.1999)).
[¶ 12] A trial court's evidentiary rulings "`are entitled to considerable deference,'" and will not be reversed on appeal so long as "`there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling....'" Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S.Ct. 1620, 149 L.Ed.2d 483 (2001) (quoting Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Wyo.1997)). The appellant bears the burden of proving an abuse of discretion. Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 11 (Wyo.2000); Trujillo, 2 P.3d at 571 (quoting Solis, 981 P.2d at 36). Even where a trial objection has been made to the admission of evidence, error cannot be found unless "a substantial right of the party is affected...." W.R.E. 103(a)(1). These general rules apply to rulings on the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo.2001); Robinson, 11 P.3d at 367.
[¶ 13] Hearsay is inadmissible under W.R.E. 802, "except as provided by these rules...." In that regard, the Wyoming Rules of Evidence provide two types of exceptions whereby statements that might otherwise be excluded as hearsay may be admitted into evidence. First, W.R.E. 801(d) declares that certain prior statements by witnesses and certain admissions by a party opponent are "not hearsay." Second, W.R.E. 803 and 804 contain lists of "[h]earsay exceptions." W.R.E. 801(d) statements are admissible because they are "defined out" of the hearsay definition. W.R.E. 803 and 804 statements are admissible because, though they are hearsay, they have sufficient "guarantees of trustworthiness...." See W.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(6).
[¶ 14] In the instant case, we are concerned with W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), which reads as follows:
[¶ 15] The focus of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) is the use of a prior consistent statement as rehabilitation of a witness whose credibility has been impeached in the particular manner described in the rule. Because of the limited purpose for which the statement may be offered, the party contesting admission of the statement is entitled to a...
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