Lancaster v. The Sec'y of Navy
| Decision Date | 30 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:19cv95 (RCY) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | ALLEN L. LANCASTER[1], Plaintiff, v. THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, et al., Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (ECF No. 48). The Motion has been fully briefed, and the Court dispenses with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court, and oral argument would not aid in the decisional process. E.D Va. Loc. Civ. R. 7(J). For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the Motion.
Taking as true the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint (Am. Compl., ECF No. 29), the Court will recount the lengthy procedural and factual background surrounding the claims of the plaintiff, Allen L. Lancaster (“Plaintiff' or “Lancaster”), against defendants The Secretary of the Navy, The Chief of Naval Personnel, and The Navy Chief of Chaplains (“Defendants”).
This action stems from three federal cases that were consolidated by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (“D.C. District Court”) in 2007 into In re Navy Chaplaincy. 323 F.Supp.3d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2018). Lancaster attempted to join an earlier stage of this litigation in 2002, but he was rejected by the court. (Am. Compl. at 3.) He was able to join this litigation in 2006. (Id.)
The plaintiffs of In re Navy Chaplaincy, including Lancaster, had been members of the Navy Chaplain Corps and were responsible for performing religious services and providing service members with counseling and ethics instructions. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 323 F.Supp.3d at 29. While these plaintiffs were in the Navy, the Navy divided its Chaplain Corps into four subgroups: (1) Roman Catholics; (2) Liturgical Protestants[2]; (3) Non-liturgical Protestants, and (4) Special Worship. (Am. Compl. at 2 n.2.) The plaintiffs in In re Navy Chaplaincy were Non-liturgical Navy Chaplains whose “primary claim [was] that, until 2002, the Navy maintained an unconstitutional policy of placing at least one Roman Catholic chaplain on every selection board, which resulted in Catholic chaplains being promoted at a disproportionately high rate compared to other religious groups.” In re Navy Chaplaincy, 323 F.Supp.3d at 29. Plaintiffs in this action also challenged “a host of other allegedly unconstitutional selection-board policies and procedures” and “challenge[d] a statute that privileges selection-board deliberations from disclosure in litigation.” Id.
On August 30, 2018, the D.C. District Court granted summary judgment to the Navy on the Chaplaincy plaintiffs' constitutional and systemic claims regarding the Navy's staffing and procedure of chaplain selection boards. Id. On November 8, 2018, the D.C. District Court severed the Chaplaincy plaintiffs who had fact specific “ad hoc” claims that still remained after summary judgment. (Am. Compl. at 5; Op. & Order, ECF No. 26 at 2.) The individual chaplains who were severed were allowed to refile “in any appropriate venue.” (Id.)
Twenty-seven plaintiffs, including Lancaster, then filed their Complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia on March 1, 2019. (ECFNo. 1.) Defendants filed a Motion to Transfer Venue on April 24, 2019, arguing that the plaintiffs had not properly obeyed the D.C. District Court and were attempting to bring their In re Navy Chaplaincy claims again, only this time in the Eastern District of Virginia. (ECF No. 9; ECF No. 10 at 6-7.) On September 13, 2019, Judge Henry Coke Morgan, Jr. granted the Motion to Transfer Venue as to twenty-five of the twenty-seven plaintiffs, transferring the twenty-five back to D.C. District Court. (Op. & Order at 10.) Only Lancaster and one other plaintiff, Barby Wilson (“Wilson”), were allowed to proceed in the Eastern District of Virginia. (Id.) Lancaster was ordered to file an amended complaint that contained allegations pertinent only to him, and Wilson was ordered to file a new action containing allegations pertinent only to him. (Order, ECF No. 28.) Both plaintiffs did so. (Am. Compl.; see Compl., Wilson v. The Secretary of the Navy, et al., No. 2:19cv515 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2019), ECF No. 1.) This action was reassigned to the undersigned on November 24, 2020.
In the Amended Complaint, Lancaster states that he was a Navy Chaplain for twenty-one years. (Am. Compl. at 6.) He was endorsed by the Associated Gospel Churches, an evangelical, Non-liturgical faith group. (Id.) He retired as a Commander after multiple “failures of selection”[3](“FOS”) to Captain. (Id.) If he had been selected for promotion to Captain, he would have been able to retire later. (Id. at 1-2.) Lancaster asserts that “personal hostility and denominational prejudice result[ed] in his unlawful FOS.” (Id. at 7.) He argues that his case “represents a prime example of the Navy's unconstitutional retaliation, hostility and prejudice towards its Non-liturgical chaplains.” (Id.)
“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). Dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) are generally disfavored by the courts because of their res judicata effect. FayettevilleInvs. v. Com. Builders, Inc., 936F.2d 1462, 1471 (4th Cir. 1991). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require that a complaint set forth “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While the complaint's “[f] actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” “detailed factual allegations” are not required in order to satisfy the pleading requirement of Federal Rule 8(a)(2). Id. (citations omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff swell-pleaded allegations are assumed to be true, and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952.
Res judicata encompasses two interrelated doctrines: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). “Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses ‘successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.'” Id. (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)). Issue preclusion, on the other hand, “bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Id. These two res judicata doctrines “protect against ‘the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.'” Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 15354 (1979)).
Res judicata is an affirmative defense that “may be raised under Rule 12(b)(6) ‘only if it clearly appears on the face of the complaint.'” Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.l (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993)). “To establish a res judicata defense, a party must establish: ‘(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits.'” Jones v. S.E.C., 115 F.3d 1173, 1178 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir. 1991)).
In Count One, Plaintiff argues that he suffered from “illegal retaliation” while a Navy chaplain. (Am. Compl. at 17.) In support of this claim, Plaintiff asserts that he received an excellent fitness report in July 1995 that was purposefully kept out of his file, which may have affected his ability to be promoted. (Id. at 15, 18.) Plaintiff also argues that many other factors affected his failure of selection, including “the historic animosity of Liturgical versus Non-liturgical theologies, ” the “hatred” and “animosity” of leadership towards Non-liturgical chaplains, a “pattern of abusive conduct and retaliation based on religious and racial prejudice, ” and the “unconstitutional” selection board procedures. (Id. at 18-20.)
Plaintiffs retaliation claim fails. To begin, Plaintiff almost entirely relies on generalized allegations against Navy policies and procedures, and not non-conclusory factual allegations about the Plaintiffs own experiences. This Court's September 25, 2019, Order instructed Lancaster to file an Amended Complaint that asserted individualized allegations. (Order at 1.) Instead, Plaintiff largely tries to relitigate the constitutional issues previously decided in In re Navy Chaplaincy and argues, inter alia, that the challenged procedures are “unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments.” (Am. Compl. at 20.)
These broad constitutional claims are barred by claim preclusion. Alth...
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