Land Dept. v. O'Toole
| Decision Date | 14 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | CA-SA |
| Citation | 154 Ariz. 43,739 P.2d 1360 |
| Parties | LAND DEPARTMENT, and Robert K. Lane, Land Commissioner, State of Arizona, Petitioners, v. The Honorable Thomas W. O'TOOLE, Judge of the Superior Court, Maricopa County, Respondent Judge, MARICOPA COUNTY; Flood Control District of Maricopa County; City of Tempe; Tanner Companies; Tanner Land Company, Inc.; Calmat Company of Arizona; Thomas M. Valente and Frances K. Valente, Real Parties in Interest. 1059. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This matter arises from a December 1985 Arizona Republic article in which Robert K. Lane, Land Commissioner, and Governor Bruce Babbitt were quoted as saying that Arizona may own, and may assert its right to, riverbeds which were navigable on February 14, 1912, when Arizona became a state. The federal Equal Footing Doctrine grants each state property rights to the riverbeds of all its waterways which were navigable on the date of statehood.
Before the article appeared, Arizona apparently had never asserted a claim of title to the Salt River bed or to any other river or stream bed in Maricopa County based on a claim of navigability at statehood. Indeed, since statehood Arizona has uniformly taxed the property of riparian landowners as if they held clear title to the waterway beds.
Maricopa County, an owner and purchaser of riverbed lands in Maricopa County, filed a declaratory judgment suit in superior court against the State, the Land Department, and Land Commissioner Lane (collectively referred to as the State) seeking a declaration whether the State owns any of the beds. 1
The Maricopa County Flood Control District (the District) and the City of Tempe (Tempe) intervened as plaintiffs. Johnson-Stewart-Johnson Mining Company and other landowners on the Agua Fria River in Maricopa County (collectively Johnson) also intervened as plaintiffs suing the State to quiet title, pursuant to the quiet title act, A.R.S. §§ 12-1101 through -1104. In accordance with § 12-1103(C), the Attorney General determined the Agua Fria River was not navigable at statehood and disclaimed any state interest. The parties stipulated to Johnson's dismissal from the action.
Before its dismissal, Johnson's motion to compel joinder of all Maricopa County riverbed landowners, claiming they were indispensable parties, was denied by the trial court. Rule 19(a), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. The court then sua sponte ordered a realignment of the parties, with the State redesignated as plaintiff. The state was ordered to pursue the case as a class action against the "defendant" class, consisting of the former plaintiffs. All plaintiffs were redesignated as defendants who would "represent the non-state property owner class." The parties were ordered to meet and discuss the class action aspects of the case. The most important problem was the large cost of notice to an enormous number of class members. After briefing on cost of notice to the defendant class, the court decided that the State should bear that cost. The State filed a motion for reconsideration of the sua sponte realignment order, which the court denied.
The State then moved for reconsideration of the court's order regarding notice costs. The Land Commissioner, by affidavit, informed the court that the State had not made any claims to riverbeds in Maricopa County because the threshold question of navigability had not been determined and no funding had been provided by the legislature for navigability studies or title searches. The commissioner estimated that the studies would cost at least $200,000, that the potential class would number in the tens of thousands, and that notice would cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.
The trial court denied the State's motion for reconsideration and ordered the State to give immediate notice to certain class members and to submit a report by December 1, 1986, explaining the scope of the State's claims to riverbeds.
Thereafter, Tanner Companies, Tanner Land Company, Calmat Company and the Valentes (Tanner) intervened as defendants in the realigned proceedings. The State unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the "complaints" by the County, the District and Tempe.
The State has no right of appeal from the order denying a motion to dismiss, from the court's sua sponte creating a class and realigning parties, or from ordering it to pay class notice costs. Thus, special action review is the only immediate remedy available.
We conclude that the court's rulings were "without precedent or support in the law and [cannot] be justified." King v. Superior Court, 138 Ariz. 147, 150, 673 P.2d 787, 790 (1983). This case concerns a potential cloud on the title of many parcels of land. The State claims that hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars' worth of land in Arizona's most populous county are at issue. Adjudicating the matter expediently is in the public's best interest, and we therefore accept review of this case.
This special action involves several issues. The one which we find dispositive is whether the quiet title act is the exclusive remedy in a quiet title action against the State. We so hold and remand with leave for claimants to amend their complaint. Therefore, we do not address the issues of whether the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in sua sponte creating a class action or whether it abused its discretion in realigning the parties.
The Equal Footing Doctrine, as enacted, grants to each state, upon statehood, title to the beds of all navigable streams within its borders. 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1983); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 27 S.Ct. 655, 51 L.Ed. 956 (1907). See also Pollard v Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845); Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 443 P.2d 421 (1968).
In Pollard the court noted that those states established after the original 13 were given ownership of navigable river beds flowing within their boundaries so as to be on an "equal footing" with the original states which had already been granted ownership of their navigable riverbeds. The doctrine of state ownership was also discussed in Morgan:
The doctrine is well established that one of the incidents of sovereignty is control of navigable waters and ownership of land thereunder.... On the formation of each new state, it becomes the owner of the land underlying its navigable waters....
103 Ariz. at 427, 443 P.2d at 423, quoting III R.G. Patton, American Law of Property § 12.27(b) at 248-49.
Arizona has numerous rivers. The best known, the Colorado River, is navigable. Morgan, 103 Ariz. at 427, 443 P.2d at 423. See also Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 51 S.Ct. 522, 75 L.Ed. 1154 (1931). Counsel have not cited, and we cannot find, a case determining the navigability and ownership of any other river. Until recently the State has not claimed any riverbed lands other than those along the Colorado. In 1985, the State claimed ownership of the Verde River near Cottonwood in Yavapai County because it was navigable at statehood. State of Arizona v. Valley Concrete and Materials, No. 45245 (Yavapai County Superior Court, filed April 26, 1985). The State's claim in that case generated speculation that the State may also claim other riverbeds based on their navigability. Title companies now put an exclusion as to possible State claims in title policies covering riverbed lands.
Aside from the state's § 12-1103(C) disclaimer of title to the Agua Fria riverbed, the State has not made any determination or claim as to navigability of streams in Maricopa County. 2 However, the State acknowledges that a cloud remains on the title to riverbed lands.
The legislature has specifically created the quiet title act for a landowner to dispel that cloud. Ariz. Const. art. 4, § 18, part 2, provides: "The Legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the State." Several portions of the quiet title act deal specifically with procedures to follow when the State is involved. For example, one section deals with service of a complaint against the State, while another section requires the complaint to specify any claim the State may have against a plaintiff. Other sections exempt the State from paying the adverse parties' costs and attorneys' fees in specific cases, and allow the State to disclaim any interest in specific property. 3
This statutory scheme demonstrates that the legislature has provided a specific procedure to remove a cloud on real property by quieting title against the State. The trial court, in denying the State's motion to dismiss, held that jurisdiction also lies under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-1831 through -1846. The State argues that the trial court erred because the quiet title act should be the exclusive remedy available to a private landowner in this situation. We agree and grant the State relief on that basis.
The existence of another remedy does not always preclude declaratory relief, but declaratory judgment jurisdiction will not ordinarily be entertained...
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