Land v. Dollar In re Killion (two cases). Sawyer et al. v. Dollar et al. , — 8212

• Decision Date: 04 June 1951
• Docket Number: 702,697,Nos. 353,s. 353
• Citation: 341 U.S. 737,95 L.Ed. 1331,71 S.Ct. 987
• Parties: LAND et al. v. DOLLAR et al. (two cases). In re KILLION (two cases). SAWYER et al. v. DOLLAR et al. , —- and —-
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

341 U.S. 737

71 S.Ct. 987

95 L.Ed. 1331

LAND et al.

v DOLLAR et al. (two cases).

In re KILLION (two cases).

SAWYER et al.

v. DOLLAR et al.

Nos. 353, 697, 702, —- and —-.

Decided June 4, 1951.

PER CURIAM.

(1) Nos. 697 and 702 are before the Court of petitions for certiorari to review, first, an order of the District Court for the District of Columbia requiring that Charles Sawyer endorse certain stock certificates as 'United States Maritime Commission, by Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce,' and, second, a Restraining Order issued by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enjoining named petitioners from:

'proposing, seeking or advocating any step in any proceeding, whether in said suit entitled United States v. R. Stanley Dollar et al., or in any other proceeding, inconsistent with strict compliance with and obedience to the orders heretofore entered by this Court in this cause.

'And it is further ordered that said persons are and each of them is enjoined and restrained until further order of this Court from complying with, taking advantage of, or utilizing, or seeking to comply with, utilize or take advantage of said temporary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, in said cause entitled United States v. R. Stanley Dollar et al., or any order of similar tenor which may hereafter be entered by said court or any other court.'

The two orders are before the Court for the first time in Nos. 697 and 702. Certiorari is granted in these cases.

(2) Subsequent to the issuance of the above Restraining Order, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found named petitioners to be in civil contempt of its prior decrees by reason of, inter alia, their activities in connection with obtaining the temporary injunction on behalf of the United States in its suit in the Northern District of California, referred to in the Restraining Order. The order of contempt has been stayed pending disposition of Nos. 697 and 702 as well as the forthcoming petitions for certiorari directed to the contempt order. Motion of respondents to vacate the stay is denied.

(3) No action is taken at this time on petitioners' motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of our denial of certiorari in No. 353. 340 U.S. 884, 71 S.Ct. 198. The motion is continued on the docket so that there may be no question as to this Court's control over No. 353 for whatever action may be deemed appropriate.

(4) It has been suggested that this Court delay the normal ending of the October Term, 1950, and hear argument within a matter of weeks. No motion for advancement has been filed.

We agree that expeditious disposition of the important issues in this lengthy proceeding is highly desirable. But our desire for expedition must be weighed against the danger to orderly presentation of important issues inherent in hasty briefing and argument. And this is particularly so when it is suggested that we hear argument not only in Nos. 697 and 702 now before us, but also in the cases to come to us from the order of civil contempt in which petitions for certiorari are to be filed.

There is a further consideration militating against premature disposition of the issues presented. There is now pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California an action brought by the United States for adjudication of its claim of title in the same shares of stock as those involved in the instant cases. We have heretofore held that judgments entered in the instant cases would not be res judicata against the United States. Land v. Dollar, 1947, 330 U.S. 731, 736, 737, 739, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 1011, 1012, 1013, 91 L.Ed. 1209. Appeals have been taken from the temporary injunction issued in that suit on behalf of the United States and with which much of the present phase of this litigation is concerned. We are advised that on May 31, 1951, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard argument on a motion to stay the temporary injunction pending appeal from the order granting the temporary injunction and has taken that motion under advisement. On June 1, 1951, the District Court for the Northern District of California began its hearing on defendants' (respondents in this Court) motion to dismiss the complaint and for summary judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, we do not accept the suggestion that hearing argument in a matter of weeks is compatible with the orderly administration of justice.

Certiorari granted, motion to vacate stay denied, motion for leave to file continued, and suggestion that ending of term be delayed rejected.

Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of these applications.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER does not join in this opinion.

LAND

v.

DOLLAR

No. 697.

Separate memorandum of Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER.

It is not practicable, as a rule, for reasons indicated in my memorandum in State of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 70 S.Ct. 252, to set forth the considerations that move the Court in granting or denying a petition for certiorari. And since an unexplained announcement of an individual vote on such action is too often apt to be equivocal, it has been my unbroken practice not to note my vote on the disposition of such petitions. However, the petition now before the Court is the latest stage in a long process. In different phases it has been here three times. Because our action may be misleading, unless viewed in its setting, a plain narrative of the course of this litigation in its bearing on this petition is, I believe, desirable.

1. What is ultimately in issue is the ownership of the Dollar Steamship Lines. As a result of transactions between the Lines and the United States Maritime Commission, which we need not here relate, 92% of the stock of the corporation was in 1945 listed in the name of the Maritime Commission and voted by the members of that body. On November 6 of that year, the former Dollar stockholders (hereafter called the Dollars) brought suit against the members of the Commission, alleging that the stock was unlawfully withheld and demanding its return. The action was brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and for four and one-half years wound its way through the Court of Appeals to this Court, back to the District Court, and once again to the Court of Appeals. 81 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 154 F.2d 307; 330 U.S. 731, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209; D.C., 82 F.Supp. 919; 87 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 184 F.2d 245. At every stage, the Commissioners were represented by attorneys from the Department of Justice, who asserted as ground for dismissal that the action was a suit against the United States to which consent had not been given. Our decision, 330 U.S. 731, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209, held that if the allegations of the complaint were true, the action was not against the United States, but rather against the Commissioners in their individual capacities. The District Court decided on the merits that the facts were not as they had been alleged. 82 F.Supp. 919. But on July 17, 1950, the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the stock of the corporation was unlawfully withheld by the members of the Commission, and that, since title to it had never vested in the United States, the suit was not against the sovereign. 87 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 184 F.2d 245. We refused to review this decision. 340 U.S. 884, 71 S.Ct. 198. Later, we refused to reconsider our refusal. 340 U.S. 948, 71 S.Ct. 530.

2. The upshot of the litigation at this point was that the Dollars had obtained a final judgment that the members of the United States Maritime Commission were unlawfully withholding the stock of the corporation, and that, as against the Commissioners, the Dollars were entitled to it. To carry out the judgment the District Court entered an order on mandate on December 11, 1950. That order stated in part that 'title to the shares in question is in the plaintiffs (Dollars), since they were never legally divested of the same, and the asserted title of all others arising out of the same transaction to the contrary (is) null and void * * *.' 97 F.Supp. 59.

3. The members of the Maritime Commission took an appeal from this order. They urged that it was too broad, in that it purported to bind, not only the individual members of the Commission, but also the United States. The Court of Appeals remanded the cause with instructions to enter a narrower order, the terms of which it prescribed. The substance of those terms is as follows: '(P) laintiffs (Dollars) are entitled to possession of the shares as against defendants, and the defendants are ordered and directed to deliver forthwith to the plaintiffs the said shares. The possession to which plaintiffs are entitled is an effective possession of the shares. In so far as such right requires action on the part of defendants in addition to physical delivery of the certificates, such action is hereby directed to be taken. Plaintiffs are entitled under this judgment to all rights belonging to possessors of the shares.' 188 F.2d 629, 631.

In further explanation of its order the Court stated: 'The District Court is directed to enforce obedience to its order, as herein modified, whether effective process is against the present named defendants or is against another official, or other officials, against whom the order might be lawfully enforced if he or they were a party or parties to the suit.

'If the Secretary of Commerce now has custody or possession of the shares, he obviously acquired such custody or possession since the beginning of this action, indeed since the order of June 11, 1947 (prohibiting transfer of the stock pendente lite). Obedience to the order about to be entered pursuant to this opinion is, therefore, enforceable against him, and he is liable, under Rule 71 (Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. 28 U.S.C.A.), supra, to the same ...